This is the fourth and final article in this series that began on the occasion of the start of the new Gregorian year, the first month of which is about to leave, motivated to drag behind it the rest of the months, leaving room for the state of madness - which controls most Arab countries - to continue more than it should;

Destroying the hopes and aspirations of its people, and dedicating the state of despair in which it lives, leading to the conviction of the impossibility of getting out of this situation, the impossibility of the success of the reform process, and the entrenchment of the belief that any efforts made in it, its inevitable fate is absolute failure.

So shall we surrender to that, to complete the current year with this impossible madness, or will we soon witness serious moves to defeat it, and put a definitive end to it?

The analysis of the local, regional and international political reality, in the current historical stage in all its contexts;

He confirms that comprehensive reform processes can only be carried out in the Arab countries through the regimes themselves, as they are the ones that have the decision, the tools and the capabilities.

In the previous article, we talked about the most prominent areas of reform that most Arab countries need, regardless of the type of their political system, and we mentioned that the reform process is a complex and long process, but it is not impossible. Some of them are in power, which has weakened their ability to contribute to the comprehensive reform process that the countries of the region need.

So what is the way to face this impossible and start the reform process?

Reform is the responsibility of the governing authorities

This situation places full responsibility on the shoulders of the ruling authorities, to carry out the entire reform process, and to involve all institutions, bodies and competencies, to play their role in it, each according to his competence, within a comprehensive national program, which is ultimately in favor of achieving higher goals, foremost of which are:

  • The stability of the ruling system and the establishment of its legitimacy without tyranny, repression or intimidation.

  • Achieving political détente at all levels.

  • Addressing the existing, chronic and emerging crises that the country suffers from.

  • Spreading law and order based on the constitution, rights and duties.

    And the institutional organization of the state, in a way that helps the authority to carry out its duties towards the people.

  • Getting rid of all destructive, authoritarian, totalitarian manifestations and behaviors.

  • Fighting corruption, bribery and nepotism, and promoting freedom, justice and equality.

  • Correcting the relationship with the people, and deepening their loyalty to the regime, without coercion, repression or threats.

  • Laying the right foundations for building future generations who adhere to the identity of the state, its national and national goals, and its religious and social values.

  • Launching the wheel of development, innovation and development in all fields and at all levels, with the contribution of all institutions and groups.

  • Increasing effectiveness and influence at the regional and international levels.

    And full sovereignty and independence of decision.

  • Here, attention must be paid to the difference between reform and change. As Dr. Saad Al-Kubaisi says in his book “The Effectiveness of Reform”, every reform is a change, and not every change is necessarily a reform. As a result, it will lead to turmoil in the social, political and economic conditions.

    We have often witnessed many Arab countries undergoing broad national change processes.

    political, economic, social, educational and cultural, but they are limited change processes that directly benefit the consolidation of the foundations of the ruling system, and respond to external dictates and trade-offs, and not with the aim of carrying out a comprehensive national reform as mentioned above.

    Which confirms this;

    Linking the process of change to the ruling regime, and canceling it directly as soon as it falls and is replaced by another regime.

    The limited individual or institutional efforts that are made from time to time, under the auspices and funding of this or that party of Western countries and institutions, to study the conditions of Arab countries, to identify areas of reform, and to suggest the necessary tools and mechanisms to carry it out (reform);

    They are vain efforts doomed to failure.

    The analysis of the local, regional and international political reality, in the current historical stage in all its contexts;

    He affirms that comprehensive reform processes can only be carried out in the Arab countries through the regimes themselves, as they are the ones that have the decision, tools and capabilities to lead this process, which will achieve:

    • Proper planning for it, defining its fields, objectives, stages and timings.

    • Directing all institutions, bodies and competencies to participate in it.

    • Provide the necessary guarantees for its integrity and independence.

    • Supervise its progress and ensure that it achieves its objectives and adherence to its plans.

    • Accepting its outputs, and directing them to be implemented on the ground.

    • Ensure that no regional or international parties interfere in it.

    As for the limited individual or institutional efforts that are made from time to time, under the auspices and funding of this or that party from Western countries and institutions, to study the conditions of Arab countries, identify areas of reform, and propose the necessary tools and mechanisms to carry it out (reform);

    They are futile efforts doomed to failure, because the ruling Arab authorities do not recognize them, and often accuse their participants of working to destabilize stability in favor of foreign agendas.

    Initiating the reform process

    Will the ruling regimes take the helm and start the comprehensive reform process, at the national and international levels?

    It certainly can, but the answer depends on a set of internal and external factors, including:

    • Acknowledgment by the ruling regime of its internal problems, and knowledge of their real causes and consequences.

      The regime's rejection of misleading reports submitted by specialized agencies in various fields to justify their failure, prove their loyalty, and preserve their interests and gains.

    • The regime is convinced that the methods of repression and intimidation, and the policies of enticement, exclusion and antagonism, will not achieve popular legitimacy for it, will not achieve stability, will not help it solve its problems, and will not record its name in the white pages of its nation’s history.

    • The regime's belief that internal reform is the only way to consolidate its foundations, gain the people's trust, and solve the chronic and urgent problems that the state suffers from in all fields.

    • The presence of the regime's sincere will to carry out comprehensive reform, and to place it as a top priority.

    • The regime's willingness to carry out the necessary purification campaigns to start the reform process, and to take the necessary measures against the centers of power that abuse the powers entrusted to them, and fuel the hotbeds of corruption spread throughout all state institutions and projects.

    • The ability of the regime to confront external pressures that are keen on continuing problems and escalating crises, in order to continue to control the regime and tighten its grip on its plans, programs, policies, and even its leadership.

    As complex as the reform process seems to be impossible, it is possible and affordable if the previous factors are realized, and we infer this from the 2030 Agenda for Change, which was adopted by all Arab countries without exception, in response to the requirements of the United Nations Plan for Sustainable Development Goals 2030. Arab countries responded to These requirements, and developed implementation plans for them at the national level, and formed the necessary teams for that, and trained them to carry out the work entrusted to them, and implemented those plans in accordance with the standards, procedures, and steps set by the United Nations, with great commitment to timetables, models, programs, and policies, and full cooperation with the follow-up and evaluation committees They meet periodically to verify the country's commitment to the details of the development plan's goals, measure success indicators, and monitor problems and obstacles encountered.

    Indeed, some Arab countries have included these goals in their national strategic plan, which has set a time limit of 2030.

    This great response to the United Nations plan brought about major changes in the structure of Arab societies, although it is an international plan that does not serve the comprehensive reform goals needed by Arab countries, which the United Nations ignores.

    Of course, this is not the only example, but it is the biggest example.

    It is certain that comprehensive reform is not an easy process, and that it collides with many interlocking internal and external obstacles, which have permeated government systems and apparatuses for decades, but that must push the crisis-ridden Arab countries that suffer from terrifying political blockages that have made them subject to a long series of extortion;

    Until it moves to put an end to all of this, by launching a process of real, honest and comprehensive reform.

    (is over)