What are the gains and losses of China a year after the war in Ukraine?

Beijing -

China formulated its position on the Russian-Ukrainian war in line with its general foreign policy approach, and its realization of the value and purpose of international alliances. Beijing's public statements regarding the war were limited to a few key messages, which have been repeated since the first day of the war.

For a full year, Beijing continued to assess the repercussions of the war on it, which created - in the eyes of observers - certain opportunities and risks, and simultaneously strengthened and weakened China's hand in international relations.

Trade between Russia and China grew by 29.5% in 2022 (Shutterstock)

economic gains and losses

The war provided some major opportunities for China, as it led to the removal of Moscow from the West, with the latter strengthening its relations with Beijing, given that Russia is the junior partner of the Chinese authorities. Trade between the two countries grew by 29.5% in 2022, with the trade balance outperforming in favor of China.

Western sanctions contributed to a partial weakening of the Russian government, making it more dependent on China and eastern markets, which enables Beijing to link Moscow with "resource assets" and expand its presence in the Russian market through the main industrial and economic sectors. Perhaps the fixed-price natural gas agreement signed by the two countries. In the past, it was one of Beijing's most prominent gains now, after the sharp rise in energy prices in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war.

And the researcher in international affairs, Qu Yuanshi, believes, in an article, that the Russian-Ukrainian war, which had a negative impact on the global economy, had a positive side for China, as it helps to promote a reduction in the relative cost of industrial production, and to enhance the demand for Chinese goods in countries. European and American, increasing Beijing's exports to the world market.

On the other hand, Chinese imports of Ukrainian agricultural products were affected, as Kiev was the largest exporter of corn to Beijing since 2015, and 75% of the corn imported by China came from Ukraine.

Ukraine, as a key country in China's Belt and Road Initiative, is of strong exemplary importance for cooperation between China and other countries along the way.

However, the possibility of Beijing carrying out strategic investments on Ukrainian soil is close to zero.

The CEO of Sinnvoll Consulting, Chen Song, explains to Al Jazeera Net that Beijing has lost the opportunity to participate in infrastructure projects due to the current Ukrainian government's attempt to win over Western politicians who oppose any Chinese expansion in the region.

A new military vision

International Relations Analyst at the Ukrainian Institute for the Future, Ilya Kusa, believes that Beijing does not need Russia as a strong and ambitious neighbor with supra-regional influence and national leaders working out of historical resentment, adding - in a research paper - that China historically views Russia as a middle-power player and partner in positions in Global competition with the United States.

At the same time, Beijing does not support unilateral Western sanctions against Russia, which would expand Washington's geographic and economic influence, at a time when these sanctions exposed the West's borders and red lines, providing China with particularly vital information in determining how to respond in the event of a confrontation. extensive with the West, eg around Taiwan.

Ahmed Al-Qarout, a researcher in political economy, told Al-Jazeera Net that the Western intervention in Ukraine against Russia prompted China to rearrange its strategic calculations regarding the military option in Taiwan, without dropping it from the calculations in light of the growing rapprochement between Washington and Taipei.

Moreover, the war in Ukraine laid the foundations for further strengthening the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which China considers an auxiliary to achieving the geopolitical goals of the United States. The war also prompted Beijing to become more active in expanding its influence in Oceania, Central and South Asia, which increased The severity of the political and ideological polarization in the region.

Beijing's Future Approaches

It seems that China is not interested in a long-term and high-intensity conflict because of the political and economic risks that this war may bring, while Beijing does not want to see Russia's complete defeat.

It is unlikely that China will join any sanctions against Russia, not because Beijing supports Moscow's military invasion of Ukraine, but rather because its accession means submitting to the will of the United States, which is unacceptable to the Chinese government, at a time when the latter appears ready to play a role in mediating a cease-fire. In Ukraine, however, it would like to do so on an equal footing with the United States and the European Union.

The researchers, whom Al-Jazeera Net spoke to, summarize the above by saying that this is what makes China seem contradictory about its support for either side in the Russian-Ukrainian war, as its geopolitical calculations lead to an accurate assessment of responses and minimal participation, which makes the calculations of profit and loss completely unclear. .