As was expected, the statement issued by Hamas recently regarding its decision to restore relations with the Syrian regime caused widespread controversy and sharp reactions, especially from circles considered close or close to it and who have good faith and support, such as some Islamic movements, scientific bodies and opinion holders who usually support the resistance. .
Most of the criticism directed at the movement's decision focused on the religious and moral dimensions, in addition to some political debate, which remained largely marginal.
Far from taking a stand for or against the decision, this article seeks to discuss the relevance of analyzing the said decision from these angles and the conclusions that can be reached.
religious debate
Regarding the statement, fatwas were issued by several scholars and advocates that tended to “forbid” the establishment of a relationship with the Syrian regime in view of what it had committed against its people. Indeed, one of the senior scholars said what it meant that “no two disagree” that restoring relations with the Assad regime is forbidden.
In addition, much of the criticism directed at Hamas by advocacy figures revolved around the idea that it is an "Islamic movement", in which religion constitutes a major part of the determinants of its work and positions, and therefore restoring the relationship with the regime contradicts this religious reference.
Political action in general is not subject and should not be subject to the logic of halal and haram. What has settled in the awareness and practices of Islamic movements is that political action, and specifically political relations, fall under the heading of “sent interests” or “legitimate politics”, which are areas that are not subject to the institution of fatwa and the logic of authorization and prohibition. Rather, it is to appreciate the "Imam" according to traditional terms.
Accusing Hamas of indifference to Syrian blood in the context of restoring relations with the regime should be accompanied by accusations of indifference to Palestinian blood, and even to “Hamsawi,” since a large number of Palestinians in general and the Palestinian movement in particular are among the regime’s victims, among the martyrs, detainees and missing persons.
This does not negate the need sometimes, and exceptionally, for a legal opinion or a fatwa in some thorny or difficult-to-measure developments on a previously known matter, as happened, for example, when the Palestinian resistance resorted to martyrdom operations, where its literature mentioned that it obtained fatwas from respected scholars.
This is in principle, and in the details that many of the fatwas that said inviolability did not mention the basis and reason for the prohibition, and some of those mentioned did not have a similar position on the relations of Hamas and others with other regimes and parties to which many of the descriptions used against the Syrian regime apply.
It is no secret that the absence of standardization is a major gap in the fatwa system.
The foregoing does not mean that religion should be completely separate from political action and that there are no religious controls for the resistance factions and Islamic movements in their relations.
But the matter is closer to a system or network of general rules and values that should be observed, and away from the logic of fatwas analysis and prohibition, especially in the absence of any unanimous religious institution as a reference for fatwas.
Ethical debate
Most of what Hamas has directed after its famous decision is the moral debate, in which most - if not all - of those who criticized it from various orientations, backgrounds and premises, including activists, media professionals, and even some affiliated with Hamas itself, participated.
They said that Hamas by restoring the relationship with the Assad regime contradicts itself, its history, and its identity as a national liberation movement.
Perhaps the main reason behind this argument is the confusion and even equality between weaving a relationship with a party and conforming to it in the situation, which is a major systematic error.
Once again, there is an “exception” to the Syrian regime in this context, as Hamas or others have not been confronted with such an allegation in the hands of their relations with other parties, and the example of the Egyptian regime, which restored the momentum to its relations with it after the coup, is a clear example of that.
Accusing Hamas of indifference to Syrian blood in the context of restoring relations with the regime should be accompanied by accusations of indifference to Palestinian blood, and even to “Hamsawi,” since a large number of Palestinians in general and the Palestinian movement in particular are among the regime’s victims, among the martyrs, detainees and missing persons.
By the same logic, what can be said about the relations that Hamas forges with regimes that are hostile to it in theory and practice?
Did its restoration of relations with Iran previously include adopting its foreign policies, especially in Syria?
Rather, does the great reaction to Hamas after the statement was issued suggest that its relations with the regime can improve its image among the segments and concerned parties, but is the regime, after all that happened, keen on its “image” in front of it?
political debate
The political dimension was the least present in criticizing Hamas's decision and statement, although it was the first to do so.
Perhaps the most important thing that has been said in this regard is the denial of the movement’s real and fundamental interests with the Syrian regime, which is a logical and certainly valid argument in view of the latter’s political and field situation, the size of foreign interventions in Syria and the extent of radical changes in it during the past decade.
But it should also be brought to mind that the movement did not issue any indication that it exaggerated the extent of the expected interests from the return of relations with Damascus, at least in the first stage and according to the current conditions, in addition to the fact that some interests may not be clear and announced to the observer from afar, not to mention that paying Some of the potential damages can be counted among the expected interests, and I mean here Hamas' references to the magnitude of changes in the region and the world, especially with regard to alliances and regional axes.
In the political debate, it was said that the Syrian regime is more in need of relations with Hamas than relations with it, which is inaccurate in view of the reality of the two parties and the priorities of each of them.
Some discussions confused what is supposed to be steadfastness on the situation and what could be harmful stagnation, and between areas of required flexibility and rejected Machiavellian paths, and all of this is a possible and even useful political discussion.
But it was remarkable that many showed enthusiastic schadenfreude when some media leaked the regime's requirement that it present a clear and public apology for its previous position on the Syrian revolution (and from it).
It was clear that she did not apologize and did not announce a change in her position, which means that she does not go into a relationship of subordination and acquiescence, does not adopt the position of the regime, and does not seek to interfere in the internal Syrian affairs, which is a fundamental and pivotal issue in the premises of criticism of her latest decision.
Finally, there was a focus on criticism of what some considered the "exceptionalism" of the Palestinian cause to Hamas and the term "centrality of the Palestinian cause" used in the region for decades.
Perhaps those affiliated with the movement have previously written that it does not differentiate between issues and crises, but rather tries to fulfill its responsibilities towards the “gap” it stands on, and that it cannot be done by others from outside Palestine, and that “centralization” does not mean exclusivity or preference.
In conclusion, there is no doubt that the negative reaction to the decision of Hamas to restore relations with the Syrian regime was expected, and a good part of it has merit, given the specificity of the Syrian situation, the heat of the event and the severity of the losses, especially since a good part of the criticism was issued by lovers And supporters and supporters of it, as well as those affected and victims of the regime.
But this does not mean that it is easy to exceed the limits of criticism, advice and blame towards areas of distortion, treason and hostility.
This is because we are talking about a political decision that is subject to the assessment of the political situation, which may err or be right, and this may become clear soon or be proven by developments later.
This does not mean denying the existence of an ethical dimension that a resistance faction and an Islamic movement such as Hamas cannot ignore, but that this ethical dimension should be approached within its limits and scope and in a manner that does not depart from the ethical framework as well.
Especially since no one has any interest in disturbing and betraying a movement such as Hamas that is still at the forefront of the resistance to the occupation, and no indication has been issued by it that it has changed or changed, and this (betrayal) approach was among the causes of loss and regression in a number of issues.
Moreover, all of the above does not mean that Hamas’ decision is beyond discussion, let alone criticism and rejection. Rather, we said that some of what was directed at it has merit and rightness, especially with regard to style, discourse, formulations and impressions that it leaves on the recipient and follower, and these are matters that Hamas should take care of. Special attention in this sensitive and thorny path, in addition to the possibility that Hamas' Arab and regional relations will gradually shift towards the exclusive - and not only priority - of the "axis of resistance" has potential risks as well as envisaged benefits.