A few days ago, "Al-Hajja" Munira Qubaisi, the founder of what was known - in the media and popularly - as the "Qubaisiyyat", a women's advocacy group that has spread in many countries in recent decades, passed away.
Several personalities and religious groups agreed to mourn Qubeisi, accompanied by a kind of praise for her, whether from supporters of the Assad regime or from the opposition, which sparked a wave of sharp criticism within the ranks of the Syrian opposition, sometimes sarcastic.
Is the lawsuit filed against the revolutionary among the sheikhs and preachers affiliated with the revolution?
Can the opponent put aside human emotions in the presence of death?
Is this even required?
Among those who mourned her from the side of the regime, the Sheikh Ahmad Kaftaro Complex and the Islamic Fatah Complex, which represent the most prominent supporters of Assad.
As for the opposition, Sheikh Osama al-Rifai, the mufti and head of the Syrian Islamic Council, Sheikh Moaz al-Khatib, former head of the Syrian Coalition, and others mourned her.
The call of the "Sheikh Ahmed Kaftaro Complex" described her as "the great preacher whose lights of her call filled the horizons," and the call of the "Al-Fateh Islamic Complex" described her as "the able professor and the virtuous educator and the venerable preacher" who "established one of the most important women's advocacy renaissances in the modern era." She singled out her brother, Bahjat Al-Qubaisi, a member of the faculty at the complex.
As for Sheikh Osama Al-Rifai and other members of the opposition, they described her as a "virtuous educator."
This agreement between associations and religious groups of different persuasions and political stances on the obituary of an influential preaching figure for about 6 or 7 decades, would have been a natural matter had it not been for the "Qubaysiyyat" turning - apparently - to support the Assad regime starting in 2012, which is what caused all this controversy. About her opponents obituary.
Ironically, it is a controversy that coincides with the meeting of the Turkish Minister of Defense and the head of intelligence with their counterparts from the Syrian regime, and in the presence of the Russian Defense Minister.
This ongoing debate brings us back to central questions such as: Is the claim presented against the revolutionary among the sheikhs and preachers affiliated with the revolution?
Can the opponent put aside human emotions in the presence of death?
Is this even required?
And the emotions here may be excited by the revolution and indignant against the criminality of the regime and the ugliness of the position of its supporters, especially from the religious current, and they may be excited by a network of advocacy and family relations linked to the deceased.
That is, we are here in the presence of human and moral motives as well, especially since everyone agrees on refusing to support the regime, but they differ about whether Kobeissi herself is a supporter or not.
Will the political or religious position on the revolution turn into a criterion for mercy and its lack thereof?
Does this even include the isolated and silent?
These questions go beyond partial (and even partial) interpretations of the scene, such as some of them interpreting this agreement on her obituary with a regional tendency (Asabiyya Levantine), and others revolved around the position of Hajjah Munira herself on the revolution and the Assad regime, between describing her as an arm of the regime or disassociating her from being supportive of its criminality. Or to say that she was completely absent from the scene, due to her isolation, illness and advanced age (she was in the early eighties with the beginning of the revolution).
Thus, the argument appears to be zero between two border parties, and it does not tolerate intermediate or synthetic positions.
It cannot be ruled out that there is an ideological position that has a problem with religiosity in general or this particular type of religiosity that the Qubeissi group has spread among women over the decades. This is the same position adopted by the Bashar al-Assad regime since it came to power until at least 2006, and this position was reflected in the negative image. Drawn by the regime for the "Qubaysiat" in the Syrian drama, as will become clear later.
Some of those who talk about the Qubaysiyyat on social media and others stuck in their minds the picture that the regime drew before it succeeded in taming the group or taming those from it (I will discuss this point later).
As for the apparent positive attitude towards Qubaisi, which was agreed upon among religious groups and personalities, Sufi and non-Sufi, loyal and opposition, and even Muslim Brotherhood, it reappears the problem of classification of “Qubaisiyyat”, which has long preoccupied writers about it to the extent that there was a fatwa issued by the Permanent Committee in Saudi Arabia in the nineties of the last century. By warning against belonging to it, is it a Sufi Sufi group or Sufi only?
Is it a group close to the group of the former Mufti Ahmed Kaftaro or d.
Muhammad Saeed Ramadan Al-Bouti or even the Zayd group, which is currently headed by Al-Rifai?
