Questions of rapprochement between Turkey and the Syrian regime

Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar met in the Russian capital with his Syrian counterpart, Ali Mahmoud Abbas, in the first official and announced meeting - at the ministerial level - between Turkey and the Syrian regime in a decade, in an implicit declaration of a new phase in relations between the two sides.

In the last few years, the Turkish opposition's criticism of the government regarding its Syrian policies and its demands to open a dialogue with the Assad regime has increased, on the grounds that the two parties share one central interest, which is to thwart the projects of secession and division in Syria.

convergence path

Exactly a year after the start of the protests in Syria, in March 2012, the diplomatic rupture between Turkey and Syria began, as a protest from the first against the security dealings of the second against the demonstrators, and the stage of Turkish support for the Syrian revolution began.

Istanbul has turned into an undeclared headquarters for the political forces and personalities involved in the revolution, and a venue for holding opposition conferences, with an official Turkish discourse rejecting the legitimacy of the Syrian regime.

With the passage of years and the development of events, the Turkish position on the Syrian issue has evolved several times, the most important of which was the decision to engage directly in August 2016 through the "Euphrates Shield" operation and the subsequent military operations in northern Syria to prevent the establishment of what Ankara calls a "terror corridor" on Its southern borders are occupied by political currents and military groups that are closely linked to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which is on terrorist lists.

With the exception of Operation Spring Shield in February 2020, there was no direct military confrontation between the two sides, even when the regime forces surrounded some Turkish observation points in the north, as Ankara contented itself with supporting factions of the armed Syrian opposition and combating organizations that it classifies as separatist and terrorist.

In addition, the possibilities of military confrontation between the regime and the opposition itself declined significantly after the launch of the Astana track at the beginning of 2017, the dismantling of Russia into 3 out of 4 de-escalation zones, and the launch of the political track that had been frozen for a while at the point of the Constitutional Committee.

In the last few years, the Turkish opposition's criticism of the government regarding its Syrian policies and its demands to open a dialogue with the Assad regime has increased, in the sense that the two parties share one central interest, which is to thwart the projects of secession and division in Syria, without the government and the ruling party, which remained on the same rhetoric regarding Assad, responding. killer of his own people.

Recently, with the approaching presidential and parliamentary elections, the Syrian presence in Turkey has become one of the most important electoral files, pressure papers, and bidding on the government and the ruling party through the traditional opposition, as well as some racist currents and personalities.

This prompted the government to adjust its handling of the file and announce a project to return a million Syrians to northern Syria on the one hand, and to consider the possibility of forging a political relationship with the regime as one of the requirements for establishing a safe zone to which the residents of Turkey will return on the other hand.

Thus, little by little, some media, research and political circles and circles close to the Justice and Development Party began to talk about the need for Ankara to communicate with Damascus to achieve both goals: combating terrorist/separatist organizations and the return of the Syrians, even if the official position remained the same with the decline in the intensity of the statements.

Upon his return from the Sochi summit with Putin last August, the Turkish president spoke for the first time about the possibility of raising the level of communication with the regime from the intelligence channel to a political level, speaking about Russia raising the matter again during the summit.

At that time, the Syrian regime's talk of preconditions led Turkish officials to put forward conditions in the opposite direction, and the track stopped temporarily.

However, the developments of the Russian-Ukrainian war and the roles played by Turkey on the one hand, and the ground operation that the latter hinted at and opposed by Russia and the United States on the other hand, and the approaching Turkish elections on the third hand, restored momentum to the course that culminated, until this writing, in the meeting of the two Turkish defense ministers. And the Syrian in Moscow.

interests and obstacles

After the meeting, the Turkish Ministry of Defense described the meeting as "constructive", and Minister Akar said that he had conveyed to his Syrian counterpart his country's position of respecting Syria's territorial integrity and preserving its independence and the exclusive presence of its military forces in confronting terrorist organizations.

On the other hand, a statement by the Syrian Ministry of Defense said, "The meeting was positive, and they discussed many files."

SANA reported that the two sides discussed efforts to combat terrorism and the issue of refugees, and that they, along with the Russian mediator, "emphasized the importance of continuing joint dialogue in order to stabilize the situation in Syria and the region."

While some reports quoted sources in the Syrian regime that Ankara "committed to Damascus' demands, including a complete withdrawal from Syria," Turkish officials denied this, and Foreign Minister Cavusoglu said that his country is a guarantor of the opposition and therefore will not abandon it and will not go to relations with the regime against its will, stressing that His country's forces will withdraw from Syria after a political solution and the presence of a strong Syrian government capable of protecting the borders.

As expected, Cavusoglu indicated that the meeting station between the two sides is close at the level of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and it is likely that he will meet his Syrian counterpart in the second half of this month.

With regard to the motives of the two sides for the current rapprochement path, there is no doubt that the Syrian regime has a fundamental interest in changing Turkey's position towards it, which is the only regional country that practically supports the opposition and refused, until recently, to open any relationship with it, in addition to the Russian pressure on it in this direction.

On the other hand, Ankara believes that a political relationship with the regime can benefit it in files that are in the interest of its security on the one hand and serve the current electoral context on the other hand, foremost of which is the fight against separatist organizations and the establishment of a safe area in the north for the return of Syrians residing on Turkish lands, as well as withdrawing the card " Communicating with the Syrian regime for the benefit of Turkey" from the hands of the Turkish opposition and strengthening relations with Russia.

Also, this path achieves several goals for Moscow, the mediator, including reducing its burdens in the Syrian file to devote more time to the war in Ukraine, widening the gap between Turkey and the United States, and dealing a blow to the latter's field ally, the "Syrian Democratic Forces", with certainly noticeable differences between Turkey's view and that of each other. From Russia and the Syrian regime to the latter.

However, this does not mean that there are no real obstacles, as it is not easy to end 10 years of direct and indirect confrontations and proxy war, in addition to the procrastination of the Syrian regime and its apparent bet on the results of the upcoming Turkish elections, the need for a safe area and the return of the Syrians for a time that may not be enough for the election date. And the positions of rejecting or unenthusiastic parties such as the United States, European countries and Iran.

As for the conditions set by each party for the other, they are not real obstacles to dialogue and coordination. They are more a matter of negotiation papers than conditions prior to and ruling the dialogue, and this has been confirmed by recent developments.

In conclusion, we are facing an important development in Turkey's approach to the Syrian issue and its relationship with the regime, and the beginning of a new and different phase in this context, but that does not mean a rapid, radical change in its position.

The matter is closer to dealing with the fait accompli according to the current balance of power and developments in recent years, and cooperation with the regime in specific files.

While Ankara is not in the process of severing its relations with the Syrian opposition, nor stigmatizing it with terrorism, let alone withdrawing now from Syria before there is a sustainable solution, stability, and a strong and capable government.

Finally, it is not expected, as previously mentioned, a major change in Turkey's political and military relations with the Syrian opposition, and Foreign Minister Cavusoglu was keen to confirm this meaning in his meeting with the head of the Syrian coalition, the head of the negotiating committee and the head of the interim government recently.

However, this does not mean that the Syrian opposition was not affected by the event, because Turkey is the most important country supporting it over the past years, and changing its relations with the regime will undoubtedly have consequences for it, but it is not expected that the Syrian opposition will go to a clash with Ankara, but rather to try to adapt to the new development. Gradually adapting to the next stage will facilitate its marketing to the popular base.