Central Africa and Chad...the war and the positions of Sudan's neighboring countries

Thousands of civilians in Sudan volunteered to fight alongside the army (communication sites)

In the previous article, we reviewed the positions of some neighboring Sudanese countries regarding the ongoing war in Sudan, what are the factors that contributed to creating these positions, the intertwined relationships regarding them, and how to communicate with their components, and we focused on Ethiopia and Eritrea.

The discussion in this second episode takes us to other countries neighboring Sudan, which have found themselves in the midst of the huge waves of this war, and the storms that are blowing from every direction, and everyone knows that what is happening will drag the entire region into the depths of the crushing regional war, and its repercussions will be devastating to everyone. No matter how different the degrees and levels, these countries include South Sudan, Central Africa, and Chad, which are the countries concerned with this episode.

The Rapid Support Commander found in his hands valuable opportunities to create a political relationship, and a commercial and investment presence that would pave the way for political influence in South Sudan.

Benefiting from his management of the peace files in the two countries

South Sudan

It goes without saying that the Republic of South Sudan has a close, organic connection to Sudan. It was part of it, and separated from it after long wars and a rebellion that began on August 18, 1955 AD. Sudan was not at that time an independent state from British colonialism, until the last rebellion ended on December 31. December 2004, with the signing of the peace agreement in Naivasha, Kenya, then the secession of South Sudan in July 2011.

The relationship between the two countries, despite its heavy burden, remained based on accurate assessments taking into account its privacy and constantly interacting with what was happening, and the two presidents: Omar Al-Bashir and Salva Kiir were able to walk over the thorns and preserve the relationship between the two countries.

Despite the distance between their steps at times, and the presence of high-cost intersections here and there, they tolerated each other until the end of the era of President Al-Bashir.

It is natural for South Sudan to welcome and support the new leadership of Sudan after April 11, 2019. President Salva Kiir is a descendant of the Sudanese military establishment, and was an officer in the Sudanese army intelligence, until he rebelled with John Garang in May 1983, and he knows the Sudanese army well. He fought in its ranks, then fought against it with the SPLA and the SPLM led by John Garang.

Following the change and the emergence of a new regime in Sudan in April 2019, the Rapid Support Forces did not have a strong relationship with the state of South Sudan, so Hemedti, after he became the second man in power, hastened to forge his own relationship with Juba after taking over the negotiation file with the rebel movements in Darfur and other regions, and to engage In the negotiations that led to the signing of the Juba Peace Agreement on October 3, 2020 AD.

At the same time, Hemedti also took over the file of mediation between the government of South Sudan and its opponents, especially Dr. Riek Machar, who was leading the largest opposition movements. A peace agreement for South Sudan was signed on October 14, 2020, according to which power was shared between President Salva Kiir, And his deputy, Riek Machar.

The Rapid Support Commander found in his hands valuable opportunities to create a political relationship, and a commercial and investment presence that would pave the way for political influence in South Sudan.

Benefiting from his management of the peace files in the two countries.

He quickly consolidated his business relationships with influential people in the government of South Sudan, and entered into investment partnerships with people in or close to decision-making areas. He chose to have a relationship with a business partner, Paul Mel, a senior businessman and leader in the SPLM and a special advisor to the president, then Mrs. Adok Salva Kiir, Your Honor, the President, worked with them on road and bridge projects and brought machinery and trucks for these projects.

Then, through the security advisor to the President of the Republic, Mr. Tut Qalwak, and others, he obtained contracts to supply the needs of the People’s Army: appointments, clothing, and equipment.

Then the "Al-Junaid" company, owned by the Rapid Support Commander, obtained contracts to purchase oil from South Sudan, and the director of the Internal Security Service in Juba, Akol Kor, played a role in facilitating obtaining these contracts. He also bought Khartoum's debts to Juba in transit and refining fees for South Sudan's oil. .