It is certain that Qubeisi studied with Sheikh Kaftaru and also reproduced the system of his group in the hierarchy, and even his Naqshbandi Sufi method, which was - according to those close to Qubeisi - granting it also, despite some of them denying that, whether from those who wrote about it or from Sheikh Osama Al-Rifai himself.
But Qubeisi was at the same time bypassing the partisanship of the prevailing groups and open to them together, as she succeeded in establishing good relations with the various personalities and religious groups working in the field, and therefore Sheikhs Al-Bouti, Muhammad Hisham Al-Burhani, Al-Rifai and others had a very positive attitude towards her, and Salah Al-Din Kaftaro confirmed ( The son of Sheikh Ahmed Kaftaro) that Qubeisi remained in contact with his father, despite her leaving his group, and she used to send memorizers of the Qur’an from her group to take leave from Sheikh Abi Al-Hassan Al-Kurdi - may God have mercy on him - who is affiliated with the Zayd group.
A conservative women's group that relied on secrecy and movement in the domestic space for decades before the regime was able to bring it out into the public space thanks to its Minister of Awqaf
This openness and complex connections with the religious, even commercial, social and familial milieu would complicate understanding of the group's political position after the revolution.
The importance here cannot be overlooked that the bias of the sheikhs and preachers affiliated with the revolution to Kobeissi's obituary is a return to their central premises, which are: religious advocacy, and it cannot be assumed that they will raise political biases above everything else, for reasons that cannot be detailed here.
In addition, there is a similarity between the thought of the Qubaysiyyat and the thought of those religious groups, whether supporting or opposing alike. Most of them follow the organizational pattern, and the distance between the individual and the collective dissolves in him. Rather, it narrows the margin of individual freedom very narrowly for them, if the individual joins their group, so that the sheikh exercises his religious and symbolic authority, where there are no dissenting opinions and individual idiosyncrasies in favor of the sheikh or the group, whether it is Brotherhood or Sufi. Tariqiya or Sufi without roads.
Qubaysiat is a complex and mysterious phenomenon
It is certain that the "Qubaisiyat" is a complex phenomenon at the historical and organizational levels, and its complexity is due - in my opinion - to 3 main things:
The first: It is a conservative women's group that relied on secrecy and movement in the domestic space for decades
before the regime was able to bring it out into the public space thanks to its Minister of Religious Endowments.
Women's work, especially in the Syrian environment, is fraught with many restrictions, which is what disturbed the Bashar al-Assad regime, which has worked tirelessly to bring it out into the "regime space" to be controlled and controlled, and some of them have deluded that this "release" was a gain, for them in it. Fadila, while this output served the regime, the mosque and the general public space in Syria is the area in which the regime excels because of its wide ability to monitor, control and control mechanisms, just as the regime dragged peaceful demonstrations to the use of weapons and violent resistance, because it is superior in them and to be able to to terminate or control it.
The difference is that in the first method (extraction) the group is integrated into the religious state apparatus, and in the second (demonstrations) the demonstrators are portrayed as outside the state, i.e. the mechanisms of containment, exclusion and delegitimization are used, which are two central mechanisms of control and control of the state.
The second: the veiling of the head of the group - I mean Mounira Qubaisi - which hardly anyone knows except in a very narrow range that
does not even include all of the members of the group.
This gave an aura of mystery and reverence, and contributed to the formation of a special identity that governs the ethics of dealing within the group, which is similar to the ethics of dealing with the Prophet - may God bless him and grant him peace - and his companions who rise - popularly - above human characteristics, and it is forbidden to embody them, and then it was just a meeting with Qubeisi An end sought by the aspirant, and if the meeting is forbidden, it is as if it was forbidden because of his shortcomings and sins.
The third: its expansion and spread in several countries, and this drew a transient image of the state
, or that it is groups in a group (similar to the Muslim Brotherhood), and then it was difficult to issue generalizations about these different formations imprinted or influenced by the contexts of each country, even if they were united by a single identity.
It is the habit of extended organizations to carry within them or to be held accountable by many who are not necessarily from them or represent them, given the capacity and mobility enjoyed by these groups, and the colors imposed by the special context according to the state and the prevailing social norms in it. A specific one that is easy to imitate and follow for everyone who wants it, even if it is not from the same group.
Dress alone does not provide evidence of affiliation or representation, and it is a defect that some of those who issued rulings and generalizations about the Qubaysiat based on an image fell into.
