“Don't worry, we will free Iran.

They'll free themselves pretty soon."

These words were not spoken by some American activist or even a hawkish congressman - they were uttered the other day by the President of the United States, Joseph Biden.

Of course, you can make allowances for the age and mental state of the owner of the White House - Biden in recent months often says strange things and even greets the air.

However, his words regarding Iran are fully correlated with a sharp increase in conflict in relations between the two countries.

Thus, the Iranians accuse the United States of financing mass protests in the Islamic Republic, and the United States, in response, disperse the information that Iran is allegedly ready to attack Saudi Arabia (an American ally).

In addition to these two events, processes less noticeable to the audience are taking place that contribute to the aggravation of US-Iranian relations, including the gradual ousting of Iraq from the Iranian sphere of influence.

All this, coupled with the accelerated development of the Iranian nuclear program (in which, according to the Americans, Moscow can help Tehran) and the aggravation of the domestic economic and domestic political situation in the United States (whose elites are more and more in need of a “small victorious war”), makes the conflict more and more likely.

Until, according to experts, the beginning of direct hostilities between the US and Iran.

It would seem that this war will divert American attention from Ukraine and lead to a sharp increase in oil prices.

However, there are also quite obvious risks.

Both nuclear (it is unlikely that the Americans will wage war against Iran, which is not far from Russia, by conventional means - Washington simply does not have the strength to do this), and military-political ones.

There is still a Russian group in Syria (where Iranian troops are stationed), and it is possible that in the event of hostilities, Russian soldiers will be under the crosshairs.

Finally, the basis of Moscow's policy in the Middle East is the principle "we cooperate with everyone who wants to cooperate with us."

Within the framework of this principle, Russia, despite all its support for Bashar al-Assad and Iranian interests in Syria, managed to establish close and constructive relations with the countries of the region hostile to Iran.

First of all, with Israel (where the 

Benjamin Netanyahu, who advocates refusing to supply Israeli weapons to Ukraine) and Saudi Arabia, together with which Russia achieved a reduction in oil production in OPEC (and, accordingly, an increase in world oil prices with the nullification of all US attempts to force the world to buy Russian black gold at a minimum price ).

From this point of view, a hypothetical US war against Iran (in which Tel Aviv and Riyadh will fight on the American side) will force Moscow to choose.

In fact, today the only guaranteed way to dramatically reduce tensions and move back from the abyss of nuclear war is the conclusion of some kind of package agreement between the United States and Iran.

Some kind of analogue of the nuclear deal that was concluded under Obama.

A deal in which Iran imposes voluntary temporary restrictions on its nuclear program, and the United States in response lifts sanctions on Tehran and allows it to integrate into the world economy.

This deal, of course, will not lead to a sharp thaw in US-Iranian relations, but it will set some boundaries for escalation, when both sides will appreciate the agreements reached and all the preferences that they receive from these agreements.

The Iranians will have less conflict with their neighbors, and the Americans will less interfere in Iranian internal affairs and try to change the regime.

Such a consensus.

Unfortunately, today the chances of concluding such a deal are extremely small.

First, because Iran and the United States have never been able to build even the minimal atmosphere of trust that existed under Obama and destroyed by Donald Trump, in which the United States withdrew from the then-existing nuclear deal and killed the famous Iranian General Qasem Soleimani.

Secondly, Joseph Biden was never able to overcome the resistance of the Democratic Congress, which is skeptical not just about the deal, but about the very idea of ​​a temporary restriction on the Iranian nuclear program.

The congressmen demand Tehran's complete and irreversible renunciation of the nuclear program.

Now, after the midterm elections, the position of Congress will become even tougher.

The Republicans who replaced the Democrats (who, according to all forecasts, take both chambers) are not against the temporary format of the deal, but against the deal as such.

They are for the most severe approach, up to the conduct of hostilities against the Islamic Republic.

In addition, the Republicans have much closer relations with both the current, right-wing Israeli cabinet and the leadership of Saudi Arabia, which means that the Republicans are more inclined to take into account the interests of these two allies.

Both Saudi Arabia and Israel view their conflict with Iran as existential, and therefore are not interested in a US-Iranian deal, but in a war with Tehran at the hands of the United States.

In freeing them from the very existence of Iran.

That's what we're worried about.

The point of view of the author may not coincide with the position of the editors.