The Rapid Support companies worked with the military intelligence of the People’s Army to facilitate the crossing of mining machinery and equipment to the Singu area in the far south of Darfur on the border of South Sudan, in exchange for the Rapid Support Commander to support joint mining work in the disputed areas with South Sudan (Copper Pit, Kafia Kanji, the Copper Pit, and the Shroud of Dubai), which is one of the most important areas in the history of Sudan that has found British, German, and Israeli interest.

Due to the presence of huge reserves of gold, copper, diamonds and uranium, the Rapid Support Commander and his company, Al-Junaid, allocated gifts of cars to some military commanders who facilitated the crossing of the vehicles.

Hemedti and his company entered into joint investments with the South Sudanese businessman, Kor Ajin, who founded a telecommunications company called: (DIGITAL), in which Hemedti owns a majority of the shares, and bought two buildings in central Juba for the company, some of whose floors are used by the “Al-Junaid” company, in addition to a medical investment. - NILE KINGS Hospital, in addition to other investments, in addition to dealings and financial interests with many influential people in Juba.

Hemedti's debts to the Juba government in supplying personnel and needs to the People's Army had reached more than one billion dollars by October 2022. A few months before the war, a dispute arose over these debts, and Juba began to get restless with the method of claiming the debts.

Juba sent the Ministers of Finance and Petroleum and the Special Advisor to President Salva Kiir to Khartoum to address the outstanding issues regarding the issue of oil and debts, and to reduce and reduce the dealing with rapid support in oil transactions, as some debts were paid from crude oil to South Sudan. The visit also included a warning message from Salva Kiir to the President of the Sovereignty Council. Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan was conveyed to him by his special advisor, Tut Qalwak, whose summary was: “Hemedti intends and plans to remove him from power.”

It was attributed to Mr. Qalwak, "Hemedti told him frankly that he would stage a coup and overthrow Al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support flag would fly above the General Command of the Sudanese Army."

Tut says:

He advised him not to do so, and a source close to President Salva Kiir stated that a report was submitted to him stating that “Hemedti set the zero hour for his coup against Burhan and the arrest of him and Lieutenant General Kabashi.”

When the war began, Juba proposed its mediation in the first days, but there was an American tendency not to give President Salva Kiir any regional role, and the role of Kenya and Ethiopia grew, and Juba needed to calm the situation in Sudan.

For its oil interests and to preserve its national security, it first asked Hemedti and his forces not to attack the oil installations in Sudan through which South Sudan’s oil is exported.

The evidence for this is that when Hemedti’s forces attacked the Al-Ailfoun area and entered the oil station to pump oil, they called Juba and asked him not to sabotage, and Hemedti complied with the request.

Hoping to settle his debts, he also bargained with the main oil refinery in the north of the capital.

A number of SPLM leaders and officials in South Sudan support the RSF position, which contradicts the declared position of President Salva Kiir, and his deputy Taban Deng, Dr.

Dhiu Matouk, Luca Biong, Francis Deng, Nhial Deng Nhial, former Foreign Minister Deng Daw Mayiq, and others dealt with the Rapid Support Commander and presented him to Western circles as a supporter of the so-called New Sudan Project, and an ally of the SPLM, and would meet all its demands, especially on border issues such as Abyei and other areas, and this is what was contained in a report written by Dr. Luca Biong to the US Institute of Peace in Washington after his meeting with Hemedti in Nairobi.

In another direction, large numbers of fighters are currently fighting with the Rapid Support Forces, who came from within the state of South Sudan, and they are several different groups:

The SPLA Intelligence Group: It is a small group of no more than 500 people, deployed by the SPLA in Sudan with rapid support.

To collect information about the war in Sudan, and about the southern armed movements and their fighting elements.

The group of southern mercenaries was brought in through southern and northern brokers (nine brokers led by a retired brigadier general in the South Sudanese army and the supervisory governor of Abyei Chol Deng Alak from the southern side). This group includes various tribes from southern Sudan and their number is between 5-7 thousand fighters.

