Did Gamal Abdel Nasser know when Israel would attack Israel in 1967?

Ahmed Hamoush

Almost half a century after the defeat of 1967, but many of the files of the war and what was happening during it is still ambiguous, as the time that Israel initiated the establishment of the committee "Agranat" to reveal the mistakes of its leaders in the war 73, the Egyptian authorities failed to succeed but to hide what It happened in the defeat that Egypt and the Arabs are still suffering bitterly until now.

One of the most important points that preoccupied the Egyptian military leaders who participated in the war, political leaders and analysts, is whether President Gamal Abdel Nasser knew the timing of Israel's sweeping attack days before it happened?

More than one Egyptian official confirmed that Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser knew that Israel would attack Egypt on June 5, 1967.

The former Egyptian ambassador to Moscow, Mourad Ghaleb, who is close to Gamal Abdel Nasser, told Al-Jazeera that he had prepared a concert for ambassadors of a number of countries, including the United States ambassador to the United States.

The concert, which the Egyptian ambassador intended to organize on the morning of June 5, was called by his Egyptian colleague three days before, and told him that he would not be able to attend because "important things will happen on Monday morning (June 5th)."

Murad Ghalib did not doubt the US ambassador's remarks. He then informed Nasser about the date of the attack on Egypt three days before the attack.

Among the sources who informed Abdel Nasser of the date of the Israeli attack was then Yugoslav President Joseph Tito, who had a good relationship with the Egyptian president, and was quick to inform him of Israeli intentions after the information arrived. Murad Ghalib himself confirmed this in his testimony to the times.

72 hours
Abdel Nasser himself, and after receiving the confirmed information from more than one side, told the army leadership.

On the morning of Friday, June 2, he met with the military leaders and assured them that Israel would attack Egypt in less than 72 hours.

And asked them - especially the aviation chief, First Lieutenant Sidqi Mahmoud - to prepare for the first strike, stressing that Egypt will not take the initiative to strike Israel!

The Egyptian president's argument is that he wants to exploit the Israeli aggression to launch a political campaign against Tel Aviv, with a strong response to the Israeli attack, and in his mind what occurred in 1956 during the tripartite aggression against Egypt, where the United States and the Soviet Union (the two new powers after World War II ) And called for a cessation of the war declared by Britain, France and Israel on Egypt after the nationalization of the Suez Canal.

The request of President Abdel Nasser has not received the approval of a number of military leaders present, so that Sidqi Mahmoud told him that the Israeli attack will lead to "reprisal" Egyptian air force.

The meeting, in which Nasser explained the international trends and what Israel intends to do, ended with demanding that the army, led by Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, take preventive measures to mitigate the expected attack, despite the warning of the military leaders that the loss of the initiative and surprise is a mistake and a danger.

It is strange that the army commanders, represented by Amer and Defense Minister Shams Badran, and their allies, have not taken any measures to avoid the disaster, and the Air Force confirmed that it is difficult to change the status of Egyptian aircraft squadrons.

Gamal Hammad, who is the first to be on the list of Free Officers and has documented political and military events in Egypt since the July 23 coup, said that Amer had commented on Nasser's talk about the possible attack and the need to prepare for the first strike. "!

Relationship
The relationship between Nasser and Amer was not at its height since 1956, when the crises accumulated between them after the status of Amer in the army and the inability of Abdel Nasser to change this reality, even after the proposal in 1962 the establishment of a presidential council to remove the powers of Marshal Amer, including the promotion of officers, The latter was angered and went to his home, prompting Nasser to abandon the idea of ​​the Presidency Council, leaving the camel to Lamar, fearing that his friend would turn over him, who controls the armed forces.

This troubled relationship made Amer barely pay attention to Nasser's analyzes at the June 2, 1967 meeting. Consequently, the president's requests did not turn into clear military orders with high alert, especially since the date of the attack was only about two days away.

But that Marshal Amer did not change the plans of his movements and his work program, including a meeting with the advanced leadership in Sinai on the morning of the fifth of June!

