Turkey and Egypt. Is reconciliation near?

Turkey and Egypt took an important step further in repairing relations following Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu's visit to Cairo, the first by a Turkish official of this level since the mutual withdrawal of ambassadors nearly a decade ago.

However, the conditions for reconciliation are not yet fully clarified, although political communication between the two countries has reasonably recovered since the launch of relations reform talks about two years ago and has become at high levels, such as the exchange of visits at the level of foreign ministers and the talks held by Presidents Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdel Fattah al-Sisi (the first was a meeting in Doha under Qatari auspices a few months ago and the second was a telephone conversation after the February 6 earthquake), and another summit is being planned, but the two countries have not They then agree to re-exchange ambassadors.

As two countries that have been in major crisis since 2013, engaged for a decade in sharp regional polarization, fought a proxy military confrontation in Libya, and stood on opposite sides of the struggle for the riches of the Eastern Mediterranean, it will not be easy to address all aspects of the crisis at once.

However, what is encouraging today in turning the page on antagonism is that the parties are demonstrating strong political will to pursue reconciliation and are negotiating on a more productive political ground. While political communication after the launch of exploratory talks in May 2021 was limited to diplomats at the level of deputy foreign ministers, communication is now taking place at the level of presidents and foreign ministers.

Moreover, regional circumstances that previously complicated the Turkish-Egyptian crisis have now become catalysts for reconciliation. Two years ago, Turkey began a U-turn in its regional policy, repairing relations with Egypt's allies such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Israel, and restricting the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's activity on its soil. It has also brought about a shift in its attitude toward the Syrian regime, albeit to a lesser extent playing an impact on the new dynamic of Turkish-Arab relations. In return, Cairo abandoned its reluctance to raise its level of openness to Ankara and sent its foreign minister to Turkey after the February 6 earthquake, before issuing an official invitation to the Turkish foreign minister to visit it.

There are 3 factors that explain the new momentum in the efforts to repair relations:

• First, although only two rounds of exploratory talks have been held so far (the first was in Cairo on the fifth of May 2021 and the second was in Cairo on the ninth of September of the same year), the talks created a constructive ground for the reconciliation project and helped dismantle some of the knots in the crisis, such as Turkey's position on the Muslim Brotherhood and the political and media calm between the two countries, as well as its contribution to partially reducing the impact of Turkish-Egyptian differences in the Libyan file. On the path of dialogue.
• Second, Qatar's success in arranging a brief meeting and historic handshake between Presidents Erdoğan and al-Sisi on the sidelines of the opening FIFA World Cup in Doha on November 20, 2022, removed a key obstacle in restoring communication at the leadership level. The two presidents then gave directions to their diplomats to give new impetus to the reconciliation process. Indeed, the pragmatism of Erdogan and Sisi has played a vital role in bringing about a radical shift in relations from antagonism to trying to find a way out of the crisis.
• Third, the February 6 earthquake created space for disaster diplomacy, which has been active in the region, to move the stagnant waters in the path of Turkish-Egyptian reconciliation. Egypt's assistance to Turkey, along with the visit of the Egyptian Foreign Minister, has played a vital role in enhancing political communication between the two countries at a high diplomatic level. When communication develops to this level, presidents and foreign ministers play an important role in making decisions that help advance the reconciliation process.

In a region where actors have been engaged for two years in a large-scale process of re-establishing relations, the rapid dynamic of regional politics is shaping a new Middle East centered on the principle of regional cooperation rather than competition. Turkey and Egypt are the two largest regional powers in terms of population, military stature and, to a lesser extent, economies.

Therefore, the re-repair of relations creates new prospects for them to cooperate in various vital areas, from economy and energy to reaching a common approach to resolving their differences in Libya, an obstacle that until recently remained a major obstacle to reconciliation. So far, it remains unclear when the two countries will decide to re-exchange ambassadors, but reaching this stage requires above all addressing issues that remain at a divergence such as Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean. Although the two countries have not taken direct countermeasures against each other in the Eastern Mediterranean, they have not been able to reach a common approach on this issue. Turkey's current priority is to conclude understandings with Egypt on maritime border and gas demarcation and joining the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, but Cairo is contingent on understanding on this issue on addressing their differences in Libya.

Given that the two countries' involvement over the past years in Libyan polarization has only deepened the crisis between them, while other powers have benefited from this polarization to a greater extent, it is logical to say that Ankara and Cairo want to learn from the lessons of the past, to avoid a return to this engagement and instead look for ways to advance the path of a Libyan political settlement, in the interests of both parties.

Given that the two sides have a common interest in the success of the current transitional period, they also need to coexist in Libya, and look at the benefits that they can derive from this coexistence, the only factor that can help the two countries reach common ground in Libya lies in Cairo's abandonment of its demand for the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Libya and instead thinking about ways to cooperate with Turkey to make the new stalled transition a success.

What Turkey and Egypt have in common in Libya is their common desire to reunify the country's institutions and build a single military institution capable of achieving security stability, addressing Egypt's security concerns and helping Turkey secure its interests in that country. It will also help the two countries play a greater role in Libya's reconstruction, bringing economic benefits to and to Libyans.