Since the Russian military intervention in Syria in the middle of the last decade, President Vladimir Putin has sought to deepen Russia's footprint in the Middle East by forging multifaceted partnerships with various regional actors.
At the time when he cooperated with Iran to support the Bashar al-Assad regime, Putin was giving Israel a margin of movement to target the Iranian presence on Syrian soil, and he worked to deepen another partnership with Turkey, which was strongly supporting the Syrian opposition, and he also expanded his ambitions in the Middle East by entering into an oil alliance. with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
For Israel and the Gulf states, the limits of their tolerance for the Russian-Iranian partnership stop at the point that allows Tehran to benefit from Moscow in order to strengthen its military arsenal.
Russia's ability to build these partnerships with parties that have a history of enmity and competition with each other was a sign of Putin's skill in understanding the contradictions of the Middle East.
As much as this ingenuity helped him employ these contradictions to serve Russian goals in the region, manage them in a way that does not lead to upsetting the regional balance of power and does not threaten Russia's partnerships with the countries of the region.
It has always been a test for Putin, which he reasonably succeeded in.
However, the risks surrounding the Russian balancing act with the region increased after the Russian-Ukrainian war, with Moscow's increasing reliance on Tehran in the military fields in particular.
The close Russian-Iranian relations go back to many decades, and they were not seen in the region as a major threat to the interests of other countries such as the Gulf states and Israel, but this view may recede now in light of the deeper growth of these relations at the military levels, in addition to closer economic and trade ties with them and benefiting from them. From its experience in circumventing Western sanctions for decades and building an economy capable of coexisting with isolation.
Moscow is increasingly relying on weapons provided by Tehran to help it in the war against Ukraine.
In addition to the Iranian drones that the Russian military uses extensively to target Ukrainian infrastructure, US and British officials recently claimed that Moscow is seeking to buy hundreds of Iranian ballistic missiles as well, but Iranian support is not without a price.
Western reports claim that Russia intends to provide Iran with advanced military technologies in return for this support.
While Moscow has not commented on the allegations, such a move is fraught with dangers for Russia's relations with Israel and the Gulf states, and indicates that Russia's ingenuity in playing on Middle Eastern contradictions has limits.
Putin's resorting to some Iranian weapons for use in Ukraine helped him partially address the increasing shortage in his weapons stocks as a result of the war, but relying on them may not be appropriate in terms of the potential cost to Russia's other relations in the Middle East.
The United States recently decided to provide Ukraine with the advanced Patriot air defense system, and this step is designed in particular to weaken the effectiveness of Iranian drones and Russian ballistic missiles or other missiles that Moscow could obtain from Tehran in the future.
The Patriot systems supplied by the United States to Saudi Arabia and the UAE have proven effective in shooting down missiles fired at both countries by the Houthis in Yemen.
For Israel and the Gulf states, the limits of their tolerance of the Russian-Iranian partnership stop at the point that allows Tehran to benefit from Moscow in order to enhance its military arsenal.
It is still not clear the nature of the advanced military technologies that Russia can offer Iran as a reward for drones or ballistic missiles, but merely raising such allegations is enough to cause concern in the region.
In recent years, Moscow has partnered with Israel and the Gulf states in various aspects.
On the one hand, Moscow allowed Tel Aviv the freedom of military action in Syria to weaken Iran's attempts to deepen its military presence in this country.
On the other hand, it established oil cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the UAE within the "OPEC Plus" alliance.
This alliance has proven important for Russia as it seeks to counter the isolation imposed by the West.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE supported the decision of the "OPEC Plus" coalition to increase oil production by two million barrels per day.
This helps Putin weaken Western sanctions targeting Russia's vital energy sector, and Saudi intransigence in the face of American pressure to increase oil production has enabled Putin to show that he has many friends in the Middle East.
Gulf concern over the possibility of Russia providing Iran with advanced military technologies is likely to lead to Gulf countries' reluctance to continue their oil cooperation with Moscow.
The more Saudi Arabia sees Russia actively supporting Iran, the more likely it is that Riyadh will end its oil cooperation with Russia.
In the case of Israel, many of Tel Aviv's concerns about the Russian-Iranian partnership center on Syria.
One reason for Israel's reluctance to support Ukraine so far is that Russia has allowed it to operate freely in Syria.
But Tel Aviv's ability to benefit from the Russian position in Syria is declining.
Over the past months, Russia withdrew the S-300 air defense systems from Syria in order to strengthen its air defenses in the Ukrainian theater, which raised the possibility that Moscow would hand over more responsibility to Iran in Syria at a time when Moscow is focusing on Ukraine.
Moreover, Tel Aviv fears that Iranian involvement in Russian drone attacks on Ukrainian targets will improve Tehran's ability to use drone weapons against Israeli targets.
The return of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to power could lead to a reset of Russian-Iranian tensions and the preservation of Israeli operating bases in Syria.
However, this matter remains subject to the limits of the military partnership between Moscow and Tehran.
With a diminished Russian ability to maintain a balance between Israel and Iran in Syria, Putin may see an interest in fueling the Iran-Israel conflict and increasing pressure on the United States in the Middle East in order to divert American resources away from Ukraine, but the risks of such a strategy are likely to be higher. outweigh any potential rewards.
The regional obsession with Russian-Iranian military cooperation could provide an opportunity for the United States to re-improve its relations with the countries of the region and work to weaken or destroy the Iranian drone and missile production capacity that Moscow now relies on.
Any Russian effort to provide military assistance to Tehran could harm Russia's ability to maintain cooperative relations with both the Gulf states and Israel.
Moscow's need to maintain a balance in its relations in the Middle East requires it to take into account the potential great damage to its influence in the region when considering deepening military cooperation with Iran.