No one can speculate on what could be the outcome of the current fireworks conflict between the United States and Iran, where the cycle of inevitable and rapid escalation seems to have been in place and began with the moment when Washington decided in April to classify Iran's Revolutionary Guard as a terrorist organization "In an unprecedented move to classify an official institution of an adversary state on the lists of US terrorism. This escalation continued with Washington's cancellation of exemptions for Iranian oil buyers exempt from the sanctions imposed on its importers (eight countries), with a declared desire to reduce Iranian oil exports to zero, It seems with a sneeze Including the deployment of a US aircraft carrier with its full combat group, an amphibious attack ship and attack launchers, as well as more than 1,500 new troops in the Middle East.
Iran, for the first time since the United States withdrew from the nuclear deal last year, announced that it would suspend some of its commitments under the agreement and gave Europe and other partner powers 60 days to fulfill their obligations to find a solution to ease restrictions on Iran. Iran's oil exports and banking transactions or else it will fully resume its nuclear program before the war of declarations develops into a real conflict with the announcement of the sabotage of four oil vessels off the coast of the United Arab Emirates port of Fujairah on 12 May without official knowledge. So far, only two days later, a vital oil pipeline in Saudi Arabia was targeted by drones launched by the Houthis from Yemen.
While countries are theoretically close to an open conflict, the consequences of such a conflict will not be limited to Iran or the United States alone, but the Gulf region, in particular, and the broader Arab region will certainly be affected by varying degrees of conflict, With the regional countries' perception of Iran and the extent of the threat posed by its regional activity, and its different position from the races of power and influence with the Islamic Republic, and with different economic and geopolitical interests, some Arab countries - pivotal to the "Iranian-American" conflict - The war reflected their own strategic priorities and concerns.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE .. The dilemma of strategic weakness
Saudi Arabia and the UAE in particular, and behind them Bahrain as a natural extension of Saudi policy, were at the forefront of the forces demanding a firmer US stance against Iran. Although the two countries did not publicly oppose the nuclear deal signed by the Obama administration with Tehran and entered into force in early 2015, Often viewed the agreement as insufficient to ward off their concerns about Iran, as it failed to address key points about Iran's regional influence in their strategic surroundings, Tehran's funding of proxies in neighboring Arab countries, and finally its missile program, Not only direct economic Hadid for their interests, but for the safety of their soil.
As a result, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi strongly welcomed the arrival of Donald Trump to the White House and welcomed his fierce campaign to discredit the nuclear deal until his decision to withdraw from the agreement fully in May last year 2018, which launched a campaign called "maximum pressure" including economic sanctions Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have shown their willingness to compensate for any shortage of oil supplies that may be caused by the Iranian deficit. Saudi Arabia has specifically declared that it is ready to produce 12 million barrels of oil per day, up from current levels of less From 10 million barrels, GM that it will seriously reduce the production reserve margin of which is owned by the Kingdom and used to adjust the market in the event of diminishing supplies for any emergency reason.
Not only that, with the fundamental changes that have brought the "hardliners" to positions of responsibility in the Trump administration, notably National Security Advisor John Bolton and Foreign Minister Mike Pompeo, and with the organized campaign of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, To convince the United States to step up its pressure on Iran to military intervention, it appears that the two Gulf states now have the hope that Washington can intervene on their behalf to keep their adversaries and their main rivals away from regional influence and to empower Saudi Arabia to dominate the region. D pressure to overthrow the Iranian regime militarily if necessary.
But the confusion and hesitation that characterized the Trump administration's political performance, the active internal opposition of Congressmen to the administration's policies against Iran, particularly the active US deployments designed as a military threat to the Islamic Republic, the sensitivity of American public opinion to war, After the success of the Israeli prime minister in achieving his goal of winning a fifth term, all of these factors convinced the two Gulf states to appear unrealistic in their ambitions for a comprehensive American intervention against Tehran, as they began to realize the limits of what Washington might be prepared to do Unless its interests are a vital attack that makes war an unavoidable option, and a full-scale 2003 invasion of Iraq is not in America's calculations at the moment. Entering a series of inconclusive military clashes such as air strikes will not enable a fundamental change On a large country with a solid regime such as Iran, and these partial actions can only make the security and strategic situation of the Gulf forces worse than it is now already.
