The war on Gaza enters its fifth month amid international inability to stop the machine of genocide committed by the Israeli occupation army (Getty)
There is an approach followed by some elites, which is to enter into the game of scenarios in which the war of aggression against the Gaza Strip is estimated to end following the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation. It has entered its fifth month, or more than one hundred and twenty days after October 7, 2023.
Whoever resorts to presenting scenarios in general is a third party other than the two main parties to the conflict or war, or he is biased towards a specific scenario that he wants to promote on behalf of one of the parties to the conflict. This is without dismissing those who harbor “other goals.”
The two main parties to the war can only tolerate one scenario being presented by each of them, which is its victory in the war, especially during it, or if it presents the situation of the next day after the ceasefire.
Scenarios game
Hence, it is not possible for him to enter into the game of scenarios, because one of them includes the scenario of him losing the war and his enemy winning it, even if he considers it a weak possibility, or the weakest possibility; Because in the end, and indirectly, it undermines his assertion of his victory and the defeat of his enemy.
Hence, the participant in the scenario game is often a third party, actual or hidden. It is determined by the way in which each scenario is presented, especially when one of them is likely and promoted.
Let us take, for example, what is proposed by some (more than one individual or party). Here its meaning is conveyed, and not its literal text, as long as there are multiple sayers. This article must be considered to reflect its desire, when conveying the scenarios, the subject of discussion.
The first scenario: The Zionist entity achieves the goals it set for the war it launched against the people and the resistance in Gaza. First and foremost is the elimination of Hamas and its leadership. (Also eliminating jihad and all resistance factions). The goal is to bring about demographic change by displacing tens or hundreds of thousands of residents, including changing the internal map of the Strip.
They consider this scenario to be the weakest of the three scenarios presented. It is very unlikely, and must be accompanied by “God forbid” and washing the hands before asking it in the first place.
Because merely considering it a possible scenario, even if weakly, or considering it the weakest, harms, even indirectly, the morale of the resistance and the people in the Gaza Strip, and makes what is presented by the psychological warfare waged by the enemy a subject for discussion. Because it is not possible for such a scenario to go unnoticed.
That is why it was necessary to apologize for it by those who committed it.
Strategy for settlement
As for the second scenario - which shares the weakness of the first scenario among those who proposed the first scenario, and they call it the second scenario - it is “without a political horizon” so that the war ends, as the previous wars ended: 2008/2009, 2012, 2014, and 2021. This is to establish a truce so that the situation returns to what it was before October 7: the Zionist entity is outside Gaza, but is besieging it, while the resistance and the people return to living and struggling, and preparing for the confrontation under the siege.
This scenario seems bad; Because he did not come out with a political horizon. What is important is that it is weak and unexpected. Note that this is most likely the strongest possibility, but beware of entering into the game of scenarios. This is due to the necessity of returning to the strategy of continuing the resistance option after the cessation of fighting in the Gaza Strip. This is under the slogan of liberating Al-Aqsa, defeating the occupation from Jerusalem and the West Bank, and dismantling the settlements.
In this way, it continues with the “Al-Aqsa Flood” and the liberation strategy, and is consistent with the experience of historical conflict, where there is no horizon for a political solution. It is the strategic line corresponding to the line in the third scenario, which is detailed as follows:
They consider the third scenario to be the most likely, and they consider it to have a “political horizon.” They project onto him a settlement strategy they want. Note that there is no scenario that does not have a political horizon, even if the political horizon differs from one scenario to another, unless the political horizon is limited to agreeing on a political solution within the framework of the two-state solution.
Resistance in itself carries a political horizon, even if it is limited to exhausting the enemy, or by long-term preparation for complete liberation.
The third scenario hopes for the occurrence of a regional-international-Palestinian-Zionist entity consensus, which achieves for the Palestinians a “state” (certainly a “state”), and grants the Zionist entity the security and other things it needs, so that it, in turn, accepts the aforementioned consensus.
Some of those who propose this scenario distance it from the two-state solution. Because it does not include recognition of the entity's state.
