Al-Qaradawi and the establishment of a liberal political culture (5)

In the first article of this series, I explained that one of the most important features of Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi - may God Almighty have mercy on him - is that he has transcended the organizational framework of the Brotherhood to the framework of the "Islamic nation" at the level of vision, theorizing and movement (activity and links at all levels), which is the characteristic that formed his credit and accumulated Its impact during the revolutions of the so-called "Arab Spring".

Hence, the media of what was called the "counter-revolution" - after the death of the sheikh - was keen to narrow the scope of looking at him to the extent that he was only "my brothers", which is the innuendo that the muftis of power in Egypt and Syria have been doing at the beginning of the revolutions.

This reductionist view based on political rivalry reflects the state of denial of the “popularity” of the protests involved in the revolutions that swept five countries, and the attempt to reduce them to a specific faction, and then transfer what happened and witnessed in the world from the realm of “popular will” to the realm of “political opposition” to a political faction. Specific, disagreement with him and against him (popular and political).

As for this article, he explained that the controversy that arose about Al-Qaradawi on the occasion of his death was based - mainly - on a political rivalry with him, and that what was considered a shortcoming in his right is the same advantage of his speech from the perspective of studying the processes of democratic transformation in the region, especially in light of the revolutions between 2011. and 2013.

This antagonism is based on the conflict between two opposing political cultures:

The first:

a non-traditional religious culture compatible with democracy, represented by Al-Qaradawi during the five revolutions.

The second:

an authoritarian political culture (or sultanism) that was spread by authoritarian political regimes and that they wanted to legitimize religiously on the tongues of their mufti and official officials, and branded it as the “Sharia” in which there is no dispute.

I will explain the details of this through two issues:

• The first is to develop an extensive theoretical framework on political culture.

• The second: highlighting the features of al-Qaradawi’s revolutionary discourse, on its breadth and intensity during the aforementioned period, whether in his sermons or in the episodes of the Sharia and Life Program.

In the past, political science focused on studying the actions of institutions and their role in democratic transformation, but the “political culture” study is a new approach that includes the study of individual or non-institutional trends towards politics or the political system and the supposed role of the individual in it, as it deals with the values ​​and visions founding political action, whether Supporter or opponent, and then political culture also deals with the arguments that give political action its legitimacy, and then combines the cognitive, emotional and value dimensions that give - all - the social and political influence required to bring about change.

Moreover, focusing on the role of actors outside institutions and analyzing their political behavior gives religion an essential role, especially in Islamic societies, as is the case in the countries of the five revolutions.

This was helped by the fact that the religious discourse had a central role in the revolutions in support and opposition. It is remarkable that the discourse in support of the revolutions came from outside the institutions (especially religious ones), so whoever joined the revolution had to leave the institutional framework of the state in order to be able to oppose it;

Because in authoritarian regimes there is no distinction between the state and its institutions on the one hand, and the ruling regime on the other.

Al-Qaradawi - then - provides an important model for study and analysis from the perspective of political culture and studies of democratic transition, which is why the so-called counter-revolution alliance was keen to condemn or demonize him after 2013 until his death.

The typicality of the Sheikh’s speech is due to the fact that it dealt - on a large scale and repeatedly - with key concepts in political culture that are disputed by the two previously mentioned perceptions: an authoritarian and a revolutionary liberation one, such as the concepts of exit, obedience, change, strife, the republican system, democracy, revolution, freedom, and Sharia.

Al-Qaradawi consciously presented a religious discourse in support of the revolutionary action in opposition to tyrannical regimes on several levels;

Starting with the concept of revolution and its connection with the exit and legitimizing the act of peaceful protest and protest, then the level of linking the revolutionary act with moral goals, and then restricting it to the controls that direct it towards its desired goal, and ending with its means that must be peaceful.

The revolution - in Al-Qaradawi's perception - is good, mercy and blessing.

Contrary to the perception of the Mufti of authoritarian regimes and the rhetoric of the official religious establishment, which made it a door to sedition and legally forbidden exit.

And because revolution is a good and a blessing;

It deserves to be thanked by God Almighty for it, and then al-Qaradawi thanked God Almighty for the 5 Arab revolutions, which he saw that God “given to our nation, and this was one of the greatest blessings that God gave to this nation.”

Thanks to the benevolence and morality of the revolutionary act, Al-Qaradawi excused Muhammad Al-Bouazizi, who burned himself and ignited the Tunisian revolution, which was the first in the Arab Spring. Excusing and praying for Bouazizi and asking for God’s intercession for him from the Tunisian people;

Because it was the cause of this great good (= revolution) from the perspective of Al-Qaradawi.

Al-Qaradawi linked the revolution to the chapter on enjoining good and forbidding evil, and considered that “it is the duty of the nation to demand its rights and to say to the oppressor: O oppressor,” otherwise he may be bid farewell from it.

