Hamas and the relationship with the Assad regime: political and religious controversy (1)

In the past few days, the Syrian Islamic Council issued a statement condemning Hamas' intention to restore its relationship with Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria. It has reconciled with the Assad regime, "will put itself in a state of clear joints with the nation, and will isolate itself from the project of the movement's first loyal leaders to move to the side of the Wali al-Faqih, militias and sectarian gangs in the face of the peoples of the region and their free sons, history, principles and values," according to the text of the statement.

This statement comes as a culmination of previous events that began when a delegation of sheikhs - of various nationalities and formations - met with Ismail Haniyeh, and the meeting - after its leakage - sparked sharp controversy.

A group of people saw the mere meeting with Hamas leaders as a problem;

This put pressure on some of the sheikhs and prompted them to issue a statement explaining that they met with the Hamas leadership to discourage it from the decision to rapprochement with the Syrian regime, which involves “great corruptions that do not conform to the principles, values, and controls of legitimacy.” They said: They demanded the movement to “review the decision and reconsider Study it in the light of what the scholars have mentioned” according to the text of the first statement.

On the other hand, Sheikh Ahmed Raissouni, head of the International Union of Muslim Scholars, sided with Hamas' decision;

As a decision that serves the interests of the resistance, while Sheikh Ali Mohieddin Al-Qara Daghi, Secretary-General of the Union, considered the issue "disciplined and not principled or textual";

It is related to politics, "and politics - with the exception of principles - is very broad," and Qara Daghi said that his goal is to stabilize the resistance and to push back any hesitation that might arise in this context, and to prevent the Hamas leadership from being described as "anything that goes against Sharia."

This data raises 5 main things:

The first is that there is a perspective that makes the field of politics very flexible and open to interest that is ambiguous with pragmatism;

All means are legitimate as long as they achieve the kinetic purpose, and here the same principle retreats in the field of political practice to advance the interest, and here it becomes legitimate to ask about the extent to which the moral prohibition begins;

The normalization, rather the alliance with Israel, has its justifications of interest or compulsion, as it is currently underway in Morocco and Turkey, and normalization with Assad has its justifications as well.

Second: We are facing two different positions here, a dynamic position that is combined with political ideology and affiliated with countries geographically far from the topic of discussion (Syria and Yemen), and the position of a Sheikh who is part of the Syrian opposition or is at least affiliated with it, although some of the components of the Syrian Islamic Council are from the Syrian Brotherhood .

Third: The details of the dialogue that took place during the meeting of the sheikhs with Haniyeh reflect the different premises between the two groups;

The group of sheikhs talked about “corruptions” and about “principles, values, and legal controls,” while the Hamas leadership proceeds from the idea that the decision was taken according to the movement’s organizational “frameworks and mechanisms.” It also did not explain the rationale for the decision to the rest of the resistance factions, according to the information available to me from sources Immediately, leave the volunteers' justifications to them;

We are looking at the rationale for decision making for the movement itself.

Fourth: We are facing political positions par excellence, but they are practiced by sheikhs from different parties.

The positions of Hamas and the leaders of the World Union are political positions that see priority in supporting Hamas in particular (which is a faction of the Palestinian factions), and the position of the Syrian Islamic Council is also a political one.

Because he believes that the priority is the position on the Syrian regime, which committed crimes against humanity and abandoned many of those who were displaced by Israel from Palestine, including the Palestinians of Syria.

But there is an important difference between the two groups here: Hamas practices religion on the grounds of politics, while the Syrian Council practices politics on the grounds of religion, and I have previously pointed out its ambiguous role, whether in defining its role or in its practices.

Fifth: This discussion raises 3 main concepts that are theoretically and practically problematic for these actors, and these concepts are the interest, the nation and politics.

As for the concept of interest, it is - as I explained in a previous article - ambiguous with the concept of pragmatism among Islamists.

It is a flexible concept capable of justifying any action by Islamists alone and not others. What is the dividing line between a reformer and an opportunist in political action?