These three factors make the assertion of a single narration about the Qubaysiyyat, or about Munira Qubaisi in particular, problematic, because those same factors open the door to different interpretations according to the available information, and according to the location of the speaker as well.
Rather, even the one who belongs to the group and joins its ranks does not have the exclusive ability to talk about it, because that depends on his closeness to and distance from decision-making in it and the degree of his knowledge of the secrets of a highly discreet hierarchical group, and also depends on his “representation” in it, as often the words of affiliates involve ( Whether they are current or former) on a mixture of information, emotional reactions and interpretations as well.
Distinguishing between these three dimensions - in a mysterious and mythical female milieu - is very important, just as it is necessary to multiply the internal sources of the group, then to stand on the intersection of these sources and their conflicts as well, and to highlight the agreed and the different in it so that the researcher can deal critically with the information in his hands.
This was not available - in what I read about the group in terms of articles and studies - rather, one of them said that he based his words about the group on numerous interviews with its members, then he gave us his narrative of what he heard from the group without any references or quotes, and without an indication of whether there were differences. Between the words of those he interviewed, and without the availability of criticism of his sources also in terms of their position in the group, the rest and the predecessors, and who left it?
Why did he leave it?
Is the narrative of the Turks different from the rest?
What is the degree of proximity of these sources to decision-making, directly or indirectly?
Is there a difference in the information available between the first grade and subsequent grades?
How many of them saw Munira Al Qubaisi herself?
Are the words of the sources based on the interpretation of actions and practices, or on explicit statements and texts from the position of leadership?
All of this is completely absent from what I have seen, which is what makes these writings non-research writings.
As for the Qubaysi women’s relationship with the regime of Bashar al-Assad, the image of a women’s delegation meeting with Bashar al-Assad and the Minister of Religious Endowments in 2012 was a great shock. They only wore the Qubaisi uniform, and they are not among them, according to a source who attended the same meeting, and some of them appear from their clothes that they are not originally from them.
The 2012 meeting was the culmination of the regime’s relentless efforts to control and control this group since Bashar al-Assad came to power in 2000. Between 2002 and 2010, the regime worked to put pressure on the group through 4 parallel tracks:
The first track: drawing a negative image of the Qubaysiyyat through the Syrian drama
, as they appeared in the series “Spot of Light”, “Assudi Al-Dama”, “Al-Marqun” and “What Your Faith Owns” in a negative way, sometimes as a group targeting the wealthy class in society to achieve Economic gains, and another that it is a religiously extremist group with isolationist perceptions of society, and a third explains their method of persuasion and luring the aspirants, and a fourth that the group constitutes an incubator for extremism and religious and social hypocrisy prevails in it.
The second track: putting pressure on the group through a problem related to the endowments between the group and the director of the endowments
at the time, d.
Abdullah knocked the door, who was working - apparently - in coordination with the Minister of Awqaf, to remove the Qubaysiyyat from the homes to the mosques.
The third track: pressure on the head of the group itself
. According to an informed source, Munira Qubaisi was summoned to the security branch before the revolution, but the meeting took place outside the security branch, thanks to some interventions from an influential party close to it, as the inclusion of wives of influential figures economically, politically and religiously Within her ranks also helped her.
The fourth track: Sending direct and harsh messages to the group, including the assassination of one of the women in the group
, which took place in 2013, and the imprisonment of some of its members, and some mediation has taken place to get them out. As a result - to leave Damascus, and - as far as I was informed - had sent them a direct message that he was unable to protect them.
The 2012 meeting was the culmination of those relentless efforts to control the group in the first stage, in addition to the group’s investment in what he called “the jurisprudence of the crisis” in the second stage, a project that was adopted by the Ministry of Awqaf and was discussed during this meeting by all female preachers and teachers, including some Qubaysiyyat.
The group - like others - remained silent at the beginning of the revolution, especially since one of its ruling rules was to retire from political work or public activity outside the space of religiosity and religious education. However, the group - like other religious groups in Syria and Egypt as well - witnessed pro-revolution stances that were not formally expressed. about her.
The 2012 meeting was arranged by the Ministry of Awqaf in coordination with the security services. This meeting brought together a group of male and female teachers and principals of Sharia schools affiliated with the Ministry of Awqaf, among them Qubaisiyat. I have in my hands a detailed report dating back to 2012 about that meeting and the details of what happened in it. Everyone was lured to the meeting at Al-Othman Mosque, under the pretext of holding a mandatory meeting with the Minister of Awqaf, Muhammad Abd al-Sattar al-Sayyid, to discuss issues related to Sharia schools.
