The third year of the Russo-Ukrainian war could be decisive

Russia's war on Ukraine (Al Jazeera)

As the Russian war on Ukraine turns into its second year, the clear outcome of these two years appears as follows.

Ukraine succeeded in avoiding the worst scenarios of the fall of the capital, Kiev, the regime of President Volodymyr Zelensky, and surrender to Russia, but in return it lost 18% of its territory, and is unable to recover it, after the failure of its counterattack that it launched against Russian forces in the east last year.

As for Russia - despite its control over four Ukrainian regions and their de facto annexation to its territory - it is still unable to force Kiev to negotiate peace based on this reality.

But it showed great ability to withstand sweeping Western economic sanctions, and quickly turned to a war economy that did not undermine its war machine as the West had hoped.

This result helps both Presidents Putin and Zelensky to claim that the war is going in their favor after two years, but the clear truth is that this war is still ongoing and there is no end in sight on the near horizon.

However, the third year of the war may be different from the previous two in terms of the potential major change that may occur in the international dynamics affecting the conflict, especially American policy.

A potential return of Trump to the White House would not only risk significantly weakening Ukraine's position in the war, but would also send a message to Putin that Western unity against Russia is beginning to crumble.

Next November, the United States will witness presidential elections, and former President Donald Trump has a strong chance to return to the White House.

This scenario - if it comes true - could have major effects on the course of the war in Russia’s favor.

This is not just due to Trump's recent comments in which he said;

It will encourage Russia to "do whatever the hell it wants" to any NATO member that doesn't pay enough into the alliance's budget, but also to Trump's pledge that he would end the war within twenty-four hours if he returns to power.

This pledge cannot be taken lightly, of course;

Because Trump does not have a magic wand to do this, but he also has no intention of escalating military pressure on Russia to force it to return to its pre-February 2021 borders.

The only way he will be able to fulfill this promise during his second term (and not within 24 hours) is to decide that peace cannot be achieved without agreeing to Russia's terms, and forcing Ukraine to accept them.

Over the course of two years, Kiev showed resilience in challenging Russia and forcing it to reduce the list of war targets, but this would not have been possible without the military and financial support for it from the West, especially the United States.

The latest support push was the European Union’s approval of a financial support package for Ukraine worth fifty billion euros over four years.

Likewise, the US Senate approved additional funding worth $60 billion for military and economic aid, but the prospects of the bill are still uncertain in the House of Representatives.

Even if it is passed during the remainder of Biden's term, the chances that the new support will lead to a radical change in the course of the war in favor of Ukraine are by no means certain.

It will be difficult to imagine that continued European support for Ukraine alone will be enough to defeat Russia or prevent it from achieving victory without Washington continuing its active involvement alongside its European partners in financing the Ukrainian war effort.

European arms production - although high - will not be sufficient to support the Ukrainian army until sometime in 2025, or even later.

Also, some key pieces of military equipment can only come from American stockpiles.

A potential return of Trump to the White House would not only risk significantly weakening Ukraine's position in the war, but would also send a message to Putin that Western unity against Russia is beginning to crumble, and that Moscow will be more emboldened in the future to continue challenging the security architecture. In Eastern Europe with minimal consequences.

Even if European countries decide to boost their military spending in the way Trump wants, this will likely not change Trump’s view of the Russian-Ukrainian war, or push him to continue American involvement in the war in the way President Joe Biden did.

Trump will be able to grant logical legitimacy for a radical shift in the American role in the war by arguing that the American approach during the Biden era did not ultimately lead to Russia’s defeat and that it exacerbated the risks of expanding the scope of the war.

According to his point of view, the United States no longer has the luxury of options. Rather, there is one more effective option, which is for Ukraine and the West to accept negotiations with Russia to end the war without preconditions.

The fact that the war will only end with a peace agreement strengthens the legitimacy of Trump’s proposal, but the criterion upon which the peace project will be negotiated will also be the criterion for determining the victor and the defeated in this war.

Although Russian President Vladimir Putin recently demonstrated his preference for Biden over Trump in the presidential contest, a preference that likely does not reflect Putin's true desire, Russia will be better able to impose its terms in any future peace negotiations with Kiev and the West under Trump rather than Biden.

With the war entering its third year and the state of stalemate it is witnessing, which serves Russia to a greater extent than Ukraine, its fate has become dependent on a group of factors, the most important of which is the results of the upcoming US presidential elections.

Biden's success in a second presidential term may dispel Kiev and Europeans' concerns about the dangers of Trump's return to the Ukrainian and Western positions in the war, but it will not mean in any way that Kiev and the West will become more capable of defeating Russia, or forcing it to negotiate peace on their terms.

In this case, Moscow will have to deal with four new years of significant American and Western involvement in the war and with a NATO more active and powerful than ever before.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Al Jazeera.