The limited sabotage operations - which American analysts believe Iran and its allies have recently carried out without conclusive evidence - have contributed to strengthening this perception in the two Gulf states. By targeting oil tankers near the coast of Fujairah, the UAE coincided with the Houthis - Iran's allies in Yemen - targeting a vital oil pipeline in Saudi Arabia, by apparently Saudi Arabia and the UAE were reminded of their strategic weakness and security despite the US military and intelligence umbrella, and were also reminded of the extent Iran's ability to target their vital oil interests beyond the strategic Strait of Hormuz, which the latter controls, and threatened to close it on more than one occasion.
The port of Fujairah is the only port in the UAE which is not located on the Arabian Gulf but is located on the Sea of Oman after the Strait of Hormuz. Abu Dhabi has long invested in its processing and expansion to be able to ship more than half of the UAE's oil exports. Gulf for any reason. Similarly, Saudi Arabia's "East-West" pipeline provides one of the few alternatives to Saudi Arabia to export its oil through the Red Sea away from the eastern Gulf ports, which account for most of Saudi Arabia's oil exports and are all subject to free shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, controlled by Tehran. 17.5 million barrels of oil and about 3.3 million barrels of oil derivatives per day, while all alternative roads on the Sea of Oman and the Red Sea cover less than 4.4 million barrels per day of capacity available if the need to divert the course of oil exports, that alternative paths do not cover more than 20% of the daily traffic in Hormuz Takri P.
This dangerous strategic situation can explain the disciplined handling of Abu Dhabi and Riyadh and, more specifically, Iran's low-profile provocations in recent weeks, and the UAE's concern not to blame Iran and its proxies directly for attacks on oil vessels off its coast, Saudi Arabia, according to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, "Adel al-Jubeir," that it does not want war, although the messages coming from Riyadh appear to be mixed (5) between diplomatic statements that tend to calm, and populist media coverage demanding "military" surgical operations against Tehran, came In Saudi Arabia's English-language Arab News website, to Saudi coverage, which reduces the likelihood of a war and promotes international deterrence, forcing Tehran to return to the negotiating table, according to Salman al-Dosari in Al-Sharq al-Awsat, for example.
Qatar, Kuwait and Oman .. Search for balance of power
In contrast, the Gulf states do not have limited space, particularly Qatar, Kuwait and Oman, which are concerned about Iran's dominance. This is mainly because the geographical size of these countries does not qualify them to possess strategic aspirations for regional hegemony, for example Saudi Arabia, The Gulf and the wider Islamic world. On the contrary, their long-term membership in the GCC and their repeated experiences in the face of attempts by the Saudi and Emirati tutelage, most recently the blockade imposed on Qatar to force it to change its policies in mid-2017, make these countries more satisfied with the presence of major regional powers Competing with Riyadh's expansionist ambitions, even if they do not fully align with the agenda of those forces. These three countries have long accepted Iran's role as a pivotal player in the region rather than as an enemy of Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
The emergence of this acceptance in the case of Qatar in particular, as the most suffering state of the "dominion" Saudi Arabia UAE, Doha benefited from its relations with Tehran to find a breather away from the Gulf blockade, either by finding new routes to the air lines or provide an alternative source of supplies of basic goods and food The time of siege, unlike the long-term strategic relationship imposed by the geography of the two countries in the field of the North / Pars gas field of gas, which supplies Doha with most of its gas production, followed by most of its financial revenues.
As a result, Doha sees no interest in a US-Iranian war that destabilizes the region and undermines Iran's influence in favor of Saudi Arabia and could ultimately affect its gas production by disrupting the North Field, or by closing the Strait of Hormuz, through which 112 billion cubic meters Of the liquefied natural gas annually, mostly from Qatar to its Asian customers, especially with the knowledge of Doha Saudi ambitions in the North Field, which arrived in Riyadh to prepare a plan for the military takeover of the field and geographical space inside Doha, a plan confirmed by some US officials, Saudis and Qataris familiar with its existence and details But they are not authorized to speak in public, according to the Wall Street Journal, which was famous with them a week ago, Washington has stopped the plan of the partial invasion of Saudi Arabia before the border, after they convinced the Saudi royal court that it would be "a breach of the international regime, about her.