What is the political taboo that cannot be overlooked if it is issued by an Islamist?

Is the political taboo determined according to partisan, national, or fixed normative considerations that transcend all those narrow perspectives?

As for the concept of the nation, it is also a cloudy concept. Hence, the question of who represents the nation and the mechanisms of its representation has become a legitimate question, with the concept of the nation being trivialized in the reality of country states and movements that are below the state and even in opposition to the state, whether for the Palestinian resistance movements or for their allies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen ;

Hamas, the World Union, the Syrian Islamic Council and Iran all speak in the name of the nation;

While we are facing conflicting and competing visions to represent the nation for partisan, national and sectarian political accounts as well.

Rather, the statement by some Hamas leaders that the nation is the one who stands with the resistance (which in this case is reduced to Hamas specifically) is similar to the Ismaili concept of the nation, which is determined by who is with the imam, even if he is an individual.

In fact, the nation’s issues in the last decade have varied and the priorities of its various components have varied. Hence, the issue of Palestine is no longer the only issue as it was before the so-called “Arab Spring,” and it is no longer an exception.

The victims of the revolutions and the counter-revolution and its tragedies have outnumbered the victims of the Palestinian cause throughout its history in killing, destruction, displacement and torture, and then many contradictions emerged on the surface. Including Iraq, which no one talks about in this ongoing debate.

The political developments during the last decade caused a dispute within Hamas, which led to a change in the political leadership, financing mechanisms, the balance of power, and the connection with Iran and its groups.

As for the concept of politics, it has also become a cloudy concept, and if we judge the Islamists to the definitions of politics among the previous Muslim imams - perhaps the most prominent of them is Ibn Aqil al-Hanbali, who defined it as what people are closer to righteousness and farther from corruption - we would find that we are facing a policy other than politics;

Islamic movements are partisan movements that practice politics according to the logic of partisan movements and nothing more.

The political actions of the current Hamas leadership (such as the determination of rapprochement with the Assad regime, congratulating the Houthi group on Eid al-Adha, condoling the UAE on the death of its former president, and glorifying Qassem Soleimani before) would not have raised any problem if they were issued by a political party that is explicit in its pragmatism that seeks power or the political interests of its party. , which are legitimate interests according to the logic of general political action.

But Hamas' behavior raises many "legitimate questions";

Because it is a movement that says that its reference is Islamic, and it is part of a major movement based on “the arbitration of Sharia” and the “Islamic nation” thesis. Rather, it must provide justifications that are consistent with its reference and its statements;

Fulfillment of its principles first, and out of respect for its audience and its affiliates who have a right over it, secondly, and a statement to the peoples who may be harmed by its policies, fourthly, according to a pragmatic logic;

In support of its cause and not to neglect its popular support, which is part of its interest as a political movement.

The first three aspects mentioned above lie at the heart of the question about the difference that the “Islamic reference” makes in political practice. Only here appears what distinguishes the action of the “Islamic” politician from the action of the non-Islamic politician.

Especially since a large part of the legitimacy of the Islamist activists is based on the claim of this difference;

Because if there is no difference here, the thesis of the "Islamic reference" will collapse, which does not make an impact on the political action or does not attend except in justifying the previous act (which is what I meant by practicing religion on the ground of politics), then the only paper that remained for the Islamists - after the experience of the "Spring" The Arab” - is their morality or principle, and if they lose it, there is nothing left for them.

Paradoxically, many of the movement’s members appear very critical when they deal with political systems or other parties, but when they deal with policies adopted by their leaders or movements, they are creative in justifying and seeking excuses that hinder the ability of critical thinking or demonstrative debate.

It is unfortunate that some Hamas partisans ridicule or belittle the moral question in favor of partisan action, and shift the matter from the scope of serious intellectual discussion to the scope of partisan justification.

Counting the exploits of the movement and freeing it from any error;

Just because I trusted it and its leaders and the sacrifices it made, even though Khaled Meshaal - who is its most prominent leader - keeps saying that the movement may err in its assessments and policies.

