The “Anti-normalization with the Assad regime” law and its repercussions on Turkish-Syrian reconciliation

The US House of Representatives overwhelmingly approved the draft law against normalization with the Assad regime (Al Jazeera)

At a time when security and military efforts are continuing in order to find a diplomatic mechanism through which points of view can be brought closer and the controversial points that are hindering the process of restoring relations between Ankara and Damascus can be overcome, it was announced that the US House of Representatives approved the draft law “Anti-normalization with the Assad regime.” With an overwhelming majority from both parties: the Democratic and the Republican, with 389 votes in favor, 32 against, and 10 members abstaining from voting.

Confronting normalization

Despite the hopes that many place on the new American draft law, it does not contain any provisions binding countries of the world not to deal with the Assad regime, or to impose sanctions on countries that deal with it.

But in its entirety, it revolves around preventing federal officials within the United States of America from taking any action aimed at recognizing the Assad government, or normalizing relations with any Syrian government led by Assad.

It also prohibits any federal official from taking action or allocating funds that formally or implicitly indicate the United States’ recognition of the Bashar al-Assad regime or its government, in addition to the provisions of the draft law prohibiting any American president from considering recognizing Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

In this way, it is nothing more than an American attempt aimed at demonstrating American policy support for the demands of the Syrian opposition, and its insistence on the necessity of bringing about fundamental political reform, without the slightest effectiveness.

Ankara's position

Although the process of finally approving the aforementioned draft law still requires many other stations that it must pass before actually starting its implementation, which may take a period of time that may exceed a year, the approval issued by the US House of Representatives has raised many questions.

It is linked in its entirety to Ankara’s position on it, and the repercussions of this position on its efforts aimed at restoring its relations with the United States of America, in addition to its direct impact on the future of Turkish-Syrian relations in light of the Syrian opposition forces’ efforts to obstruct all normalization processes with the Assad regime, whether those linked to Arab countries in general. Or the course of Damascus’s relations with Ankara in particular.

It is the largest international incubator for Syrian refugees, hosting about five million refugees on its territory. It is also geographically the closest to the Syrian state, and has historical and social relations with it, which has generated many problems related to the developments of this issue.

Independence of Turkish decision

The change in the paths of Turkish foreign policy in the last two decades, the confirmation of its liberalism and distance from the system of dependency - which characterized its relations over the past many decades - and its adoption of an approach of independence in its decision-making in a way that serves its interests, as a regional state with political weight, and an influential and effective role in the region’s files, clearly indicates that its position The aforementioned draft law will not affect its decision to move forward on the path to restoring its relations with Damascus, compared to the size of the gains expected to be achieved from this approach.

Ankara's current pressing interests, which revolve around the importance of preserving its national security and expanding the scope of its economic and security relations at the regional level, are the actual driver of its political decisions, and the steps it takes with the aim of achieving these goals, regardless of whether this position is consistent with the administration's position. Whether America disagrees with him.

Single parking

Evidence of this trend is its unilateral approach to dealing with the American-Iranian crisis, and its refusal to comply with the application of the economic sanctions that were imposed on Tehran by Western countries and the United States of America, which is the same position it has taken since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war, where it explicitly declared its non-commitment to implementing the sanctions. Which was imposed on Russia, and even expanded the scope of cooperation with it at all economic, military, security, and energy levels.

Ending Assad's isolation

The political changes that currently dominate the relations and alliances of countries in the region represent the main driver for shifting regional positions towards the Syrian regime and opposition forces, including the Turkish position.

In addition to achieving its political, security, and economic interests with Damascus, Ankara realizes that the continuation of its differences with the Bashar al-Assad regime may hinder the further improvement of its relations with the Arab countries, and raising the volume of economic cooperation with them, which seems to remain dependent, in one way or another, on the level of improvement of its relations with Damascus, in particular After it restored its diplomatic relations with all the countries of the region, only Damascus remains, which receives explicit support from most Arab countries wishing to turn the page on the Arab Spring.

Therefore, breaking the isolation of the Assad regime is its top priority at the current stage. After realizing the difficulty of changing the Syrian political path, it has turned today to supporting the continuation of the Bashar al-Assad regime, and is only seeking to change its behavior towards its people, and is making unremitting efforts to support the institutions of its state.

With the aim of restoring stability inside Syria.

Turkish-Arabic compatibility

The vision of the Arab Group coincides with Ankara’s in the necessity of making more efforts to eliminate terrorism and its organizations inside Syrian territory, and to find a logical mechanism according to which the humanitarian crisis suffered by the Syrian people will be resolved, the refugee file will be closed, and the foundations will be laid that will guarantee their safe return to their cities and villages, and the recovery of their stolen property. It was confiscated, along with the return of state institutions’ control over all Syrian lands, controlling the borders, removing armed groups from them, and then ending the foreign presence.

From this standpoint, we can understand the meaning of the statement recently made by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan about leaving the door open for continued dialogue with Damascus according to President Erdogan’s instructions.

Relaxation of the American position

One of the factors that would encourage Turkey to move forward on the path of reconciliation with the Syrian regime, and ignore the new American draft law, is the American administration’s own dealings with the Syrian file on the ground, as it directed most of its attention and support to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) faction in eastern Syria.

Under the pretext of his support for it in its war against ISIS, while completely ignoring the rest of the other Syrian opposition forces.

This, in addition to reducing the volume of its military support, and abandoning its security obligations in the Middle East, until it reached its intention to develop a plan to withdraw its forces from the places where they are stationed inside northern Syria, while turning a blind eye to the violations that affected the application of the economic sanctions imposed on the Syrian regime, It itself eased some of these restrictions following the February 2023 earthquake, and overlooked the application of the “Caesar Act.”

The laxity of the American position, in addition to the widening gap of disagreement between the Syrian opposition factions, the exchange of accusations among them, the decline of their military and political presence, and the fading hopes after these years of their ability to bring about real, tangible changes on the ground that can be built upon in determining the policy that should be pursued with the Syrian file, All of this prompted Ankara to review its position, reconsider its rhetoric towards the Syrian regime, and take a different approach in dealing with it.

In search of their interests, just like the Arab countries.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Al Jazeera.