This month, Turkey hosted an emergency meeting of foreign ministers of the Organization of Turkish States to prepare for the organization's first summit at the leaders' level in Samarkand next month.
It has been nearly a year since the organization was formed as an alternative to the Council of Turkic-speaking countries, but its influence as a new regional power is still very limited compared to other regional organizations.
And early last year, the military intervention of the Collective Security Treaty Organization led by Russia to quell unrest in Kazakhstan raised doubts about the ability of the Organization of Turkish States to manage its internal situations and the conflicts among some of its members away from Moscow's influence.
This seems natural considering that the organization is new and does not have a security arm like the Collective Security Treaty Organization.
The stability of the regimes in Central Asian countries depends mainly on the regional security influence of Moscow.
Erdogan’s strategy relies first on soft power and ethnic, cultural and religious ties with members of the Organization of Turkish States to attract them to Ankara, second on the desire of these countries to reduce Russian hegemony over it and build economic partnerships with other parties, and third on arms sales to those countries
This was clearly demonstrated in the turmoil of Kazakhstan, where the intervention of the Collective Security Treaty helped President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to consolidate his grip on power and weaken the influence of his predecessor Nursultan Nazarbayev, but the repercussions of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the region and the Russian role;
In the long run, they may lead to a reconfiguration of its political geography.
After the war, the countries of the region seemed more cautious in continuing to stick with Russia, as the war and Western economic isolation that Moscow faces undermined its economic influence in the region and weakened its role as a regional security leader, and gave way to other geopolitical competitors such as Turkey and China to strengthen their presence in the former Soviet space.
Ankara's ambition to play a leading role in Central Asia and the Caucasus has long clashed with Russian hegemony.
Moscow has not hidden its opposition to Turkey's desire to establish a military base in Azerbaijan and views the Organization of Turkish States with suspicion.
Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu speaks to reporters after the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Turkish States at Dolmabahce Palace in Istanbul (Anatolia Agency)
Given that Russia's strong influence in the region combines regional security hegemony with deep economic partnerships, Ankara has modest tools to rival Moscow.
Erdogan's strategy relies first on soft power and ethnic, cultural and religious ties with members of the Organization of Turkish States to attract them to Ankara, second on the desire of these countries to reduce Russian hegemony over it and build economic partnerships with other parties, and third on arms sales to those countries.
Kazakhstan has the largest economy in Central Asia, and the nature of its relations with Russia and China largely determines the size of its future contribution to the Organization of Turkish States, and thus the effectiveness of this organization as well.
And when Russia backed Tokayev in his grip on power, it looked like Kazakhstan would turn into Putin's tame junior partner.
But that did not happen;
Tokayev has outright refused to support Russia's war on Ukraine, and is increasingly working to reduce his country's dependence on Moscow by fostering other partnerships with China and Turkey.
And in May last year, he visited Ankara and signed a protocol with it to start joint production of the Turkish Anka drones, making Kazakhstan the first outside Turkey to produce them.
Turkmenistan is also among the largest buyers of Turkish arms.
Also, Kyrgyzstan bought Turkish "Bayraktar TB2" aircraft last year.
Tajikistan is also keen to buy some of it, which puts Turkey in the dilemma of balancing its relations with countries that have border disputes such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
The changing regional dynamics since the dissolution of the Soviet Union created a suitable environment for Ankara to deepen its relations with the Turkish world in Central Asia.
And some of the transformations that occurred in Central Asia and the Caucasus as a result of the Ukraine war seem encouraging to Turkey's ambitions.
At a time when Putin is working to confront Western isolation, he seems unable to employ the countries of the region to his advantage.
Despite important economic and political relations with Russia, none of the five Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) sided with Russia in two United Nations resolutions condemning the war on Ukraine last March and April.
The continuing Russian military failure in the Ukraine war casts doubt on Moscow's prowess as a powerful military or regional police chief.
Ankara has a lot to do to project itself as a new power in the region, but the repercussions of Russia's war in Ukraine have shortened distances and made the tools it possesses more effective.
There are other indications that Central Asian countries are wary of remaining in Russia's orbit the way they have been since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Kazakhstan resolutely refused to recognize the Russian annexation of the four Ukrainian regions.
Uzbek President Shavkat Mirzaev strongly condemned the Soviet-era repression of his country in late August, while working to strengthen ties with China.
There are two main factors that undermine Russia's role as a regional security power:
First, in the two recent military confrontations between Azerbaijan and Armenia on the one hand, and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on the other, Russia has not played an active role.
The European Union, the United States and Turkey have played a greater role in calming tensions between Baku and Yerevan.
Moscow is too tired in Ukraine to focus on its role as a watchdog in the region.
Second, all Central Asian countries rely heavily on Russia to keep their weak economies afloat, through trade, seasonal employment and remittances, but the weakening of the Russian economy due to sanctions will also affect Central Asian economies in the medium term.
China is the main economic power that could benefit from Russia's decline in the region, thanks in large part to ambitious Belt and Road projects there, while Russia will no longer be quite as attractive as an economic partner as it was before the war.
Russia's increasing weakness is likely to help Turkey strengthen its ties deeper with the region.
But the fact that the political, economic, and security ties between Moscow and Central Asia are so deep that it is difficult to predict their weakness for the foreseeable future, means that the obstacles facing Ankara are not simple.
Unlike China, which has significant economic influence in the region and is helped by Russia's dependence on it to counter Western isolation in making its hand stronger in the competitive partnership with Moscow, Turkey needs to be more active and interactive with the region by presenting itself as an integrated partner.
In addition to investments and arms sales, energy trade and global trade routes are the most important tools it has in this regard.
On his recent visit to Astana, Erdogan again raised the importance of the Central Corridor, which stretches from Beijing to Europe and is at the heart of the annual global trade movement of more than $600 billion.
While the line is more prominent in global trade with the security and time it provides, it also strengthens Turkey's role as a regional transportation hub linking the West and the East, partially replacing Russia.
Ankara has a lot to do to project itself as a new power in the region, but the repercussions of Russia's war in Ukraine have shortened distances and made the tools it possesses more effective.