Similarly, Oman has similar concerns about Saudi hegemony. Oman has threatened to withdraw from the GCC if it is converted into a union among the six countries for fear of Saudi hegemony. The GCC monetary union project has also delayed the same concerns. Amman's relations with the UAE are no better, Especially after the announcement of the Sultanate in the past three months the arrest and start trial of members of a second spy network in the country (the first in 2011 was also dismantled), and the growing fears of the Sultanate towards its two Gulf neighbors in particular because of the war in Yemen, - in one aspect - Saud's attempt Which is considered by Oman to be suspicious due to its 228-km coastline on the coast of Yemen, and in view of its historical relations with the inhabitants and tribes of Al-Mahra. This may be the case in the Sultanate of Oman. The Gulf blockade is what prompted Oman to accelerate its efforts to seek new political allies, either by demonstrating its usefulness to the United States by receiving Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu in October or by signing a support agreement that allowed the Iranian Navy regular access to a For strategic port in Amman in early May.
With these long-term fears of the Sultanate towards its Gulf neighbors, and with the inevitability of the geography of Oman and Iran against each other on the strategic Strait of Hormuz, Muscat has historically maintained warm relations with Tehran to act as a counterbalance to Saudi influence, Tehran, Muscat, to confront the Marxists' rebellion in Dhofar in the 1960s, a relationship that continued after the "Islamic revolution" and enabled the Sultanate to play a major mediating role between the West and Iran, as in 2007 when Muscat mediated to persuade Tehran to release members of the Royal Navy, And a sailor In 2010, when it brokered the release of American tourists, and more importantly, Muscat hosted several vital preparatory meetings for the Obama administration's nuclear deal, a role that Oman seems to be looking to play again, as evidenced by its recent moves. Of US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo less than two weeks ago (15 of this month), he was quick to send his foreign minister, "Yusuf bin Alawi" to Tehran five days later, before Muscat finally hosted the Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran, "Abbas Arajiji" early This week, in what appeared to be Omani efforts to provide a back channel For contact between Washington and Tehran rather than war and escalation.
The situation in Kuwait has not changed much since the emirate seems to no longer have much confidence in the Saudi leadership of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), especially since the siege of Qatar. Its relations with Saudi Arabia have been strained since Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's unsuccessful visit, To the emirate in September, and the failure of the two countries to reach a solution on oil production in the neutral zone. On the other hand, although Kuwait has a long history of fears and tensions with Iran since the Islamic Revolution, and in the mid-1980s, when Kuwait accused Tehran of involvement in the assassination attempt on former Emir Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, the events that followed, Iraq, Kuwait and the demography of the country, which constitutes a quarter of its citizens, eventually convinced Kuwait to embrace dialogue and diplomacy as the only means of settling disputes with Tehran. Otherwise, Kuwait fears any possible confrontation between Washington and Tehran over its ability to export oil through ports Most of Kuwait's oil passes through it. Although Kuwait has access to the Sumid pipeline, which runs from the port of Sokhna on the Red Sea in Egypt, it still needs to transport its oil through the Strait of Hormuz to reach the Egyptian coast.
Egypt and Iraq .. Reduce damage
Relations between Cairo and Tehran have always been problematic, and tensions have remained a dominant feature since the late Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser when Tehran joined the Baghdad Pact. Despite relatively improved relations under the late President Anwar Sadat, Cairo joined the US orbit , It deteriorated again with the outbreak of the "Islamic Revolution" in Tehran in 1979, and later with Egypt's support for Iraq in its war against Iran, and continued tensions collapsed during the time of deposed President, "Mohammed Hosni Mubarak," which came closer to the relationship with Tehran from a security perspective, (11) since 2004 when Cairo was accused of " Reyes of masterminding the assassination of the Iranian Revolutionary figures Egyptian attempt did not name then nor later.
The relationship between the two countries witnessed a brief relative breakthrough in the wake of the Arab Spring and the arrival of President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood to power and his desire to open a political channel with the Islamic Republic to balance the rise of Saudi influence. However, differences in the Syrian file prevented the development of these relations, Was soon over anyway with the rise of General "Abdul Fattah al-Sisi" to power after a military coup overthrew the system "Morsi" mid-2013.
