The political transformations witnessed by the countries of the Arab armed conflicts are inseparable from the change in the demographic composition of the communities living in these countries, during the past nine years, where evictions have emerged from their regions, relocated to other cities and towns and resettled to hold other loyalties different from their indigenous peoples. This is reflected in a number of indicators, namely the resettlement of pro-militia elements in the capital, the targeting of the majority of the population affected by the prolongation of the conflict, and the fear of the displaced people to return to their areas of origin after being liberated from the control of terrorist organizations. The efforts of terrorist organizations and criminal gangs, geographic expansion and serve economic interests, and strengthen the influence of regional non-Arab powers.
Although changes in population growth have occurred in the pre-armed conflict in the Arab countries, they have taken a different post-conflict post-revolutions in 2011, and left a clear mark in 2019, as follows:
Militia settlement
1. Settling pro-militia elements in the capital
The Houthi rebel movement is making a demographic change, including the resettlement of its members from Sa'ada, Amran and Hajjah, in Sana'a, where it transported large numbers of its fighters and supervisors with their families to the capital and deployed them in all districts and districts after it was confined to the “northern regions”. Provision of financial provisions for the payment of rents due. The rebel group is trying to bring as many followers as possible to ensure that it has a population to defend against any attempts of popular uprising against its coup.
Therefore, Yemeni official sources and government newspapers reported on October 1 that a Houthi leaders are scrambling to buy land and rent apartments in the capital without paying attention to the money they are paying. Excessive and disproportionate to the value of the local currency (riyal), especially in the light of the interruption of their salaries and not paid regularly, as well as the inability of low-income to live in Sana'a as a result of the high cost of living.
According to these sources, the leader of the Houthi militia and the director of the so-called Presidential Office, Ahmed Hamed, known as Abu Mahfouz, approved a monthly budget of about Rls 1 billion and Rls 800 million (about $ 550 riyals) to pay rents for supporters of the militia along the outskirts of the capital The so-called “Mujahideen Housing Department” has been directly supervised since 2016. Land, buildings, houses and villas for Houthi leaders close to Abdul Malik al-Houthi are also purchased. There is a tendency for "Hawthna" society in parallel with the "Hawthna" state agencies in Yemen.
Empty areas
2. Target the majority of the population affected by conflict
Many literature suggests that Syria's demographic change is targeting the majority of the population most affected by the conflict for nearly nine years.The Syrian regime is aware that its Alawite base is still a minority despite the high migration rates among Sunnis, which explains its interest in tightening control. On the Christian, Alawite, Druze and Ismaili areas, or the so-called “beneficial Syria”, especially in light of the exodus of these religious and national minorities from opposition-held areas and armed militias to areas controlled by the regime, which is part of the strategy of “emptying vital areas” and along the road. The link between the capital and the coasts of the revolutionary basins with a predominantly Sunni manner contributes to achieve a balance in his favor.
The regime and its forces have used political, military, intelligence and economic mechanisms to increase the forced displacement, including intensifying aerial bombardment of these targeted areas with the aim of destroying the elements of life through the implementation of so-called «spatial or terrorist cleansing», and restricting the movement of population and the arrest of shabeeha for young people under claims As for Daria, Moadamiyeh, the old neighborhoods of Homs, Zabadani, Madaya and other displaced areas, there has been a decrease in the population not at the time of the siege but in times of siege. After the siege or the severity of the blockade.
This has also been done through the change of ownership and reconstruction or the application of the new Urban Planning Law in Syria (Law No. 10), which would lead to the forced eviction of citizens who are unable to prove their ownership, and transfer ownership of these areas to new arrivals. This law constitutes a threat to the demographic composition. In Syria, in addition to the evacuation agreements, which are a demographic negotiation process between the representatives of the regime and the local armed opposition under the mediation of the United Nations, resulting in the restoration of order to the areas controlled by the opposition in addition to the displacement of civilians and fighters, leading to the liquidation of civilians. Areas of anti-Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, conducting demographic change enhances the security of the system and the repositioning of its allies in any future arrangements for Syria.
