Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, the prank of "Hemedti", was born in 1975 in Darfur, and was famous in his youth for trading camels and sheep, and continued to move between Chad, Libya and Egypt. The fact that a militia began with it to secure convoys and deter bandits, and developed into a large force that drew the attention of the Sudanese government, which aspired to include it to support the Janjaweed militia in order to suppress the rebellion of armed movements in the western Darfur region, and thus that militia was his gateway to enter the political arena until he became the vice president of the Transitional Military Council after the coup against Omar al-Bashir, who appointed him and introduced him to the army.

Birth and upbringing

Mohamed Hamdan Daglo was born in 1975 in North Darfur State, and his origin goes back to the thigh of Mahamid from the Arab Bedouin Rizeigat tribe, which has a great popular depth in Darfur, Kordofan, Chad and a number of African countries. He was educated in traditional schools, but has been out of school since 1991, at the age of 15.

In the mid-nineties, Hamidti became a well-known young man in the corridors and trade routes, so he was active in the camel and sheep trade and the import of cloth, especially between Libya, Mali and Chad, and led a small group to secure convoys and deter bandits and thieves in the areas controlled by his tribe.

Between Darfur, Chad, Libya and Egypt, Hemedti moved as a camel vendor and caravan protector until he made a fortune, forming a militia that drew the attention of Sudanese politicians to their desire to include tribes in their alliance with the Janjaweed in order to confront the rebellion in Darfur, and his militia later enabled him to influence Sudanese political affairs.


Political experience

With the outbreak of the Darfur conflict in 2003, Hemedti's militia attracted Janjaweed elements and began to attract the attention of decision-makers in Khartoum, and soon began to attract members of different tribes, until a nationalist popular force was formed under the name of "Border Intelligence Units" and Hemedti was appointed to them.

In 2007, Hemedti was appointed brigadier general, and his forces were included in the Sudanese intelligence service, and then in 2013 it was restructured by ousted President Omar al-Bashir and called it the "Rapid Support Force", and made it an official paramilitary entity led by Hemedti, who granted Bashir great powers and privileges that aroused the jealousy and anger of senior officers, and Bashir made the force fight on behalf of the Sudanese government during his reign during the war in Darfur.

Hemedti's wealth increased during this period, and with it increased his influence and forces, until he seized key gold mining sites in the Darfur region, and by 2017 gold sales in the country accounted for 40 percent of exports.

In 2015, Hemedti was able to develop his foreign relations, sending the Rapid Support Units (RSF) to Yemen after Sudan joined a coalition with Saudi Arabia to fight the Houthis.

According to unofficial statistics, the RSF in 2019 numbered about 40,100 members, mostly from Sudanese tribes from the west and east, and Bashir armed it with light and medium weapons such as rifles, small guns and SUVs. It is now reported to be about <>,<> militants, equipped with fast-moving armed four-wheel-drive vehicles.

Some reports say that Hemedti and his forces' control of Sudan's gold mines, especially in Jebel Amer, after the ouster of former Janjaweed militia leader Musa Hilal, gave Hemedti financial independence and power outside the control of the military, exacerbated by some hands of external support, according to his opponents.

Omar al-Bashir tried to strengthen the influence of the RSF and make it a parallel power center to the army, in order to avoid any military coup. Hemedti continued his remarkable rise in Sudanese ruling circles, and obtained exceptional military promotions that raised him to the rank of major general and then to the rank of lieutenant general, without the pressure of military leaders succeeding in overthrowing him after the army's hostility to him grew.

In January 2017, the government passed the Rapid Support Law and transferred the subordination of the Force from the NISS to the armed forces, even though most of its members are not military.


The overthrow of Omar al-Bashir

With the escalation of demonstrations in 2018-2019, Hemedti decided to abandon Bashir, who remained his protector for 15 years, and refused to suppress the demonstrators, and also called for the overthrow of Bashir and all the old guardsmen, and the reduction of the transitional period, and put forward a referendum on the survival of Sudanese forces in the war in Yemen, and made remarkable statements in which he called on the government to provide services to citizens and provide them with a decent livelihood.