Over the course of most of his reign, Sisi failed to develop an independent approach to political engagement with Tehran, and Egyptian-Iranian relations remained heavily dependent on the positions of the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which are the most important financial and political supporters of his military regime. Egypt will not accept that Gulf security is in danger, and that Egypt "will move its forces to protect the Gulf brothers from any direct threat," in what appeared to be paid statements directed specifically at Tehran.
The Egyptian support for the Saudi war in Yemen, for example, was very limited, and it was limited to intensifying the naval presence to secure the waterways of interest to Egypt in the first place, so that Cairo showed a clear reluctance in announcing its welcome to the Strategic Alliance To the Middle East known as the "Arab NATO" and sponsored by the Trump administration against Tehran, before the media recently published news that Cairo officially informed Washington that it will not be able to participate in the coalition, which has technically failed so far.
The Egyptian withdrawal is a clear sign that Cairo does not welcome any military option in the face of Iran, whether this military intervention by the United States alone or with the participation of Arab allies, mainly because Cairo does not consider Iran an existential threat, By supporting a military war to serve the interests of other countries. The Egyptian withdrawal also reflects the distrust of the Egyptian regime in the Saudi leadership represented by Ibn Salman, despite Cairo's reliance on Saudi support. The Egyptian distrust also appears to be present in Trump's policies, He feels very doubtful about the chances of being returned His election in 2020.
In addition, it is clear that Egypt wanted to cut the road early in the face of any consequences that might arise from an American war against Iran. These consequences may include the request for the participation of Egyptian forces in the war, similar to Egypt's participation in Operation Desert Storm in 1990. , Which could put Cairo's intimate relations with the United States and Saudi Arabia at stake if it refused to respond to the request, as well as Cairo's fears of the consequences of this war on Egypt even if not directly involved in it, the least likely rise in oil prices and the accompanying increase in the bill Importing cumbersome fuel for the Egyptian economy, as well as the effluence T likely war on the security of waterways in the region and the movement of shipping through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.
On the side of collateral damage, Iraq appears to be the most critical situation in the midst of the US-Iranian escalation. Iran maintains significant influence in Iraq and finances many factions, political parties and armed Shiite militias there, many of which are linked to the state and government. At the same time, And Washington has a heavy artillery battalion and an Apache squadron protecting vital US interests, led by the US embassy in the Green Zone. The existing Iranian and American forces Iraq in the amount of coordination during the battles against the "Organization of the Islamic state" known as "Daesh" during the past two years.
But given that Iraq is the most prominent region with a close US and Iranian presence, it remains the most vulnerable in the event of a confrontation between the two countries, so it makes sense that Baghdad is the most intransigent policy of neutrality in the escalation and even more keen to play the role of mediator to defuse tensions Which appeared in the offer of Iraq officially mediated between Washington and Tehran during a press conference gathered by the Iraqi Foreign Minister with his Iranian counterpart earlier this week, as well as intensive contacts being conducted by Baghdad with Washington and Tehran in anticipation of any possible military confrontation between them.
The Iraqi government does not have the luxury of bias in a war between America and Iran, where Iran is the main provider of Iraq's commodities, including gas and electricity, while Washington is the main supplier of weapons and security services to the army and police. The two countries on its territory, where the armed militias loyal to Iran can target US interests in Baghdad without the permission of the government of course, in return there is nothing to prevent US forces from using bases in Iraq to launch attacks against Iran, In contrast, a war between the United States and Iran could threaten the fragile political consensus of the Iraqi government if the pro-Iranian parties chose to align themselves with it, not at the will of the nationalist currents hostile to Iran - and also for the American presence - foremost the Sadrist movement, which adheres neutrally In the crisis, and could increase tensions between the Shi'ite-dominated central government and the KRG if the Kurds allow the United States to use the region as a base for attacks against Iran.
Finally, the Iraqi government has every reason to worry about the future of its oil exports once the Strait of Hormuz is closed. Iraq relies exclusively on the Gulf port of Basra. The country exports only a small amount of its oil through a pipeline to the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean, That Iraq's oil exports, and consequently government revenues, will suffer severely if any confrontation between the United States and Iran, even if Baghdad succeeded in a thousand possible scenario can be put in the heart of this confrontation, whose consequences can not be predicted.