On April 1, Israel attacked Iranian diplomatic facilities in Damascus. One of the buildings was destroyed, killing at least seven Iranian military advisers. Among them were two generals - the head of the Quds Force (Iranian military units) in Syria, Mohammad Reza Zahedi, and his deputy, Mohammad Hadi Haji Rahimi.

And this blow, of course, came as a surprise to many. Yes, the Israelis regularly attack Iranian targets in Syria, but we were always talking about military targets - convoys, warehouses, even bases. Experts explained these attacks by the fact that Tel Aviv was thus opposing Iran’s military strengthening on Syrian territory, and also preventing the transfer of Iranian weapons into the hands of Palestinian or pro-Palestinian groups, such as Hezbollah. However, now the Israelis have deliberately struck a diplomatic facility - a legal and nominally non-military consular building.

The Iranians, of course, are indignant. “We view this aggression as a violation of all diplomatic norms and international agreements. Benjamin Netanyahu has completely lost his mind due to his constant failures in Gaza and his failure to achieve Zionist goals,” said Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian.

However, we are not talking about any insanity or loss of reason. Benjamin Netanyahu struck the consulate in order to turn over the chessboard, the game on which was absolutely not in his favor.

The Israeli prime minister is truly in a seemingly hopeless situation. In Israel itself, thousands of people are protesting - people are tired of both his methods of government and his inability to achieve victory in Gaza. He is apparently unable to change the course of this war. The opposition is increasingly calling for early parliamentary elections. And in this situation, Netanyahu may lose not only his post, but also his freedom.

Unless he comes up with some non-standard way out of the situation. An exit that will completely change the configuration of the pieces on the board - or demolish them, forcing all players to re-position.

And this solution, according to Benjamin Netanyahu, should have been a strike on the Iranian consulate in Syria. With this blow, Benjamin Netanyahu puts Tehran facing a choice of three options. Options that could bring the Israeli prime minister either victory (in his understanding, of course), or at least an improvement in his position.

The first option is war. The Iranians are already making it clear that they will not leave the attack on the consulate unanswered. Iran's ambassador to Syria, Hossein Akbari, says the response to Israel will be "of the same level and severity." Hezbollah announced its readiness to join the boycott, promising Tel Aviv “punishment and revenge.”

Actually, Tel Aviv now needs to provoke the maximum possible aggression from Iran and its allies in order to launch a regime of besieged fortress in Israel. To force the opposition and the entire population to unite against the real threat of war with pre-nuclear Iran and its regional satellites. Moreover, few people here can blame Netanyahu for creating unnecessary tension in relations with a third country. The vast majority of Israeli society views Iran as an obvious, even existential enemy. And not only Israeli society - Netanyahu can also mobilize external allies for a war with Iran. The same Americans who view Israeli leadership as increasingly toxic in light of Netanyahu's aggressive actions in Gaza. And no matter how toxic Biden may consider Benjamin Netanyahu, the American president will not be able to avoid war with Iran. Especially in the context of elections. Thus, Israel will provoke a war that is needed not only for the survival of Netanyahu himself, but also to rid the country of an existential enemy.

If Iran resorts to the second option - follows the path of passivity and reluctance to start a war - then Netanyahu will be able to derive some benefit for himself.

Israel will try to position Iranian passivity as evidence of Iranian weakness. Failure to protect both your interests and your allies. This could lead to a weakening of Tehran's influence in Syria, Lebanon, and southern Iraq. If the Israelis manage to relay (or rather, strengthen - there is someone in the Iranian elite to relay) this idea inside Iran itself, then certain upheavals in power may begin in the Islamic republic. With the further arrival of tougher and more radical leaders in the leadership of the country. Which, taking into account subsequent Israeli provocations, can give Benjamin Netanyahu the war he wants.

Well, as a third option, there is a small, but still probability that Iran will not want to either start a war or become a doll for an Israeli-American whipping. That the Iranians are aware of the limits of their capabilities and will slow down somewhat in the Middle East. And then Netanyahu will take this victory to his advantage - at least within the framework of his relations with the United States.

So no madness. Only sober calculation.

And the question now is whether Iran can respond just as soberly. Will the leadership of the Islamic Republic find an opportunity to get out of the fork that Netanyahu has given it?

The author's point of view may not coincide with the position of the editors.