In another context, Al-Qaradawi reverses the argument of the Grand Mufti regarding the fact that the revolution is a sedition and pretexts must be closed to it, by saying that just as pretexts must be blocked, they must also be opened, as established in the science of jurisprudence;

Corruption of pretexts may be one of the causes of evil;

As the excuses are only blocked in what brings great evil to the people.

As for blocking the pretexts of goodness, it is not said by a law that came to establish the interests of the people in the life and the next.

As for the concept of revolution, it means a peaceful exit to speak the word of truth.

The revolution differs from “exit” which is a jurisprudential term that is applied only to “armed exodus” issued by “others of its people” and to a “right ruler.”

That is, "the one whom the people chose freely and with consent, on the basis of a commitment to Islam", and then revolting against this ruler in this capacity would be unjust (or unjust).

Al-Qaradawi clarifies in another place the timing of the rule in the republican system of government, which has turned into a “republican monarchy”, saying: “There is no emirate for life,” and the discussion about the term of the rule is based on a “positional legitimacy” that will disappear, so whoever comes with a popular will will disappear. out.

The term exodus - then - refers to the "Khawarij" who revolted - with weapons - against the Muslim community and declared Muslims to be infidels.

The revolution is a protest by speech and gathering, expressing a popular will for change, and it is against an unjust ruler who came to power illegally, such as a military coup or succession in a republican rule (which requires the transfer of power after a certain period), and then this unjust regime wants to continue in power. By succession (I do not know that al-Qaradawi addressed the position of monarchies during the revolutions).

On the level of goals, the revolutions call - on the one hand - "to establish the truth and to nullify falsehood", and "to analyze what is permissible or forbid what is forbidden, or for the sake of creating forgotten obligations."

Then, on the other hand, it is based on restoring the free will of the people, by making the peoples the ones who are in charge of their own affairs;

The peoples “are the owners of the matter, and the change starts from them; the people are the ones who change what is in themselves, so everything changes.” Thus, Al-Qaradawi linked the revolution to the chapter on enjoining good and forbidding evil, and he saw that “it is the duty of the nation to demand its rights and to say to the oppressor: O unjust.” Otherwise, you may be entrusted with it.

As for the controls that make the revolutionary act a blessing, not a curse, its condition is that it “be put in its place, and that it be issued by its people.”

By this, he refers to the availability of the concept, goals, timing and feasibility, and then the revolution may reach a type of jihad that varies into: practical jihad, verbal jihad, and heart jihad.

When asked about the type under which revolution falls, he replied that it falls under the jihad of the tongue or the jihad of the heart.

Perhaps he wanted to combine them together, or perhaps he wanted to include in the revolutionary act - as a rule - the state of the evil in his heart;

Because he is defeated by his command, and it is the lowest degree of enjoining good and forbidding evil contained in the Prophetic hadith, but the inclusion of this specific act (silent denial) within the revolution is problematic here!

On the level of means, Al-Qaradawi emphasized - contrary to what his opponents accused him of after his death - on the renunciation of violence and the peacefulness of demonstrations and protests in more than one place and on occasion, especially in the episodes of the Sharia and Life program.

Peaceful action - to him - is “the origin of all these revolutions,” and his last words were in the last episode of the Sharia and Life program on August 25, 2013 (i.e. after the coup) saying: “Whatever is done to us, we cannot use violence. The violence of the Islamists has ended. Or with the Brotherhood in particular...we meet everyone in peace."

With these words, he concluded nearly 17 years of his jihad with the word through this program, which he presented to the whole world and contributed to making his reference.

In relation to the means of resisting oppression as well, Al-Qaradawi made it clear that people are faced with three categories of oppression:

By this, he means self-defense, as happened in Syria, for example.

In other words, peace is not a solid doctrine (jihad, war, self-defense, and retribution are different types of violence, and modern political thought speaks of “legitimate violence” which is state violence), but the important thing here is maintaining order and recourse to the law.

And what confirms the above is that al-Qaradawi, when he was asked - in a fatwa dated August 24, 2013, i.e. after the coup - about the permissibility of working in the ministries of defense (the army) and the interior (the police) in Egypt, he permitted it and then said: “As for working in these two ministries It is an indispensable work to preserve the entity of the Egyptian state, which must remain an inviolable machine, and we all work to preserve it."

But he restricted the work of those who work in these two ministries with the fear of God Almighty, “and not to be of help to these wrongdoers;

And he concluded his fatwa that “the abuse of a soldier from the army or the police towards any human being: Muslim or Christian, good or bad; unjustly, even without killing: whoever hits or touches an injury by word or deed: is a forbidden matter in Islam that God does not like or accept, but rather He will be punished justly."

