Is Russia really opposed to a Turkish operation in Syria?

When Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Ankara on June 8 to hold talks with his Turkish counterpart on a project to establish a sea corridor to facilitate the transit of Ukraine's exports of wheat and grain, Turkish plans to launch a new operation against Kurdish units in northern Syria were firmly on the agenda of the visit.

Although the visit did not come out with a clear Russian position on the possible Turkish operation, with the exception of Lavrov's reiteration of taking into account Turkey's security concerns, days later the Kremlin said that it opposed any new Turkish attack, and warned that it would lead to an escalation of the situation and destabilization.

But the most important Russian statements so far in this regard were made by the Russian special envoy to Syria, Alexander Lavrentiev, in which he said that Russia will not fight Turkey and the Syrian National Army in the countryside of Aleppo, and that the Turkish army can control the area that it will target, but it is difficult to predict the consequences. on it.

While Russia opposes, in principle, any new Turkish attack for many reasons, most notably preventing the increase of the areas under Turkish control in northern Syria and concern about the impact of its approval of the operation on the relations it established with the Kurdish units, as well as taking into account the position of Damascus rejecting it. At the same time, not to enter into a military clash with Turkey, which would have major repercussions on the intertwined interests between the two countries in Syria and other issues, especially the conflict in Ukraine, where Ankara is still adopting a balanced approach in the Russian-Western conflict, and has not engaged in Western sanctions. Against Moscow, it also kept its airspace open to Russia.

Given that the four military operations launched by Turkey in Syria since 2016 did not enjoy public Russian support, Moscow avoided using its forces in Syria to obstruct those operations in the last large Turkish operation in the east of the Euphrates 3 years ago, and Russia did not support the operation, but it was concluded after That is the Sochi agreement with Turkey to stop the attack at the enclave that the Turkish army and the opposition factions managed to control between the cities of Ras al-Ain and Tal Abyad.

Considering that the Russian army controls the Syrian airspace in the west of the Euphrates, Russia’s assertion that it does not want to confront any Turkish operation in the areas of Tal Rifaat and Manbij is of great importance that outweighs the importance of the political position opposing it, and will mean that the Turkish army will be able to use the air force to strike the Kurdish units In the two regions, without the risk of being targeted by Russian air defense systems, but what must be taken into account - which Moscow hinted at - is the risk of a military clash between Turkey on the one hand and the Syrian regime and forces allied to Iran on the other.

Such a scenario actually happened two years ago and could be repeated again, and what increases its risks is that Damascus and Tehran are desperately seeking to prevent Turkey from seizing more lands as much as Russian military neutrality in any new Turkish operation will benefit Turkey, but Moscow's position is still vital in Preventing the development of events into a broader confrontation that is difficult to contain and may lead to a complete collapse of the ceasefire agreement in Idlib.

After the Sochi Agreement in 2019, Tal Rifaat and Manbij were the focus of ongoing negotiations between Ankara and Moscow, and the latter pledged to Turkey to expel the Kurdish units from them in return for their return to the control of Damascus, but that did not happen.

Russia currently sees that reviving the agreement constitutes a possible settlement of the conflict over Tal Rifaat and Manbij, but the circumstances today seem different from those they were three years ago for 4 considerations:

First: Returning to the Sochi understanding will not address Turkish concerns about the presence of Kurdish units west of the Euphrates.

Second: Considering that Turkey's acceptance of the regime's control of the two areas will open the door to a discussion about the future of the areas under its control and the regime's return to them, Ankara is not currently willing to engage in this discussion.

Third: Such a settlement will further deepen the existing relationship between the Kurdish units and both Damascus and Moscow.

Fourth: Expanding the borders of the safe areas for the return of Syrian refugees to them is one of the main objectives of the possible Turkish operation, and therefore the control of Tal Rifaat and Manbij is gaining importance in Ankara's calculations.

Since President Recep Tayyip Erdogan spoke more clearly about the intention of the military operation, many questions have arisen about its timing and geographical scope, and with Ankara clarifying the targeted areas in the potential operation - which are Tal Rifaat and Manbij - it is still slow to launch the attack in order to prepare the appropriate field and diplomatic ground.

The Turkish conflict with the Kurdish units is not only related to the conditions of Ankara’s relations with Moscow but also with Washington, but limiting the possible operation to areas under Russian and not American influence makes understanding with Russia and not the United States a major Turkish priority.

The fact that most of the understandings that the two countries have concluded in Syria are based on the principle of barter, Moscow will likely seek some gains in return for reducing costs for Turkey.

Recently, Russian officials acknowledged that the restrictions imposed by Turkey on the movement of Russian forces to and from Syria caused logistical problems for the Russian army, and demanded that it lift some of them, especially ending the closure of the airspace to the transit of Russian aircraft carrying weapons and equipment to Syria.

In light of Ankara’s insistence on implementing a new military operation, in addition to military neutrality, Moscow will seek to draw red lines in front of the borders of this operation so that it does not go beyond the international “M4 Highway”, given its strategic importance for Damascus, and will pressure Ankara to implement the provisions of the additional protocol to the Idlib Memorandum. , which provides for the opening of the M4 highway in opposition-held areas, such potential trade-offs would be seen in Ankara, Moscow and possibly Damascus and Tehran as a win-win deal.

The experiences of the Turkish-Russian understandings in Syria have demonstrated the ability of the two parties to rotate corners and reach common consensus that meet the interests of both sides. Based on this, Moscow’s priorities are currently focused on not showing a challenge to Ankara’s security interests in Syria and pushing it, in turn, to enter into negotiations with Damascus on some arrangements. Regarding the northwest.

Finally, the constructive ambiguity pursued by Russia on this issue indicates that the Russian-Turkish partnership - which goes beyond the borders of Syria - still outperforms any other considerations in shaping the Russian position with Ankara.