This behavior reflects the inability to distinguish between evaluating a specific act or policy that may be wrong and evaluating the movement as a whole. It also reflects a disregard for the huge sacrifices of peoples in the region, such as Syria, Iraq and Yemen, an extremist position that opposes those who drop the entire history of the movement for the sake of a specific policy, and such border positions. They are positions of faith that do not belong to politics;

It is purely partisan behavior.

The personification of discussion and the inability to critically deal with the political act regardless of who does it, by invoking dualities such as the al-Qa’id and the Mujahid, and who has his hand in the fire is not like someone who sits under air conditioners, and other things that are closer to being slandered;

Because the saying ignores that the leaders of the Islamic work themselves have dispersed in exile, and that the leaders of Hamas and leaders of the struggle against tyranny in several countries are both persecuted and suffering, and that the political leaders of Hamas use air-conditioning and luxury hotels as well, without this being considered a shortcoming in their rights;

Because it is foreign to the whole discussion.

Seeking elastic justifications valid to justify any act issued by any actor, such as summarizing the vague interests without entering into their merits and details, and in what meaning are the interests, and what are the avoided evils?

Is the balance here between evils and interests, or between evils only?

Is it bad for the movement or for the Palestinian cause as a whole?

Did consultations take place between the leaders of all the resistance factions to assess these interests and corruptions, or is it a partisan assessment at the level of a movement that does not represent the Palestinian cause, but rather a faction of its factions?

Like saying: the issue is jurisprudential or suspicious at best;

To avoid taking a position and holding the stick from the middle, or like saying by necessity and eating dead meat without examining the reality of necessity, and whether the matter reached the extent of death without it?

What is the boundary between satiation and filling one’s stomach in eating it after giving up necessarily, to other necessary details that are deliberately skipped;

Because the goal is justification and not serious and critical discussion and the realization of the rulings.

Perhaps the funniest type of justification is to say: The leadership may take decisions that may appear to the public to be likely, but these decisions are due - in the same matter and when weighting - to the balance between interests and interests, and the evils and evils;

As if "the same thing" can be found;

Also, the one who said this confuses the actions of a movement that is a faction inside the Palestinian territories with the leadership of the state or the imamate in the classical jurisprudential heritage. He also assumes that the leadership never errs;

So doing it at the lowest level is likely, then it appeals to the pre-state perceptions that separate a complete separation between the leadership that is known and the public who are not known, so he included all the religious, intellectual and political elite that do not belong to the movement in the public sphere, and this has nothing to do with modern politics;

It is a non-historical or contemporary partisan perception.

Paradoxically, many of the movement’s members appear very critical when they deal with political systems or other parties, but when they deal with policies adopted by their leaders or movements, they are creative in justifying and seeking excuses that hinder the ability of critical thinking or demonstrative debate.

The implementation of critical thinking within Islamic movements and parties would create a different opinion or position that does not coincide in positions along the line, but this difference is not tolerated by party affiliation and organizational structures.

The critic may expose himself to accountability or dismissal.

Critical thinking does not give confidence to the idea, just as it would look into the details, contexts and balances of forces within the movement itself to stand on the internal influences and disagreements. , What is the difference affecting them, and for whose benefit?

And what pressures were applied?

What are the profit and loss accounts?

For whose benefit?

Which of the two decisions Assad political and moral?

Critical thinking does not ignore the justifications for the different positions that affect the same issue (such as severing with the Syrian regime and returning to it, which means acknowledging the mistake or changing the interests of the movement).

And if we are to surrender to the leadership of a movement all the matter;

Because she knows the secrets and the details of the interests, let us submit to the ruler on the way of Sheikh Abdullah bin Bayh, who then uses the same arguments that the justifications use;

And then they will find themselves before a question dealing with the legitimacy of the Islamic movements themselves;

Because they will then become schismatic movements within the public order, or they will face a stark contrast between being loyalists in one country and revolutionaries in another.