General Abdel-Fattah Al-Burhan smiled unusually in official speeches while repeating a slogan that was spread in some popular demonstrations that reject the military and do not trust the parties. Al-Burhan said that the framework agreement came to achieve the slogan "The military is for the barracks and the parties for the elections", and that signal indicates that the army will represent the official guardian of what What remains of the transitional period, albeit from behind the walls of the Army General Command, and this is complemented by what the same man said when the Al-Jazeera correspondent asked him in a press interview about his professional future after completing the settlement;

He replied that he would remain a soldier in the service of the army, and this is another indication of the personal presence of General Al-Burhan in the scene of the second half of the transitional period, which is the coaches’ round in the language of football, where tactics and skill are used to employ the time factor.

The most important military victory included in the agreement is a written document stipulating the integration of the Rapid Support Forces into the Sudanese army, even after a while, and getting rid of the "quarrelsome" generals from Burhan's comrades in the military council, who have become more politicians than professional soldiers.

But the most important question is why was the response to the call for a truce that might end in open scenarios?

A large number of observers agree that the framework agreement and what will come later was thanks to international pressure, which seeks stability for Sudan in light of a region rife with turmoil, and the stability equation in the outside world’s opinion is based on a civilian government and a clear role for the army during the transition period, and this is what he expressed. The representative of the international will and the head of the United Nations Mission in Sudan, Volker Peretz, when he said on the "Day of Decoration" that the framework agreement is not ideal, but it can be built on it.

But what about the accounts of the parties related to the framework agreement, such as the President of the Sovereignty Council and the Commander-in-Chief of the Sudanese Army, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan?

Al-Burhan found some opportunities in the framework agreement, as through this agreement he will be able to erase the effects of the October coup, and open a new page for him with the world, as the agreement was devoid of any reference to those measures that the man took on October 25 that ended Dreams of civil rule, and perhaps the biggest confrontation of Al-Burhan as a result of this coup was with the international community.

As for the second step of the proof, it is that he will put all the contracts in the final agreement, which will not see the light except according to the vision of the military.

The agreement will also deepen the differences between the civil forces, which will entrench in the collective memory that civilians cannot rule without the tutelage of the army during the remainder of the transitional period.

In order for Al-Burhan to achieve this goal, he expedited the signing of the framework agreement, leaving influential forces, some of which bear arms, without cutting the cords of communication with them.

Maybe even communication channels.

The most important military victory included in the agreement is a written document stipulating the integration of the Rapid Support Forces into the Sudanese army, even after a while.

Also, Al-Burhan will be able, through this agreement and the one that follows it, to get rid of the quarrelsome generals among his comrades in the Military Council, who have become more politicians than professional military men, headed by Lieutenant General Muhammad Hamdan Hamidti, commander of the Rapid Support Forces, who will not be part of the Armed Forces Council.

Hamidti will find himself alone in the Rapid Support Command booth, surrounded by international pressures and other internal civil forces, with the need to integrate into the national army.

Foreign hands were present in the details of the framework agreement in a way that does not lose sight of the acumen of the ordinary observer. The outside influence was clear in accepting the forces of "freedom and change" to the extent available in the agreement with the military.

Through this agreement, Al-Burhan will be able to get rid of the headache of the Freedom and Change Alliance, which since the political change in April 2019 has been bearing the seal of the legitimate representative of the popular revolution, as the name of this alliance was not mentioned in the terms of the agreement, which was signed by parties in their partisan and professional capacities, as the general can The proof is that he will bring the first group of his potential allies to the top of the scene, as the Popular Congress, the Ansar al-Sunna group, and a faction from the original Democratic Unionist party are on the list of new partners, while others will come successively, and not even the dissolved National Congress will be far from the climate of compromise through its political facades.

Here, Al-Burhan expects in the end that the dissenters will come and ask the army to mediate between the parties, and then lead the rest of the transitional phase, and then Al-Burhan or whoever represents the army institution will take off the military uniform and prepare for the general elections in a model closer to the Egyptian model that enabled Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi. Whoever ruled Egypt with a soft military coup won the approval of the international community, in a precedent that framed double standards.

The commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Muhammad Hamdan Hamidti, contributed greatly to reaching this agreement by announcing, inconsistently with his fellow generals, his support for this agreement based on a constitution that was discussed and agreed upon in the Sudanese Bar Association building.

The agreement grants Hemedti the independence of the mantle of the army, although it stipulates in another clause that the Rapid Support Forces be subordinate to the Sudanese army.

What did the civil forces achieve from the framework agreement?

Foreign hands were present in the details of the framework agreement in a way that does not lose sight of the acumen of the ordinary observer. The outside influence was clear in accepting freedom and change to the extent available in the agreement with the military.

The forces of "Freedom and Change - Central Council Group" were looking at the street, which was leaking from their hands, leaking water from trembling palms.

Also, the Central Council group is betting on deepening the dispute between the generals of the Military Council by bringing Hemedti closer and giving him some benefits, through an independent placement of his forces under the command of the head of a sovereignty council that has symbolic and honorary powers.

The theory of "distinguishing the generals and returning them to the barracks" gave freedom and change the margin of a political movement, as the generals would not be able to lead a new coup without the curses of the world and its harmful isolation falling upon them.

However, the danger of the framework agreement is that it enabled all military forces to be far from civilian control and live on isolated islands that enable them to attack civil rule by surprise and through the agreement of the same generals, as happened at dawn on October 25, 2021.

As for the most important weaknesses of the framework agreement, it is represented in the fact that it is an agreement in many details, and then in its last clauses it made controversial issues represented in justice, reform of military institutions, and the dismantling of the isolated regime;

Unresolved and debatable, the devil is in the details.

In general, despite these data, none of the parties will be able to resolve the next round according to what they desire. There are surprises and calculations that may occur at any time and constitute a turning point in the course of the expected settlement.

Where does the world stand?

It is true that the framework agreement and beyond will receive the support of the international community, but this support will not turn into a tangible reality in light of the world's preoccupation with other files.

The most important of which is the Russian war on Ukraine.

This preoccupation will enable Cairo - which is not enthusiastic about this agreement, which restricts the hand of the army and alienates its allies - to move in its vital field to find a new equation that does not fall into the realm of a real democratic transition in Sudan, which constitutes a psychological concern for the Sisi government, as it fears the transmission of the pro-democracy political contagion from Up the Nile to below.