Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that his country will launch a new military operation in northern Syria to complete the "safe zone" it seeks there.

Unfinished project

Turkey had intervened militarily in Syria in 2016 to prevent what it calls the "establishment of a terrorist corridor" on its southern borders, that is, the establishment of forces linked to the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which is on terrorist lists, as a political entity in northern Syria, especially after it broke the armistice with it and resumed its military operations and fought a war Cities and streets in Kurdish-majority areas in the country after declaring "autonomous administrations" in them.

The second operation, "Olive Branch", launched by Turkey in January 2018, expelled the People's Protection Units (the armed arm of the Democratic Union) from the Afrin region in northwest Syria, preventing its connection with the Mediterranean coast and locking up its geographical presence between the Syrian interior and Turkey's southern borders. .

The Democratic Union Party had announced autonomous administrations in 3 cantons in northern Syria at the beginning of 2014, so the first Turkish operation aimed at "Euphrates Shield" in August 2016 to prevent geographical contact between them, in addition to combating the "Islamic State" organization "ISIS" in those areas.

As for the second operation, "Olive Branch", launched by Turkey in January 2018, the People's Protection Units (the armed arm of the Democratic Union) was expelled from the Afrin region in northwest Syria, preventing it from communicating with the Mediterranean coast and holding it and finding it geographically between the Syrian interior and the southern borders of Turkey. .

In October 2019, Ankara launched Operation Peace Spring against the "Syrian Democratic Forces" and announced that its goal was to establish a safe zone on the Turkish-Syrian border, 30 km deep and 432 km long.

This process ended with Turkish agreements and understandings with both the United States and Russia, according to which they pledged to remove the "SDF" militants to a depth of 30 km from the border.

As for the last operation, "Spring Shield", it was somewhat different, as it was carried out by Turkey with the Syrian opposition factions close to it in February 2022 against the Syrian regime forces, after dozens of Turkish soldiers were killed in Syria with air strikes that Ankara accused the regime of President Bashar al-Assad of carrying out. .

context and opportunities

From the above, 3 main conclusions can be drawn.

The first is that the main objective and first priority for Turkey in Syria is to prevent the formation of a political entity for the forces organically linked to the "PKK" in Syria.

The second is that the Turkish vision to establish a safe zone to distance the SDF militants 30 km from its lands along the border was not fulfilled until the end.

The third is that the United States and Russia have not fully fulfilled the understandings they concluded with Ankara, which prompted the latter to repeatedly threaten to launch a new operation that would complete the task.

More than once, the Turkish president threatened the "Syrian Democratic Forces" with a surprise operation, but the last threat seemed different and more serious and prompted the expectation of an imminent operation this time given its timing and context.

In the first place, the timing and context are closely related to the Russian war on Ukraine, which prompted Moscow to partly and to re-position its forces, which may mean gaps and a vacuum that Ankara will be among the first to be interested in filling.

Secondly, Turkey is currently living in an era in which the West, the United States and NATO, are emphasizing its importance and the roles that it can play and that it will be difficult for others to replace them, according to James Jeffrey, the former US ambassador in Ankara and a veteran diplomat.

This is because its position on the Ukrainian crisis in the beginning, then the mediating role it played between Moscow and Kiev, and its importance in the European security system to face emerging challenges raised its shares with regard to its Western allies in general.

Also, its declared position rejecting Sweden and Finland's accession to NATO without achieving its demands related to arms embargo and support for terrorist organizations gives it negotiating papers and power in return for them.

Returning to previous Turkish statements of desire to establish a safe zone along the border to the Iraqi border, this means two main possibilities, a large and expanded operation or several limited operations with the agreements and understandings that may accompany it with Washington in particular.

Finally, the threat comes in light of Ankara’s talk of preparing a project to return a million Syrians to their country, as one of the most important requirements of that project is areas that accommodate the returnees as well as ensuring their security and not being bombed or attacked. Preventing attacks and attacks on the safe zone” and not only on Turkish soldiers.

Zero hour?

In his speech, Erdogan referred to the meeting of the National Security Council, which was held on May 26, and stated in the second item of his final statement that the operations that were conducted “and will be conducted” to remove the threat of terrorism from Turkey’s southern borders do not target the sovereignty or territorial integrity of neighboring countries, which It is a sign of an upcoming process on the one hand, and reassurances for the various parties on the other.

Field reports from the border areas say that the Turkish armed forces are working to complete the preparations for the operation. One of the most important field correspondents quoted military sources as saying that the preparation process amounted to about 90% of what was required to launch it.

However, on the other hand, it is important to note that the preparation for the operation and its requirements are not only military and logistical, but that there is a required political safety net related to justifying the operation and accepting the various parties involved in the Syrian issue in it and not obstructing it.

In this context, the statement by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov about the United States' intention to divide Syria by supporting the "Kurds" and that Turkey "cannot remain a spectator on this" was read as a sign of tacit approval or a Russian green light for an operation heading east of the Euphrates.

Thus, it can be said that threatening the operation aims to pressure both Moscow and Washington and remind them of their obligations in accordance with the previous understandings, and therefore it is possible - as a matter of possibility - to expect that new understandings will occur that may postpone the process at the present time if it achieves the minimum Turkish demands.

But Ankara has also previously proven that it does not wait for the full approval of the United States and Russia and that it can launch military operations despite their opposition if it deems it necessary for its national security, which makes the new talk about the military operation different from its precedents and makes the possibilities of launching the operation much greater than before.

This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the aforementioned circumstances may specifically prompt the United States to remain silent about the operation, and not work to stop it or make it practically difficult.

In view of the Turkish vision and previous operations, especially the "Spring of Peace", Tel Rifaat and Manbij come at the forefront of the areas that the expected Turkish operation could target, as well as several cities and towns on the border strip east of the Euphrates, such as Ayn al-Arab / Kobani, Ain Issa and others.

Returning to previous Turkish statements of desire to establish a safe zone along the border to the Iraqi border, this means two main possibilities: a large and expanded operation or several limited operations with the accompanying agreements and understandings with Washington in particular.

Therefore, in view of the field and political data, it can be said that an expanded operation targeting the entire aforementioned region is currently excluded, but it remains for Ankara temporary targets, but at the heart of the future vision, pending the maturation of the optimal conditions to achieve them according to a strategy of gradual steps, some of which the subsequent ones build on the former. .

In conclusion, and in any case, the current moment for Ankara holds an unprecedented opportunity to achieve additional points in favor of its vision in confronting the "PKK" and its affiliates in Syria.

Although Ankara does not lack the military capabilities to launch the operation, it seeks the best political conditions for it, as it would have a greater chance of success and less potential losses, especially as it indirectly faces both Moscow and Washington, and the latter specifically is able to disarm The fuse of the process if it provided Ankara with what satisfies it at the minimum in the interim.