Polish Ambassador to France Jan Emerick Rosciszewski said on the LCI news channel: "If Ukraine cannot defend its independence, we will have no choice but to enter into conflict." That is, if the goals set by Russia (demilitarization and denazification of the territory of the former Ukrainian SSR) are achieved, then the Russians will have to deal with Warsaw. We are proudly at war with arrogant Moscow.
The statement is strong. As part of secret diplomacy, Ambassador Rosciszewski could (and even in a sense was obliged) to ventilate on the Cay d'Orsay how Paris thought to act if Kiev was defeated, and how it would react to Poland's armed intervention in the conflict. A possible future war is a serious matter, and it is important for Pilsudski's heirs to know how Bonaparte's heirs will behave in this case.
But in the rank of ambassador, one should act with all possible delicacy, so as not to expose either its leadership or the leadership of France. If Poland wanted to warn Russia that it would not simply abandon the denazification of Ukraine, this could also be done through secret diplomatic channels. In military preparations and threats, excessive publicity is more likely to be harmful, as politicians are held hostage to their own excessive statements, and if necessary, it is more difficult for them to make a back door.
Moreover, the ambassador, by the very nature of his position, does not and cannot have a personal opinion. He speaks on behalf of his sovereign (in the present case, Duda, Morawiecki), who authorized him to do so by providing him with credentials.
Therefore, after the spectacular scene "Hot heads have completely lost their minds" played out on the air of the LCI television channel, the guests drew their sabers, the table staggered, the candles fell. One dense, one-eyed nobleman shouted: "This is how our enemies, schismatics and moskals, will perish! "- famously cut a huge dish of sausages with a saber", - for the heroically chopped sausages should not be responsible Pan Rosciszewski, but the clairvoyant Duda and Morawiecki, who gave him the authority to knit and chop.
In passing, we note that threatening war is not quite an embassy business at all. The position of ambassador was invented to resolve controversial issues peacefully, avoiding the last argument of kings. When it is impossible to avoid, it means that the ambassador's mission has failed – the end of diplomacy has come.
Ambassadors used to understand this. On August 1, 1914, the German ambassador in St. Petersburg, Count Pourtales, handing Minister S.D. Sazonov a note on the declaration of war, could not restrain himself and began to cry, so that Sazonov had to console him. On June 22, 1941, Ambassador von Schulenburg, delivering a note to the People's Commissar V.M. Molotov, although he refrained from tears and Molotov did not have to console him, was still shocked by the catastrophic end of his service in Moscow.
Unlike the faint-hearted Pourtales and Schulenburg, Rosciszewski was cheerful and determined.
In addition, in the question of whether the ambassador's statements should be disavowed, a technique was used that had not previously taken place at all in diplomatic practice.
Neither President Duda, nor Prime Minister Morawiecki, nor even polish Foreign Minister Rau spoke in any way in the sense that the ambassador took on too much. Perhaps it was silence, which is a sign of agreement.
However, the disagreement was still revealed, but not by the highest officials of Poland, but by the employees of the Polish Embassy in Paris. Embassy staff pointed out that the ambassador's statement was taken out of context, there was no statement about Poland's direct participation in the conflict, but only a warning about the consequences of Ukraine's defeat. It was about "the possibility of Russia attacking or drawing into the war the next countries of Central Europe - the Baltic States and Poland."
When it turns out that politics is misunderstood, that's a bad sign. He is speechless to be properly understood. All that is needed is to avoid ambiguities. Especially in sensitive matters. And for a diplomat, this applies purely and demandingly.
But it is equally important who is entrusted to explain that the ambassador was misunderstood.
Embassy staff: chargés d'affaires, secretaries, attachés are the ambassador's servants. If today they are given the right to explain what the ambassador meant, then tomorrow the valet and the cook will deal with such explanations. It is generally unclear who the ambassador is and what he is responsible for.
Recently, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland proudly reported on the personnel achievements of his department: the last MGIMO graduate left it, and now it is completely free from the Soviet legacy. But, it seems, along with the remnants of the cursed communist past, the Polish Foreign Ministry got rid of minimal ideas about diplomatic protocol. Poland's ambassador to Paris, who bravely chopped down sausages, schismatics and Moskals, is a case in point.
The author's point of view may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.