The team tells Saad al-Din al-Shazli that all the leaders of Sinai were waiting for Marshal on the morning of the day of the attack, as the war began and there is no commander in his position in Sinai! These are major questions surrounding the June 5 defeat.

The focus was on flying, because Israel's main goal is to destroy Egypt's air capabilities, so that it can carry out its military plans and attack all Egyptian positions with no fear of flight or missile force.

Israel achieved this immediately after the attack, and the situation worsened over the years. With the arrival of 1969, the Egyptian army could not repel any Israeli air aggression, and the Israeli planes started flying in the skies of Egypt as they pleased, prompting Gamal Abdel Nasser to visit the Soviet Union. Forces and mechanisms to help push Israeli aggressions.

Military demonstration
The testimonies of Egyptian military leaders, especially those who participated in the defeat of 67, confirm that Nasser has repeatedly assured them that he does not intend to attack Israel and that the escalation he launched in May 1967 against Israel was aimed at achieving specific political goals.

Summed up by those who wrote about the defeat of 67 in Nasser's desire to silence hostile Arab broadcasters, which he continues to regard as daring to send his troops to Yemen, while Israel messes with the security of the region and threatens to enter Damascus and can not respond.

In addition to his desire to resolve the situation since the 1956 Suez War, in which Israel greatly benefited from the freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba, and to limit the number of Egyptian troops in the Sinai.

In addition to the attempt to regain popularity in the Arab world and repeat what happened after the war of 56, which came out of Nasser, an Arab hero.

Shams Badran
However, the other side was not looking from the same perspective to the current developments, as Israel, which was preparing for a second round with Egypt since 1956, was not to miss the opportunity, especially learning the state of chaos experienced by the Egyptian army at the time, because of the war in Yemen and the repercussions of the conflict between Abd Nasser and Amer, along with the inefficiency of the Minister of Defense Shams Badran, who was appointed by the President as director of Amer's office for espionage, as confirmed by close associates of Nasser himself, while Amer - the owner of the nice character - winning his class, did not enjoy any value in military science , And throw around him many question marks.

For example, Bassem Badran is the one who sent a signal from Pakistan demanding an escalation of the situation to respond to the scorn of Arab radio stations from Abdel Nasser, who can not deter Israel but can fight the rightists. He also assured the president that the leaders of the Soviet Union assured him that they would stand by Egypt , And they would destroy the Sixth American Fleet and make it into the Sardine Caskets!

While Ambassador Murad Ghaleb, who attended Badran meetings with the Soviet leaders, sent a message to Abdel Nasser immediately after these meetings confirms that the Soviets confirmed that they would not enter the war, and advised Egypt to ease the escalation, and that the talk of a Soviet official to Badran, which he placed in front of the plane ladder was a light compliment followed Formal and decisive official meetings.

Chaos
The Egyptian military confirms in their books, which documented the stage, including Jamal Hammad and Abdul Latif al-Baghdadi, that because of the chaos spread favoritism and loyalty among the ranks of a number of army officers, and loyalty to Amer and Badran basis of promotion and win privileges, Hammad said that a general seen on one occasion, For the sun of Badran!

As a natural consequence of this chaos, the senior officers with courses in the Soviet Union, known for their efficiency and seriousness, were often transferred to the Foreign Ministry and to distant embassies.

Murad Ghaleb was asked if Nasser could have been rid of Amer before 1967. He replied: No, as well as those who wrote about the defeat, and how the president used it to get rid of his defeated companion, who was about to lead a coup - against his leaders - against Nasser after defeat, but the president feeds them before they eat him.

According to the analysis, Nasser hoped to achieve that goal with minimal losses, and he would be considered an Arab to deter Israel from striking Syria, but his prediction was wrong, and Israel used the opportunity to crush the Egyptian army and occupy the entire Sinai, along with the Golan and Gaza, , And most of all the occupation of Jerusalem and the Far East.