Secret negotiations began between Hemedti and the army on merging his forces or reducing their powers, and the two sides reached a deal in which Hemedti was offered the position of deputy head of the military council, in exchange for guarantees that did not prejudice the interests of the army in the post-Bashir phase, which were to protect his old authorities, ensure that he maintains control over the vital resources of the state, and limit any future government that aims to oust him from the scene.

In addition to the new authority he enjoyed, the RSF commander maintained an independent budget for his forces, in addition to fortifying his position throughout the transitional period from dismissal or trial, which is reflected in the outcomes of the constitutional document signed in late 2019.

Abdalla Hamdok (then prime minister of the transitional government) clashed with the RSF over an initiative that included annexing these forces to the military and regularizing their status, and Hemedti and Burhan decided to turn against Hamdok.


Disagreement with proof

Until the extraordinary measures taken by Sudan's army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in October 2021, the relationship between him and his deputy, Hemedti, was good, and Hemedti had broad power, especially in choosing state governors.

Both sides were allies against civilian forces after Bashir's ouster, with Burhan becoming head of the Sovereignty Council and commander of the army, while Hamdan became vice president of the Sovereignty Council.

In May 2021, differences between the two parties over power and influence flared up, almost reaching armed confrontation, but Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and civilian members of the Sovereignty Council intervened to reconcile them, until they agreed to end the partnership with the Forces of the Declaration of Freedom and Change on October 25, 2021.

After that, Hemedti began again by accusing Burhan and said that he "lived with him the trick" of overthrowing the ousted President Omar al-Bashir, and accused him of having an "agenda" to restore the Bashir regime to power, and came out announcing the inability to form an executive government, with the worsening of the economic crisis, and the deterioration of the security situation, then he retired in Darfur, then talked about the hands of military intelligence that moved unrest in Central Africa, and criticized the performance of the security services loyal to Burhan.

The army now sees a widespread threat in the growing capacity of Hemedti's irregular forces, their possession of the latest weapons, their control over a large budget thanks to their financial independence, and Hemedti's tendency to build a new alliance with tribal notables and sheikhs of Sufi orders, at a time when the army is looking for a civilian façade to complete the transitional period and transfer power to an elected government in which it guarantees that its interests will not be compromised.

By the end of 2022, Hemedti unilaterally announced his support for the transitional constitution prepared by the Sudanese Bar Association, which stipulated the removal of the military institution from power and the integration of all other forces into the Sudanese army, in a comprehensive security and military reform process.

Proposals for a political settlement between the military and civilians emerged in August 2022 under regional and international auspices, and RSF commander Hemedti was more enthusiastic about the settlement, versus the army commander, who accepted it "very conservatively."


On December 5, 2022, Burhan and Hemedti signed a preliminary framework agreement with civilians to end the political crisis in the country, and to conduct five workshops dedicated to security and military reform, justice, transitional justice, and others. Although Burhan signed the framework agreement, he stated on more than one occasion that the RSF be integrated into the army to implement the agreement.

Hemedti then issued an official statement in February 2022 declaring his regret for participating in the October 25 "coup", which was followed by obstructing the workshops included in the security and military reform in the agreement.

Burhan and Hemedti signed the security and military reform paper on March 15 under the auspices of the Quartet of America, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, which set the maximum limit for the integration of the Rapid Support Forces at 10 years, but disagreement has arisen over the method and details of the integration.

This was followed by several attempts at mediation between the two parties, but they failed without solutions, and the focus of the dispute was that Burhan and those with him believed that the forces should be subordinate to the army commander, while Hemedti believed that they should be to the head of state according to the framework agreement.

In April 2023, Hemedti and Abdel Fattah al-Burhan clashed over the timetable for the integration of the RSF, who will assume the position of commander-in-chief of the army during the merger period, and the place of RSF officers in the future hierarchy.

The RSF headed to the northern Sudanese city of Meroe on April 13 to position itself near Merowe airport, which has an air base said to house Egyptian military personnel present to assist the Sudanese army in the anticipated war against the RSF.

The stationing of Hemedti's forces angered the army, which in return reinforced its presence in the area with additional forces, to the point of armed confrontation and ignite throughout the cities of Sudan in light of the exchange of accusations between the two parties about the cause of the first flame.