"I spoke with Sisi for 45 minutes and he was very happy to meet us, and we also expressed our happiness for that. The process of building relations with Egypt will begin with meetings at the ministerial level, after which relations will be developed, as there is no permanent rivalry in politics

. "

This is how Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan spoke - a few days ago - about a meeting he had with his Egyptian counterpart Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, and his handshake with him on the sidelines of the opening of the World Cup, in the presence of the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani.

In fact, during the last two years, remarkable shifts took place in the Egyptian-Turkish relations, which for nearly a decade have suffered from tension, apathy, and enmity between the two parties, against the backdrop of the events that took place in Egypt in the summer of 2013, and the subsequent regional tensions that contributed to the complication of the relationship between the two countries. the two countries.

The roots of the crisis between Cairo and Ankara go back to the latter’s refusal to overthrow the rule of the late President Mohamed Morsi, and the subsequent events and tragedies, the most prominent of which was the Rabaa al-Adaweya massacre, which claimed the lives of nearly 800 people, which Turkey categorically condemned at the time, which prompted Cairo to recall its ambassador to Turkey. Ankara on the eve of the massacre in August 2013. In November of the same year, Cairo expelled the Turkish ambassador, which led to an unprecedented break in relations between the two countries.

Perhaps the most prominent files that led to tension in the relationship between Cairo and Ankara are represented first in the file of the relationship between Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood, as Ankara provided a safe haven for the members and leaders of the group.

It also allowed some Egyptian activists and opposition figures to establish media platforms opposing the Egyptian regime over the past years.

This negatively affected Cairo's view of Ankara, considering it an interference in its internal affairs.

The second issue is the Libyan file, where the two countries stand on opposite sides of the conflict there.

At a time when Cairo supported - and still does - the Eastern Front in Benghazi, which is led by retired Colonel Khalifa Haftar, Ankara supported - and still does - the Libyan government in Tripoli, which was previously headed by Fayez al-Sarraj, and is currently led by Abdul Hamid al-Dabaiba.

The matter did not stop at political and diplomatic support only, but the two parties also provided military, intelligence and logistical support to their allies inside Libya.

The Turkish role in the Arab region, especially since the beginning of the Arab Spring, has aroused the ire of many countries, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which have allied themselves with the UAE in order to limit the repercussions of that role on their regional interests and influence.

As for the third file, it is the eastern Mediterranean gas file.

Over the past five years, huge quantities of oil and gas have been discovered in the eastern Mediterranean, which has led to an intensification of conflict and competition between the countries of that region, and the reshaping of regional alliances.

For example, in early 2019, Egypt established the so-called “East Mediterranean Gas Forum,” which includes countries from the south and east of the Mediterranean, such as Jordan, Palestine, Israel, Lebanon, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, and France. Turkey was excluded, although it is one of the important countries in the Mediterranean basin, which is what They are perceived by Ankara as a challenge and exclusion from it, especially since the forum includes countries in a state of political and geostrategic disagreement with Ankara, such as Cyprus and Greece.

Therefore, Turkey responded to this step by signing an agreement to demarcate the maritime borders with Libya in late 2019, which aroused Egypt's ire and prompted it to demarcate its maritime borders with Greece, Ankara's arch-rival in the Mediterranean region.

As for the fourth file, it is the regional influence of Cairo and Ankara in the region.

The Turkish role in the Arab region, especially since the beginning of the Arab Spring, has aroused the ire of many countries, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which have allied themselves with the UAE in order to limit the repercussions of that role on their regional interests and influence.

This was clearly demonstrated during the Gulf crisis, which witnessed strategic alliances between Qatar and Turkey in the face of the blockading countries.

These files played an important role in the strained relations between Cairo and Ankara over the past years.

However, with the advent of the US administration led by Joe Biden in early 2021 and the completion of Gulf reconciliation, relations between Egypt and Turkey began to witness a kind of cautious convergence, through attempts to reduce areas of difference and increase areas of convergence between them.

Over the past year, the Turkish side has sent many positive signals about the desire to improve relations with Cairo.

These signals were translated into holding the first official meetings between the two parties.

Last May, a delegation from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs visited Cairo, where it met its counterparts in the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, in order to conduct what the two parties called "exploratory consultations" in order to consider improving relations between the two sides.

A few months later, specifically on the seventh of last September, a delegation from the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headed by Ambassador Hamdi Loza, Assistant Foreign Minister, visited Ankara and met with his Turkish counterparts to explore how to develop relations.

At the same time, Ankara took several positive steps to show its goodwill and seriousness in improving relations with Egypt, for example, stopping the media broadcast of the "Mekameleen" channel, which is affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, and asking some opposition media figures to stop criticizing the Egyptian regime. Some of them had to leave the country.

What is remarkable is that the trade and economic relations between Cairo and Ankara have not been affected much by the crisis between the two parties.

On the contrary, these relations have developed and increased over the past period, which is evident from the increase in the volume of trade exchange between the two countries, exceeding $11 billion over the past decade.

There are continuous visits of Turkish businessmen to Cairo, and vice versa.

Despite this remarkable improvement, two issues are still pending in the development of Egyptian-Turkish relations.

The first is the Libyan file, as the two sides still support conflicting fronts in Libya.

The second is the file of demarcation of the maritime borders between the two countries.

However, the chances of reaching understandings to resolve these two files remain possible in the coming months.

Therefore, the recent developments - at the level of Cairo and Ankara - indicate that achieving (return / improvement) the relationship between them is much closer today than it was over the past decade, and that the full normalization of relations is only a matter of time.

We would not be very surprised if we read in the news that President Erdogan decided to visit Cairo in the next few months, which means opening a new page in the relations between Turkey and Egypt.