Revolutionary action is one of the means of political change for al-Qaradawi;

As the means and systems of governance are spacious and have ample capacity.

He says: “The affairs of the world are based on innovation, and the affairs of religion are based on following.” Hence, he does not see anything wrong with quoting from the West in the field of means, as our master Omar Ibn Al-Khattab, may God be pleased with him, quoted some of the means from the Persians in his time.

Hence, the “means of resisting injustice” vary, such as demonstrations, sit-ins, civil disobedience, and strikes, and they are legitimate means in his opinion, and the permissibility of such means prevents people from resorting to arms or violence.

In view of the reality of the situation in our time, Al-Qaradawi believes that regime change can be done in three ways:

The greater purpose of political change is the realization of the right on the one hand, and the expression of the free will of the public on the other, and therefore freedom enjoys an important place in Al-Qaradawi’s discourse, especially individual and political freedom.

Al-Qaradawi is explicit in his bias towards the third option here;

Because it expresses the will of the people, and it is - according to him - the status of allegiance and general consent, and he reviews - to support his position - arguments from the Noble Qur’an, and he weakens a hadith in Sahih Muslim on which the jurists of authority depend on saying to obey the leaders, then he criticizes the jurists of authority who do not master the jurisprudence of the purposes or jurisprudence budgets.

Al-Qaradawi agrees with the juristic-political-historical heritage, in rejecting the armed exodus, which was restricted by the general Sunni jurists to the issuance of outright infidelity from the ruler only. The legitimate reasons for protest and political change, which also include the ruler’s departure from “the texts to which the nation adheres and considers it a religion, which are moral covenants, justice covenants, and covenants of values” that have been agreed upon among people regardless of their religion.

Since taking care of the interest and warding off corruption is one of the criteria of Sharia, “it is in the interest of the people to build themselves and build their own renaissance.”

civilian, not military, courts;

Natural courts with natural judges who were known for integrity and justice.

Man’s freedom - in Al-Qaradawi’s conception - expresses what God wants from him;

That “he should be free in his thinking if he thinks, free in his expression if he crosses, free to change it if he changes, free in his will, free in his religion.”

and the number of types of freedom that include “religious freedom, scientific freedom, political freedom, and social freedom” that I have previously addressed with him in several episodes of the Sharia and Life Program before the revolutions;

He believes that people need all these freedoms.

Rather, he considered freedom as one of the purposes of the Sharia.

Because it is - in his view - “a necessity of life;

Then this freedom is required for ourselves and for others, and individual freedom is the basis of public freedoms, including political freedom.

Although Al-Qaradawi held religious institutions "a burden in the nation's support", he refused to hold them - alone - responsible.

There are many other parties bearing the responsibility with them, but at the same time, if these institutions lose their freedom and do not fulfill their functions and duties, “they froze life, and followed the rulers’ rides… the nation could not follow them”;

Because it would then be a "life-freezing institution".

The follower of Al-Qaradawi’s revolutionary discourse sees that his discourse is developing, so his arguments to support revolutions develop from one country to another according to the specificity of the rebellious country. by the opponents, and he constantly affirms that the will of the peoples is victorious as he affirms the values ​​of justice and freedom, and may invoke poetry as he did in his commentary on the Libyan revolution, and that it is time for it to enter the contemporary world and renew and build itself as an ancient civilized country.

As for Syria, he cited the crimes of the Assad regime in the past decades, then said: The rule of captivity has ended, and that Syria is governed by the Baath Party according to the constitution, and it is not governed by religion or by Sharia, and the Baath Party should not be supported.

Al-Qaradawi’s political vision between 2011 and 2013 was based on jihad against injustice on the one hand, and support for a revolutionary liberation discourse reconciled with democracy on the other, based on the demand for political change and appeal to the people’s will, and providing freedoms for people.

Thus, the political culture that he formulated in his speech during this period transcends three problems:

• The first: the problem of the relationship between ideology and political culture;

  As his Islamic ideology itself pushed him to bypass the Brotherhood party organization, and thus gave freedom over Sharia;

  For his confidence in the will of peoples and their religious choices.

• The second: that his discourse during the revolutions helped shake up the essentialist interpretations that were common in some Western studies before the Arab Spring about Arab cultural exceptionalism or Islamic democratic intransigence;

  He has supported the various revolutionary popular tendencies;

  His confidence in the will of the peoples and his openness to the various political spectrums, which undermined the explanations for the democratic faltering in the Arab world referred to.

• The third: that he presented religious arguments against the interpretations of the official religious institution serving the existing political system, and then imposed its presence and influence as an important challenge to the consensus that wanted to be formulated “officially” by the authoritarian regimes that could not remove its voice before the end of 2013, and it turned in the support of the authoritarian religious discourse that It is based on the concepts of obedience, sedition, and the inviolability of going out and demonstrating or protesting.

  God knows.