Vacancies in senior state positions are common in Lebanon, but it is increasingly becoming a sign of the depth of the crisis in the political system.
Therefore, it does not seem shocking to many Lebanese that, at the beginning of this month, the Baabda Palace became devoid of a President of the Republic after the end of the term of former President Michel Aoun, and Parliament failed to elect a successor.
The political system, which has run the country since the end of the civil war, was determined to perpetuate the post-war peace by imposing a sectarian and doctrinal division of senior positions.
But this system, which was planned to be temporary and to prepare the ground for the establishment of a civil state, has turned into a tool for former warlords and sect leaders to continue to tighten their grip on various aspects of life, from politics to economy and security.
Since the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in an explosion in 2005, the political system has begun to show weakness and rot, which is no longer able to produce a stable political situation for a long time, as was the case after the Taif Agreement.
Unlike the past three decades, in which the political system was able to coexist with a state of vacuum more than once whether it was at the level of the presidency, as happened between 2014 and 2016, or at the level of the absence of genuine governments for many months, the new presidential vacuum portends more political chaos. and economic and social collapse.
Lebanon has been suffering from an unprecedented economic collapse for three years, and is currently run by a fragile caretaker government with restricted powers, and a sharply divided parliament that lacks an explicit and clear majority capable of electing a new president.
Since the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in the explosion of 2005, the impotence and rottenness began to appear in the political system, which is no longer able to produce a stable political situation for a long time, as was the case after the Taif Agreement.
The Lebanese are known for their inability to govern themselves.
The Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon after the assassination of Hariri contributed to deepening the deficit in the performance of the political system.
Syria has never played a positive role in Lebanese political life after its military intervention alongside the Arab deterrence forces to end the civil war, but it was able to impose its security and intelligence control to intimidate the Lebanese leaders from its allies and opponents alike.
The various Lebanese politicians today, with their different orientations, are unanimously agreed on the predicament of the political system, but none of them has a clear vision of an alternative system that can gain a national consensus and get Lebanon out of its crisis.
Political stability after the civil war has always been contingent on economic stability, internal sectarian balance, and the balance of regional influence in the country, but none of that exists anymore.
The economic collapse led to a sharp reduction of the middle class, pushed the majority of the Lebanese into poverty and escalated resentment against political leaders, while the rise of Hezbollah’s political and military hegemony disrupted the political and sectarian balance, while the decline of the Arab and Gulf role in particular contributed to deepening Iranian influence on the country. .
All these transformations, along with the corruption inherent in the state as a result of sectarian and sectarian quotas, have brought Lebanon to a stage in which the ability of the political system to continue managing crises in the way it was accustomed to in the past was weakened.
The dangers now are that a prolonged presidential vacancy could cause the country to collapse even further.
Although the office of the president does not play a fundamental role in the administration of the executive branch, the government, to which presidential powers are supposed to be transferred under the constitution, is resigned and thus restricted in how it is used.
Its work is also shackled by internal consensus, which is difficult to achieve easily in light of the great polarization among its components.
Given that the economic reforms required by the International Monetary Fund in exchange for aid, emerge as an urgent issue in the work of the caretaker government, the approval of these reforms requires the approval of the majority of members of the government, which means putting another obstacle in the way of economic recovery, and causing further economic collapse that increases In turn, the risks of social and security turmoil.
It is unlikely that the political elite would prefer national interests to their own narrow interests, as they used to do.
The first urgent step towards breaking the impasse is the agreement of the political parties on a presidential candidate who enjoys the consensus of the actors, especially the alliances of Hezbollah and its opponents, and an agreement on a new power-sharing similar to what happened in 2016, but this does not seem possible in the foreseeable future for reasons many:
First, former Prime Minister Saad Hariri played a prominent role in the previous presidential settlement, but he is now out of the political equation and there is no Sunni political leader who can lead a potential new settlement.
Second, there is still no centrist figure to take over the presidency who could have the unanimity of the various parties, unlike the 2014 settlement in which Michel Aoun was that figure.
Third, regional and international sponsorship of Aoun’s election was essential in the power-sharing agreement in 2016, but providing such sponsorship again appears to be a difficult situation in light of the fact that the Gulf states, which were a major sponsor of Lebanon’s Sunnis after the civil war, are no longer willing to grant legitimacy to any presidential settlement. A person close to Hezbollah arrives at Baabda Palace.
The experience of the 2014 settlement was bad enough to make the Gulf states not repeat it again.
Given the current risks, Lebanon's political leaders may be able to reach an interim settlement to limit the damage caused by the presidential vacuum, including an understanding of a new arrangement that would give the caretaker government the freedom needed to agree to economic reforms.
However, such an understanding, if it occurs, cannot constitute a stable alternative to the understanding over a new president.
The fact that the position of the president reflects the political and sectarian balance of power makes the imbalance of power the main driver of political polarization, which may see its interest in coexisting with the presidential vacuum for a longer period with diminishing chances of understanding a consensual candidate.
At the present time, both the Hezbollah alliance, and the sovereign forces opposed to it along with the bloc of independents, have the ability to block the provision of the majority needed to elect a new president in order to deny the other party the delivery of the candidate it wants, but this game will only further complicate the crisis. Politics and the risk of deepening economic collapse.
In light of the fact that the current situation clearly limits the chances of concluding a new presidential settlement, the remaining way to avoid a long-term presidential vacuum lies in the little influence that regional and international forces influencing the Lebanese situation have to reduce the intensity of internal polarization and encourage political leaders to think about the advantages of giving priority to national consensus. On the consequences of going ahead with the game of wills.
The fact that the regional factors represented by the repercussions of the Syrian war and the Iranian-Saudi rivalry have greatly complicated the Lebanese polarization, makes reducing its effects necessary as a starting point for initiating a new political process that redresses the internal imbalance.
Given that the breakthrough in recent months in Saudi-Iranian relations did not lead to a clear shift in the course of regional competition and did not positively affect the Lebanese situation, the continuation of the Lebanese bet on the Saudi-Iranian track or the fate of the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the West will mean more internal stalemate.
It is unclear whether the tools possessed by Western countries such as the United States and France are actually capable of separating the Lebanese case from the regional conflict.
Surrendering to the presidential vacuum as a fait accompli will, over time, raise doubts about the legitimacy of the caretaker government in exercising its powers, thus deepening political paralysis and institutional disintegration.