Does political Islam have a future?

Former Secretary General of the Justice and Development Party (Al Jazeera)

Will political Islam or activist Islam remain the “big idea” that in the Arab world captures people’s imaginations and stimulates political action, as Arab nationalism was for a period?

There is no doubt that political Islam has been the “big idea” since 1967, and it took away from Arab nationalism its luster and organizational strength, and its momentum increased with historical events that gave it momentum, including the Iranian Revolution (1979), the Second Gulf War (1991), and to some extent the war. On Iraq (2003).

He was influenced by a theoretical reference at every specific stage, and he knew that allies and opponents change according to contexts.

The Justice and Development Party constituted a special case of excessive pragmatism to the point of estranging its political and sectarian references by allying itself in 2013 with a party that considered the Justice and Development Party a red line.

Political Islam was the most organized force with the outbreak of the “Arab Spring,” which made it reap its benefits. It moved from the opposition to exercising power, even if it was difficult to talk about assuming power.

The transition of political Islam, or parties with an Islamic reference, from discourse to responsibility was a fundamental shift in the region.

It is no longer possible, according to this transformation, to evaluate the Islamic parties that exercised power based on rhetoric, but rather on performance, and the performance was not up to the rhetoric, in each of the experiences of the Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt, the Ennahda Party in Tunisia, and the Justice and Development Party in Morocco.

The situation of the Islamic Action Front Party in Jordan remains a special case.

Because he did not exercise power or participate in it in this era.

We cannot deny the failure of the parties emanating from political Islam that exercised power, despite the differences in the reasons for each case and the specificity of each country.

The failure is clearly evident with the decline of the Ennahda Party in the electoral elections in Tunisia, and the resounding defeat of the Moroccan Justice and Development Party in the 2021 elections, which is the expression used to demonstrate the failure of the Justice and Development Party.

The talk spread about what came after political Islam, after the frequent retreats of parties with an Islamic reference, or what some Western researchers expressed as a transition from solid political Islam to liquid political Islam.

Many people lie down on the bed of Islamic movements to find out the reasons for their weakness.

Some attributed the reasons for the decline to the parties with an Islamic reference giving priority to the regional dimension and internal concerns, which contradicts the tendencies of political Islam, which transcends the regional dimension, the tendency toward excessive pragmatism in hybrid or unnatural alliances, the lack of state culture, and excessive clinging to power. Even at the expense of its authority.

The Justice and Development Party constituted a special case of excessive pragmatism to the point of estranging its political and sectarian references by allying in (2013) with a party that considered the Justice and Development Party a red line, passing a law on teaching scientific subjects in French (a party that was calling for Arabization), and approving a law permitting the use of... Indian hemp, and it was time-consuming to sign the normalization agreement with Israel.

The voters' response to excessive pragmatism was to remove the party from the position of the first political force in the country, to eighth place, as it was barely able to form a parliamentary team.

The question today is what is the fate of political Islam, or Islamic parties with an Islamic reference, after the “Al-Aqsa Flood.”

Will she regain her strength, renew her life, and attract the widespread anger in the street?

There are indeed indicators showing the return of Islamic trends, in varying proportions, openly in Jordan, clearly in Morocco, and subdued in Egypt and Tunisia, given the nature of the two regimes.

Regardless of the specificity of each country, its culture, and the experience of each party, the “Al-Aqsa Flood” constitutes a new turning point in the political scene in the Arab world.

We see its influence in the strong presence of Islamic trends in the street, in Jordan and Morocco, and in debates over immediate issues, such as reforming the family code in Morocco, or returning after latency, as well as the Moroccan Justice and Charity Group, which presented what it called “the political document of the Justice and Charity Group.”

Will the new situation help in the revival of political Islam after the setback that befell it?

There are objective, or continental, elements that constituted a driving force for political Islam, including Western arrogance, the dependence of governments in the Arab world on the West, through certain political, economic and cultural choices, and the dominance of Westernized elites.

Political Islam was in large part a response to Western arrogance, Westernized elites, and subservience to the West.

The second element is that the focus of political Islam has always been the Arab Levant and the events taking place there, including the defeat of 1967, the Second Gulf War (1991), and the war on Iraq (2003).

Each temporal context produced a theoretical reference, a theorist, and the predominance of a particular organizational movement.

The first two elements are present in the context of the “Al-Aqsa Flood,” that is, Western arrogance, subservience to the West, and the dominance of Western elites, with a rift point being the East. However, the current context has not yet produced a theoretical reference.

Can the “moderate” or “pragmatic” trends that characterized the previous stage regain their strength, or do they bear the curse of complicity and unsuccessful choices, and that time is a time of trends that do not see moderation as an option, nor pragmatism as a path?

Perhaps the context closest to what is unfolding is that which Algeria experienced during World War II, through the transition from the Algerian People’s Party, which believed in a kind of settlement with the colonial authority, to the Movement for the Victory of Democratic Liberties, which was established in the year (1946), following the Setif and Jalma massacres ( She speaks in Persian (May 1945), and was impressed by the sharpness of her demands and style.

There is a new wave on the horizon for a new generation of political Islam, with new actors, new discourse, and new theorizing. As for those riding the wave, they are paving the way for a new generation of activist Islam, and nothing else.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Al Jazeera.