The appointment of former Turkish intelligence chief Hakan Fidan as foreign minister in the new government formed by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan gives some indications of the nature of Ankara's approach to foreign policy in the coming period.

In the years he led the intelligence service, Fidan oversaw (more sensitive) back-end channels of communication with various regional and international actors, playing a prominent role in shaping the security and intelligence aspects of the relationship with Russia and the United States, contributing behind the scenes to arranging reconciliations with Turkey's former regional rivals such as the UAE, Israel, and Egypt, and overseeing the security and intelligence communication channels that Ankara opened years ago with the Syrian regime.

Over the past years, Erdogan has created an exceptional formula that has allowed Turkey to formulate foreign policies more independent of the West while preserving its geopolitical identity as part of NATO.

Moreover, Fidan has played a prominent role in Turkey's conflict with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and its Syrian affiliate, the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG). In light of the extensive intelligence experience he has gained in managing sensitive issues with these influential external actors in Turkey's foreign policy, as well as his extensive knowledge in diplomacy, which was reinforced by his permanent presence with Erdogan in foreign visits and talks with various world leaders, he will be able to employ it to shape a new foreign policy that harmonizes the requirements of security and diplomacy.

One of the salient features of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's rule was the formation of a foreign policy based on 3 principles:

  • The tendency towards strategic independence.
  • Balance of major powers.
  • Combining hard power and diplomacy in dealing with the ambitions and challenges facing Turkey in its southern periphery.

With Erdogan winning a third term, Turkey's foreign policy will continue to be based on these principles while maximizing the role of diplomacy to promote the delicate balance between major powers and give additional impetus to the process of re-zeroing problems with neighboring countries, especially Arab ones. Because security is more dominant than other areas in shaping Turkish foreign policy, the assumption of foreign affairs by an intelligence figure reinforces the close link between security and foreign policy formulation.

Fidan will have to design a foreign policy that deals primarily with some of the most sensitive foreign policy security issues such as the conflict with the PKK and Turkey's geopolitical challenges with Greece and southern Cyprus, as well as managing troubled relations with the West by relying more on diplomacy.

Given the cornerstone of Turkey's membership in NATO in the field of security, the advantage of membership will continue to be of great importance in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey has the second most powerful NATO military after the United States and benefits from significant membership advantages, and is actively involved in NATO strategies in different regions of the world.

However, the problems it suffers with some of its NATO allies, such as the United States and Greece, will remain a disturbing factor for the harmony of Turkish foreign policy with other NATO countries. Over the past years, Erdogan has created an exceptional formula that has allowed Turkey to formulate foreign policies more independent of the West while preserving its geopolitical identity as part of NATO.

In the new five years of Erdogan's rule, this formula will remain one of the important means that maintain Turkey's effective role in NATO policies, and balance its divergent national interests with the alliance on some vital issues such as the Russian-Ukrainian war.

The biggest problem is that Turkey's policies with NATO are not fully harmonized in Turkish-American differences on sensitive issues such as the U.S. relationship with the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) and Washington's growing military ties with Greece and Southern Cyprus.

For the foreseeable future, Ankara and Washington are unlikely to be able to find a magic solution to these differences, but both sides will be able to focus on means of effectively and meaningfully managing differences. If the United States fulfills its pledges to Turkey to sell F-16 fighter jets, such a move would give a positive sign for the next five years in Turkish-American relations.

Sweden's inclusion in NATO remains one of the current problems facing Turkish-Western relations. Still, a combination of maximum Swedish response to Turkey's demands for the extradition of wanted terrorism suspects to Ankara, the complete severing of Stockholm's ties with the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), and Washington's facilitation of the F-16 deal could mark a new beginning for Turkish-Western relations.

Erdogan's strong partnership with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, after the middle of the last decade, has strained Turkish-Western relations. But Western capitals may be willing to accept this partnership if Erdogan can strike a delicate balance in relations with Russia and the West.

It is encouraging in this regard that Turkey's maintenance of its partnership with Russia after the war in Ukraine was not at the expense of Turkey's rejection of this war and its assertion of Ukrainian territorial integrity. Of course, Westerners had hoped that Turkey would engage in sanctions on Russia, but such a move does not necessarily advance Western interests.

The West still needs a channel to communicate with Putin and convince him of the advantages of de-escalating the war and seeking ways to peace, and Turkey is the most available and effective channel. Moreover, Turkey's neutrality and mediating between Moscow and Kiev had benefits for the West, especially in terms of concluding the Black Sea grain export agreement and extending it three times in a row.

Given the broad geopolitical interests overlapping between Turkey and Russia on many issues such as the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Syria, and Libya, and given the West's limited influence on these issues, Erdogan will continue to attach importance to this partnership in his new presidential term.

Besides ending the threat posed by the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), the Syrian arm of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), and returning Syrian refugees in Turkey to their country, which deeply worries Erdogan, achieving these goals requires Turkey to continue its cooperation with Russia and Iran in particular.

Because Turkey is a member of NATO, the rest of the alliance must view the threats it faces as a threat to them as well, so Turkey's cooperation with Russia and Iran in Syria and the South Caucasus should not be seen as a threat to Western interests.

At the level of Turkey's perception of its place in the new world order shaped by the new geopolitical competition between great powers, Turkey under the new term of Erdogan will continue the strategy of diversifying foreign partnerships as a mediator to ensure its interests and to hedge against the threats that this competition carries for it.

Ankara will work to build ties with China through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which Erdogan is considering joining, and he also has aspirations to join the BRICS. In this sense, Turkey's new foreign policy seeks to transform Turkey into a stabilizing force between East and West.