A group of officers and soldiers fleeing from the SPLA while they are on duty;

They infiltrated to take advantage of the war and rapid support ranks, and they are the elements specialized in artillery and heavy weapons.

Of these, 120 officers and soldiers were killed in the battles of the city of Babanusa in West Kordofan, west of the country, in battles from January 24-26, 2024 AD.

Southern opposition elements: There are groups affiliated with Paul Malong, Thomas Cirillo, Stephen Boya, Lam Akol, and groups from Equatoria.

Groups loyal to Vice President Taban Deng.

The number of these people is estimated at four thousand fighters.

South Sudan’s position now depends on the position of President Salva Kiir, who is facing intense pressure from many countries. Ethiopia and Kenya have promised him to sign cooperation agreements and establish land roads linking the two countries, oil refineries, and pipelines. However, Juba still says;

It supports the solutions provided by Sudan's neighboring countries and IGAD, although Juba has its own paths and advice to offer to everyone.

Central Africa

Due to the state of chaos in this country and the influence of the Russian Wagner company, which is responsible for protecting the regime of President Faustin Touadera, the Rapid Support Forces found themselves, as a result of their alliance with the Russian Wagner, plundering Central Africa’s wealth of gold, diamonds, uranium, and other minerals, protecting the president’s regime in Bangui, and protecting the borders. The Rapid Support tried to attract the tribes of the northern, eastern and western regions to join its ranks, taking advantage of the open borders between Sudan, Central Africa and Chad and the tribal interference. It tried to win over the Seleka movement, the main opposition movement, after it became hostile to it. It arrested its leaders before the war in Sudan, threatened some of them, and also tried to... Major opposition movements (Anti-Blaka).

Wagner controls some dirt airports in Central Africa, which were used to transport military equipment and some types of logistical support that actually continued to arrive through Central Africa.

Given the relations between the two countries and Sudan’s role during the Bashir era in bringing peace to Central Africa, and signing a peace agreement in 2018, Central Africa’s position ranges from undeclared support, attempts to disavow it, and responding to pressure and financial temptations from RSF supporters.

Chad

Chad played a pivotal role in supporting the rebellion, as a result of tribal overlap and the presence of Chadian fighters since 2014 in the ranks of the Rapid Support. There are no specific and clear problems between the Sudanese state and its army with Chad, but the Chadian position went in the direction of supporting the Rapid Support for several factors, including external factors. , such as the Israeli role, then financial reasons, and so Chad pushed officers and soldiers from its army to engage in the war in favor of the Rapid Support Forces, and turned a blind eye and helped in the flow of African mercenaries towards Sudan, then opened its airports to support the Rapid Support Forces, especially Umm (Jaras) Airport and ( Abéché and N'Djamena Airport.

It received the Rapid Support leaders who departed from its territory, and coordinated meetings of the Rapid Support Command with parties from the armed movements in Darfur, and put pressure on some of them, and splits occurred in the Justice and Equality Movement to put pressure on its leadership.

The work in support of rapid support is carried out by leaders in the Chadian government, such as Idriss Youssef Bouy, director of President Mohamed Idriss Deby’s office, who has a strong influence and is linked to a number of army leaders and tribal figures.

Chad is well aware of the presence of a huge number of Chadian fighters within the ranks of the Rapid Support Forces, as well as the presence of Chadian armed opposition elements who are temporarily allied with the rebellion in Sudan, and it knows the danger these people pose to the ruling regime, but it is thinking on two levels:

The first: This war eliminates the opposition’s military leaders, cadres and forces, and this is in the interest of N’Djamena.

The second: Hemedti's reassurances to prevent the Chadian opposition from returning to their country once the war in Sudan ends.

There are investments (oil - gold) and rapid support companies in Chad, and large sums of money have been paid to many leaders, politicians and tribal leaders in this country.

A few days ago, Rapid Support arranged visits for a Chadian media delegation that visited the city of El Geneina and West Darfur State in Sudan to improve the image of Rapid Support inside and outside Chad.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Al Jazeera.