Forces loyal to the Houthis gathered in Sanaa after American and British strikes on their positions (Anatolia)

The Houthi group is not the product of the last two decades of Yemen's history, as some believe. It is also not a political movement that emerged as a result of the democratic margin that resulted from the circumstances after achieving unity between the two parts of South and North Yemen in the year 1990 AD, as much as it is an extension of an Imami project that laid its seeds in Saada Governorate and the regions of the north, what was called the Imam, the Guide to the Truth, Yahya bin Al-Hussein Al-Rasi in the year. 893 AD, and later known as the Hadavian doctrine.

It is thus the offspring of this doctrine and system that extends for more than 1,100 years, which is based on the idea of ​​the two clans based on divine selection and restricting the imamate and leadership of the nation to the descendants of the two grandsons: Al-Hassan and Al-Hussein until the Day of Judgment.

Tactical engagement

Although this thought agreed and identified with the Zaidi school of thought, it differed from it in many aspects and did not adhere, for example, to the 14 conditions required by the Zaidi school of thought to assume the imamate in many of its historical stages, as happened during the era of the Qasimi state that ruled most of Yemen, and the rule changed during its reign. To a royal hereditary, as was the case in the last Imami rule in Yemen before the outbreak of the September 26 Revolution, which was supported and supported by the late Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1960s.

The Houthis reaped the fruits of this thought and the efforts of its symbols, which engaged tactically in the republican regime that followed the aforementioned September Revolution, and the ensuing civil war that ended in national reconciliation, and worked to strengthen the presence of its members in state institutions and sensitive facilities. It is the deep state in Yemen, if we can describe it as such, and it worked diligently to create the atmosphere and conditions for a return to ruling Yemen.

Following Yemeni unity, the first youth entity appeared under the name: “Believer Youth.” Taking advantage of the late President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s state of apprehension about the growing strength of the Islah Party, or the Yemeni Brotherhood, as some like to call them, as well as the dispute that began to expand between the two unity partners: the General People’s Congress Party, led by Ali Saleh, and the Yemeni Socialist Party, led by Ali Al-Baidh, and this nascent entity enjoyed With implicit support from Saleh in his attempt to play on the contradictions, dancing on the heads of snakes as he chanted.

At the beginning of the current century, Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi turned against his founding partners of the “Believer Youth” movement, according to the story of its most prominent founders, and took control of the movement. It was then known, since its armed appearance, as the “Houthi group,” before it later called itself the “Ansar Allah group.”

Field gains

The founder of the "Houthi group" - who was a member of the first parliament after achieving Yemeni unity from President Saleh's party - fought his first war against the government authorities in 2004 after previous tensions during which his supporters seized financial revenues and controlled some of the areas that fell within their influence in their main stronghold. In Saada Governorate, northern Yemen, on an ideological basis, he was killed in the first round of the war in the same year.

His younger brother, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, took over the leadership of the group after him, and fought five subsequent wars that extended until the year 2010. In each of its rounds, his group achieved expansionary field gains and political gains, taking advantage of the declared and undeclared differences between Ali Abdullah Saleh and his military, tribal, and political partners in power, and the skill of its arms. The politician who played a brilliant role in fragmenting the ruling system.

The events of the Arab Spring and the protests of Yemeni youth against the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh provided a valuable opportunity for the Houthis, so they cunningly played on the contradictions of the allied and conflicting Yemeni forces alike.

They expressed their sympathy with the Southern Movement and pitched their tents in the squares of change with the youth of the revolution, and at the same time their communication with the president in crisis was not interrupted as a result of the escalating protests against him. These protests - and the agreements they produced on weak figures to manage the transitional phase - enabled them to reverse the political path and take armed control. On Sanaa, their forces have been knocking on its doors since 2009.

The accumulated experiences of the project they represent and the experience and shrewdness of its seasoned politicians enabled them to understand the sensitivity of neighbors and external powers and their fears of the parties and groups produced by the Arab Spring revolutions, especially the Islamist ones, and to play on their strings.

Confused attitude

Just as the war in Yemen has strengthened the Houthis’ power at the internal level, the American-British bombing today legitimizes their popular presence at the Arab and Islamic levels, gives them much-needed external sympathy, and puts their local opponents in a confused position, especially since the Palestinian issue enjoys consensus among everyone. Categories of the Yemeni people and their components.

Hardly anyone disagrees that the Houthi solidarity with Gaza and its targeting of commercial ships connected to Israel or heading towards its ports - which developed into targeting American and British ships in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea - is a bold and important act in the course of the conflict. However, the Houthis benefited greatly from the events Gaza, and through its unprecedented solidarity, it was able to present itself to the world as an important player in the region.

Indeed, we are not exaggerating if we say that, as a result of these events, Al-Houthi discovered himself and the extent of his ability to shuffle the cards with regard to international trade and its sea lanes.

At the same time, he fled from local entitlements that almost pushed him into a tight corner due to the escalating popular anger. Due to the deterioration of living conditions and the interruption of employee salaries since the outbreak of war, especially with the signs of peace that appeared before the end of last year.

Special reference

The events in Gaza provided a valuable opportunity for the Houthis to prove the sincerity of their slogans raised since their armed appearance at the beginning of the current century, and what was included in the "lieutenant" of the group's founder, Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, whom they describe as the speaking Qur'an. It is considered the group's intellectual reference, as well as the intellectual and cultural document that the group's leader signed with A number of Zaidi scholars in recent years, which emphasize a number of principles, including the aforementioned idea of ​​selection, and hostility to America and Israel.

Here we can say: The Houthi group, although it appears to be part of the Zaidi doctrine, differs from it on many issues, and has its own authority, and there are those who say: It represented a coup against the legacy of the Zaidi sect in Yemen.

As for its relationship with the Islamic Revolution in Iran, it does not deny that relationship, but rather brags about it. It raises pictures of its symbols and leadership on its occasions, is in harmony with their ideas, and has benefited greatly from Iranian support for it. However, its roots extend back to before the Khomeini Revolution in Iran, as we mentioned previously. Therefore, it is not unlikely that it will have a special vision, especially after the regional and global presence it has achieved recently.