The proponents of this scenario base their logic on the following facts:
The “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation, as they understand it, or want it, was not without a goal, or was not in vain. Rather, it demanded a Palestinian state based on the statement announced by Muhammad Al-Deif, “Abu Khaled,” and it does not detract from all the goals mentioned in the statement that address the issue of resistance. Liberation, defeating the Zionist project, and even revolutionizing the entire region. Thus, the historical statement summarizes the achievement of this state.
They stress that this war has proven that it is not possible to ignore the Palestinian people. Fortunately, they do not use the phrase: "a difficult number in the region that cannot be ignored." It is a Fatah song in the 1980s. The difficult number, or not ignoring the Palestinians, combine to give the Palestinians a “state” on the lands of June 4, 1967.
There is a hindering problem, which is the slogan of eliminating Hamas. They provide ample evidence that this slogan is not achievable, citing examples of previous attempts that failed. As well as its popular strength, as the largest Palestinian faction, add the valor of its resistance, and the inability to defeat it, as Netanyahu plans.
This is to engage Hamas with all Palestinians, to achieve the expected regional and international consensus. Hence, this prohibition must be dropped from their calculations.
The bottom line is to reassure Hamas that it must be a partner in the consensus stage (the next settlement). Then he further reassured her that the project to establish a state would include, after a year or two, holding elections in which Hamas would have a stake.
International consensus
They believe that the West, America, and the countries of the region, who will participate in the consensus on formulating the third scenario, have begun to accept a role for Hamas. Their positions must be reversed after October 7.
They consider Turkish President Erdogan ready to be a guarantor of the Palestinian people and to be part of the arrangements to stop the war.
The “Al-Aqsa Flood” represented an opportunity for the Palestinians to overcome the unresolved crises of the past 15 years. This will be done by rearranging the Palestinian situation by forming an “interim leadership” that includes all Palestinians.
Thus, a new movement emerges, with the will of all parties to bring about positive change. And be ready to enter the settlement process.
The world wants to offer something to the Palestinians, but to whom does it offer it? The Authority is absent, and Hamas is excluded, while America realizes that it is not possible to bypass the Palestinians, as proven by the “Al-Aqsa Flood” and the war on Gaza. She started talking about a Palestinian state.
Here he returns, the illusion of a new path based on that consensus (settlement), with American participation, to repeat the past with amazing reassurance, in addition to urging the Palestinian house to be put in order for the settlement. Not to win the war. And continue the resistance to liberate Al-Aqsa and defeat the occupation. –
The rational solution in the middle is this consensus, and Hamas must be at the center of these arrangements.
The proponents of this scenario do not, in fact, speak impartially and objectively about a possible scenario, or only the strongest possible scenario, but rather they urge putting the Palestinian house in order with the participation of everyone, including Hamas, in order to benefit from the “opportunity” provided by the “Al-Aqsa Flood.” It was also enabled by steadfastness and resistance in Gaza. It is not an opportunity to continue the resistance and move forward to complete liberation.
A creative path to editing
They demand and expect a regional, international, and then Palestinian, consensus to force the Zionist situation to get rid of the extreme right and Netanyahu, and to strengthen the role of the “centre” that can accept this consensus, in exchange for securing the entity’s existence and future. By giving him some of what pleases him as well.
This means that talking about scenarios hides behind it a political direction to resolve the Palestinian issue on the basis of establishing a Palestinian state on the lands of June 4, 1967, and through an international consensus formed by America, the West, and the countries of the region, and through a Palestinian emergency leadership that must be formed, as well as salvation from Mahmoud Abbas. , as from Netanyahu, and the right to involve a practically non-existent “centre”.
That is, we are in the process of draft settlement No. 2, with conditions for establishing a state that are better than the conditions upon which Oslo was based. The illusion that mounted the heads of some Palestinians on the way to the Oslo Accords has begun to invade the minds of some Palestinians who want to take Hamas and the “Al-Aqsa Flood” and everyone else, to repeat the PLO and Fatah from 1988-1993, even with an American participant.
Advice: Do not try what was tried with the Al-Aqsa Intifada, which paved a creative way to liberate Palestine, and to continue the resistance after a truce, or a ceasefire.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Al Jazeera.