Obsession return
3. Fear of the displaced people to return to their areas of origin after liberation from the control of terrorist organizations, as is the case in some areas inside Iraq, for example, after the removal of elements belonging to the organization «Daesh». But the return is governed by two concerns. First, the Kurds have destroyed Arab villages in areas controlled by IS in Nineveh province. The second is not to exclude the possibility of the return of the group to Iraq again, in the belief that there is a set of ingredients that can help him to achieve that goal, led by the ability to infiltrate from a soft border through Syria to Iraq, and the ease of obtaining weapons to the group inside Iraq There are also many sleeper cells whose role is not only to support and finance, but also to carry out terrorist attacks and subversive operations. There is a major demographic transition in Iraq after the liberation of areas from ISIS control, making it difficult for the Sunni population to return home because of fear for their lives.
Shadow Networks
4. The efforts of terrorist organizations and criminal gangs to expand geographies and serve economic interests. This applies to the roles played by the Chadian opposition led by Mohamed Hakimi in cooperation with the armed militias in southern Libya, where they exploited their family extension by the Tabu tribe to carry out repeated attacks in Libya's Murzuq, located south of the country. Western Libya, in an attempt to displace the indigenous people, and bring expatriates from Chad, especially as the city has one of the most important oil basins and estimated recoverable reserves of more than five billion barrels. The opposition needs financial resources to finance its attacks on the Chadian government.The Libyan National Army (LNA) forces, led by Field Marshal Khalifa Hifter, managed to remove these elements from the border with the help of the French Air Force, which explains why the meeting between Hifter and Chadian President Idriss Deby in October 2018 , To strengthen the axes of cooperation in the fight against outlaw elements, especially as the southern Libyan region has become the focus of cooperation between terrorist organizations and African gangs, especially Chad with the scarcity of population and lack of security.
Sectarian fingerprints
5. Strengthening the influence of non-Arab regional powers
Iran is moving on the Syrian arena to change the demographic situation, grant Syrian citizenship to Iranians and Lebanese, especially members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and increase the presence of Shiite families in some areas of the capital and downtown Homs through the purchase of shops and land at high prices, in addition to the efforts of the Iranian Embassy to buy real estate In historic neighborhoods of old Damascus in the area that stretches from the Umayyad Mosque to Bab Touma, as well as buying plots of land in the Shrine of Sayyida Zeinab area west of the capital, which Hezbollah militias have fortified, and Shiite families inhabited al-Laban Intention since 2012.
This is also aimed at strengthening Hezbollah's strongholds in northern Lebanon and its influence on Israel's northern border, as Syria is Iran's main strategic ally and has a key role in supporting the group. On the other hand, the commander of the «Quds Force» of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Qassem Soleimani, in an interview with the Supreme Leader of the Republic Ali Khamenei, and published on October 1, that «the main objective of the July 2006 war was not to eliminate Hezbollah, It is an end to the Shiite presence in southern Lebanon, by bombing Shiite villages, without Sunni and Christian villages. ”
The influence of regional powers is not limited to Iran, but extends to Turkey, which seeks to displace the indigenous population of northeastern Syria and resettle others in their place, which means a change in the demographic composition, which is rejected by tribal elders and elders, because in a narrow space such as the geography of northern and eastern Syria there are more For five million people, another three million can only be resettled at the expense of changing the indigenous population. The self-administration of northern and eastern Syria has agreed to the return of refugees from Turkey, but refuses to turn the refugee issue into an instrument of demographic change, especially given Ankara's precedent in Afrin wa Labab, Jarablus, Azaz and Idlib. In a press statement on October 2, 2019, a number of tribal sheikhs called on Syrian refugees from northern and eastern Syria to return to their homes and participate in the reconstruction of their cities.
where do we live?
Forcible displacement at the epicenter of Arab armed conflicts results in a significant change in the demographic composition of Libya, Syria, Yemen and Iraq, to the extent that one of the questions that has become a question in the literature is "Where do we live?", As a result of the displacement of indigenous people and the arrival of new arrivals, and the intervention of regional powers It aims to obliterate Arab identity and establish new situations, identities and interests, which can only be changed by the limits of blood.
There is a rush of Houthi leaders to buy land and rent apartments in the capital, without paying attention to the money they pay, in a way that resulted in the inability of residents of the capital to pay rents as a result of excessively high, and disproportionate to the value of the local currency (rial), especially in Their salaries continued to be cut and disbursed regularly, and low-income people were unable to live in Sana'a as a result of the high cost of living.