The nuclear facilities in Iran are divided into four main branches: research centers, enrichment sites, nuclear reactors, and uranium mines.
Nuclear research centers: the most prominent of them are: the Gorgan Center, the Jaber Ibn Hayyan Center for Research and Transformation, the Darmand Center for Plasma Physics Research, the Sharif University Center for Nuclear Research, the Bonab Center for Research and Development, and the Moalem Kalayeh Center for Nuclear Research.
Uranium enrichment sites: the most important of which are: Ramandeh Center, Lashkar Abad, Natanz facility, Darkwein site suspected of being intended for enrichment, and Ardakan Uranium Ore Purification Center.
Iran has two uranium mines: Soghand and Zarigan.
Uranium enrichment is the process of converting raw uranium gas into nuclear fuel.
This process is carried out by centrifugation, which is the process of separating uranium and then concentrating it.
Reactors dedicated to energy production need 3.5% enrichment, for example, the Iranian-Russian-made Bushehr reactor.
As for enrichment at higher rates, up to 20%, it is used for reactors devoted to scientific research, which produce doses of nuclear therapy to fight cancer.
These reactors also produce nuclear materials used in agriculture and to raise the quality of fertilizer.
Iran has one major nuclear reactor dedicated to research purposes.
And uranium enriched by 20% requires only a few additional steps to become enriched to 90% and then be ready for use in nuclear weapons.
Nuclear reactors
Iran has five major reactors that are subject to periodic visits by United Nations inspectors who have installed 24-hour monitoring devices linked to satellites. These reactors are:
The Bushehr reactor
is a nuclear power plant, with which Iran's nuclear program began in 1974 with German assistance, but after the Islamic revolution in 1979 the project was canceled, and it was not resumed until 1992 when Tehran signed an agreement with Russia to resume work at the Bushehr plant, where there are two reactors for water.
Isfahan reactor,
Iran built a plant in Isfahan to convert uranium into three forms: uranium hexafluoride gas, which is used in the uranium enrichment activities taking place in the Natanz reactor, uranium oxide, which is used in fuel plants, but not of the kind used by Iran, and the metal often used as the basis for explosives. nuclear.
Natanz reactor Iran
has built a facility for feeding uranium using centrifugation and laser separation method at the Natanz site, 260 km south of Tehran.
A leaked IAEA report in 2003 stated that weapons-grade uranium had been found in samples taken from the site, although Iran blamed imported contaminated materials, and an independent report later confirmed Tehran's claim.
Iran suspended work on a uranium enrichment reactor at Natanz in 2003, but later restarted it.
It was estimated in 2006 that the Natanz reactor - much of which is underground - could contain about 50,000 advanced gas transmission tubes, allowing it to produce enough uranium to develop more than 20 nuclear warheads each year.
Other estimates in the same period said that the reactor could have five thousand transport tubes after the completion of the initial stages of the project, a number that would enable Iran to produce enough uranium to produce a few nuclear weapons each year if it embarked on that, especially after conducting research. The B2 centrifuges were more sophisticated and efficient than the B1 centrifuges it used.
Years later, in 2014, Tehran tested a new generation of centrifuges (IR-8) that allow it to enrich at very high speeds compared to the existing devices.
Arak reactor
Since 1996, Iran has started building a heavy water production facility in the city of Arak (central Iran). Tehran officially announced the start of production on August 28, 2006 after the Iranian opposition unveiled this facility for the first time in 2002, and photos of it were published. Captured by the US Science and International Security Institute - which tracks Iran's nuclear program - in December 2002.
Iran said that the plant will produce 17 tons of heavy water annually, with a purity of 15%, and eighty tons, with a purity close to 80%.
Thus, according to the opinions of nuclear experts, Iran has achieved a breakthrough in order to achieve independence in the nuclear fuel cycle, as the fuel produced from the heavy water reactor can produce ten kilograms of plutonium annually, which is enough to make at least two nuclear bombs.
In 2004, Iran began constructing a 40-megawatt reactor of its design near the Arak heavy water production facility. The reactor relies on heavy water and natural uranium available in Iran, without the need to enrich uranium, which the major powers demand Tehran to stop producing.
Fordow reactor
Iran uses the Fordow facility - which is located underground in a fortified mountainous area south of the capital, Tehran, which it admitted its existence to the International Atomic Energy Agency in September 2009 after it was discovered by Western intelligence services - to enrich uranium to a fissile purity of 20%, to be fuel for a reactor. Medical Research in Tehran produces radioactive isotopes to treat cancer patients.
Tehran suspended It suspended the Fordow facility in January 2014 under an interim nuclear deal it struck with major powers in Geneva in November 2013, but later restarted it.
On July 10, a spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Behrouz Kamalvandi, said that his country had been able to produce 20% enriched uranium from the IR6 series of centrifuges, which were placed at the Fordow facility two weeks before that date. Gas was pumped into it.
Centers serving the nuclear industry
According to United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 1737 in 2006 regarding the Iranian nuclear program, the Iranian institutions involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities, many of them affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards and the Ministry of Defense, the most prominent of which are:
The Munitions and Metallurgy Industries Group (also known as the Ammunition Industries Group) controls the Haft Tir industrial complex and runs Iran's centrifuge programme.
It is owned and controlled by the Defense Industries Corporation.
Isfahan Nuclear Fuel and Centrifuges Research and Production Center, and Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center.
Parchin Chemical Industries Corporation, a branch of the Defense Industries Corporation located 30 kilometers southeast of Tehran.
Karaj Nuclear Research Center, an acceleration research facility that is part of the Research Division of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization.
Cruise missiles, also known as the Naval Defense Industry Group, is responsible for cruise missiles, including cruise missiles.
Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group and Shahid Baqri Industrial Group.
Sanam Industrial Group of the Aerospace Industries Corporation.
Ya Mahdi Group for Industries, a subsidiary of the Aerospace Industries Corporation.
Al-Quds Corporation for Aeronautics Industries (which produces: drones, parachutes, gliders, and motorized gliders).
Pars Aviation Services Company of the Revolutionary Guards.
Shuaa Aviation, whose products are used by the Revolutionary Guards as part of its asymmetric warfare theory.
Center for Nuclear Electromagnetic Studies, founded in 2005.
Malik Al-Ashtar University specialized in defense technology, in which the Department of Chemistry conducted tests on the element beryllium, which is used in the nuclear industry.
Facilities Insurance
The US and Israeli intelligence services assert that Iran has established many highly fortified nuclear facilities in the ground and in remote areas in a misleading manner, which makes it impossible for the Israeli or American air force to strike all these nuclear facilities.
It is also difficult for these intelligence services to obtain accurate information about the facilities of the main weight in this nuclear program, which would suffice to hit them to stop the entire production process, in addition to the fact that these facilities are surrounded by powerful air defenses consisting of anti-aircraft and anti-aircraft missile batteries. Also, it is subject to the strict protection of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.
The Iraqi lesson
According to Western reports - including American - that one of the biggest difficulties that may face any military action to destroy the Iranian nuclear program is the absence of accurate and detailed information about Iranian nuclear sites.
The reports are due to the fact that the Iranians learned well from the Iraqi lesson and the targeting of the Osirak reactor, and did not put all their nuclear secrets in one basket and followed the needle and straw theory, on the basis that there are supposed nuclear sites, but they are distributed over the vast area of the country, in addition to what is said that some of them enjoy It is strictly confidential and only a few Iranian officials are allowed to enter it.
In addition to the rumors that there are underground tunnels that hide the sites of sensitive programs.