After the parliament in Chişinău approved a state of emergency last Friday because of a possible impending gas shortage, the government of the Moldovan Prime Minister Natalia Gavriliţa is trying to secure the country's energy supply in the long term through various channels.

The state of emergency was a legal prerequisite for being able to release budget funds for the short-term purchase of gas from various suppliers on the international gas markets.

It is initially valid for one month.

Michael Martens

Correspondent for Southeast European countries based in Vienna.

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So far, the Republic of Moldova has been a Gazprom customer.

But the contract, which actually expired at the end of September but was extended again for a month at short notice, will end in a few days.

The negotiations with the Russian monopoly are at least not made easier by the fact that the new leadership in Chişinău is unequivocally oriented towards the EU in terms of foreign policy.

Market prices overwhelm financial possibilities

Although the country has no formal prospect of accession, neither President Maia Sandu nor Prime Minister Gavriliţa and their cabinet members leave any doubts about the fundamental goal of integration with the West. Cheap “friendship prices” for the purchase of Russian gas, as Belarus was able to negotiate recently, should therefore not be expected in Chişinău. However, the current market prices clearly overwhelm the country's financial resources. Along with Kosovo, Moldova is the economically weakest country on the continent.

Gazprom announced via a spokesman over the weekend that if a new supply contract is not signed by December 1st, exports to Moldova will be stopped. Prime Minister Gavriliţa had previously spoken of a "critical situation" for the gas supply in her country. Basically, the Moldovan government wants to maintain a contractual relationship with Gazprom. Deputy Prime Minister Andrei Spînu, responsible for energy and infrastructure, has just returned from talks in Moscow, about the course of which initially nothing was publicly known. It is significant that Spînu was apparently accompanied to Moscow by Vladislav Kulminski.

He is also a deputy head of government responsible for the conflict over the Republic of Transnistria, which has broken away from the Republic of Moldova.

This is an internationally not recognized quasi-state with support from Moscow, located between the actual Republic of Moldova, to which it belongs under international law, and Ukraine.

The question arises, not only from Kulminski's presence in Moscow, whether Gazprom is just taking advantage of the expensive hour and demanding the highest possible gas price from the Republic of Moldova or at the same time negotiating Chisinau's political concessions in the Transnistrian conflict.

It would not be the first time Moscow has tried to put pressure on Moldova in this way.

How much pressure does the Kremlin want to exert?

The government in Chişinău is also in talks with other potential suppliers. Infrastructure to obtain gas from Romania, Ukraine or Poland is available. Foreign Minister Nicu Popescu was in Kiev for talks on this matter last week, Spînu in Poland, while Prime Minister Gavriliţa confirmed "intensive talks" with Gazprom. Buying gas on the international market (with delivery via Romania) would have the advantage for Moldova of not being associated with political pressure in the Transnistrian conflict. Such an arrangement will definitely be expensive - possibly even more expensive than an agreement with Gazprom.

Meanwhile, it is unclear how strong the pressure the Kremlin wants to exert on Chişinău. The Moldovan government has already reduced state energy consumption as a precaution, for example with the lighting of historical monuments. Moldova can count on Western help to a certain extent, which the country has already asked for. At the price, however, that Western funds, which were originally intended to support the country through long-term investments, will instead flow into gas purchases or subsidies for gas prices for the economically weakest consumers. In addition, nobody in Chişinău has any illusions that a social crisis could be completely cushioned with such help.

It will be possible to alleviate the consequences for the poorest sections of the population, but not or hardly for the country's weak economy.

It is also unclear how Moscow would react if the Moldovan government actually decided to enter into long-term supply relationships excluding Gazprom.

With the Transnistria conflict, Russia has a variety of options to make life difficult for the government in Chişinău.