After the crowd of invitees attended, about 80 names were chosen from among the directors of religious schools and secretaries, in addition to some female employees of the Ministry of Awqaf.
Then they were taken to the Ministry of Awqaf building adjacent to the Al-Othman Mosque, where the security forces were filling the place, and after the names of the attendees were seized and their identities were confirmed, they were told that they would meet with the president, then they were transferred to the guesthouse in the Al-Maliki neighborhood in Damascus after they were stripped of their phones and searched.
Al-Assad spoke at the meeting that the crisis is a "moral crisis", and that the responsibility of the female attendees is to contribute to educating their families and educating their children. When the principal of one of the schools asked him to hold the officials accountable, he said: We are not in the process of being held accountable now, and that the security solution is irreversible.
Not all of those who asked to talk were allowed to intervene, and it seems that it was limited to certain names, some of whom are employees of the Ministry of Awqaf who proposed authoritarian ideas to resolve the crisis, such as asserting that whoever kills or dies is a judiciary and we must believe in it, and some of them asked to increase the number of snipers in Malihah.
The 2012 meeting paved the way for similar meetings later, including the 2014 meeting with a group of female preachers from various parties, including Qubaysat, similar to al-Assad’s previous meetings with sheikhs in the same period within one policy that accommodates men and women from different groups, to regulate and control religious affairs through the Ministry of Awqaf Especially since the mosque was an important tool in the revolution during its peaceful phase.
The 2014 meeting followed the appointment of Salma Ayyash, one of the leaders of the first row in the Qubaisiyat group and a relative of the Minister of Awqaf, to the position of Assistant Minister of Awqaf. This appointment constituted an explicit and direct message about the relationship between the regime and the Qubaisiyat. And that it is a reward from the regime for the group and a transition from the stage of attack and previous restrictions to the stage of support and alliance, similar to the rest of the groups that were domesticated and prevailed in the scene after the revolution.
However, there are those who saw - such as Sheikh Osama al-Rifai - that Ayyash does not represent the Qubaysiyyat nor al-Hajja Munira, and that it represents a split that occurred within the group (and with it about a thousand Qubaysiyyat, which is a small number considering the members of the group), and that the Minister of Awqaf managed to penetrate the group through Ayyash By virtue of his family connection with her, she is his wife's sister.
There is no direct information about Mounira Qubaisi's position on these developments, but if we say: The group enjoys extreme centralization, there is nothing to absolve the needy from the responsibility of such a political transformation, and if we say: It lost its authority over the group due to its advanced age and illness, and it used to play a role Spiritually only during the era of the revolution, there is no doubt that the matter will be different, and therefore the issue of the group's "representation" is a very important issue here, and it is an ambiguous issue.
With Ayyash becoming part of the regime’s structure through her holding the position of Assistant Minister of Awqaf, activities and meetings were repeated, the latest of which was the Prophet’s birthday party in 2022, when Bashar al-Assad appeared in a photo accompanied by a number of women, including Ayyash and others, which provoked the opponents and aroused their resentment in general. The Qubaysiyyat, although the picture shows that not all of the people in the picture are Qubaysiyyat, and Bashar al-Assad was keen to describe them as "teachers of the Qur'an."
The statement of the Ministry of Awqaf in 2018 also mentioned that "there is no organization with this name (i.e., the Qubaysiat), just as this name, which was dating back to a certain period, no longer exists now, but there are currently teachers of the Holy Qur'an whose mission is to memorize and interpret the Qur'an."
This may confirm the idea of the split and transformation that occurred in the group, and that the regime ended the group (officially and popularly) when it succeeded in removing it from domestic work to the mosque and joining the Ministry of Awqaf, like other religious groups domesticated politically and religiously through the mechanism of authoritarian control and control, and by appointing Ayyash and dissolving the group. Officially, within the "women's call" and "the female teachers of the Qur'an", which is what he sought for two decades ago. As for the group's actual presence in homes during this era, this is a matter left to those who know the inside of things.
May God have mercy on Mounira Kobeissi, and prepare for her group someone who will renew her religion for her and relieve her of her burden and the shackles that bound her intellectually and realistically.