With the dawning of 2022, there was a spark of friendly exchange of messages between Turkey and Israel, suggesting that there was a serious move by the two parties to open a new page in their relations. Israeli President Isaac Herzog, Turkey, to a warm welcome.
stagnant stagnation;
This is the state of diplomatic relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv since the “Mavi Marmara” events in 2010, and the two sides tried to restore their relations in 2013, but this did not happen as a result of the Israeli aggression on Gaza in 2014, and in 2015 the two sides returned to try to improve relations, and Tel Aviv was appointed As its ambassador in Ankara, Ankara hesitated in appointing the ambassador until it saw an improvement by Israel against the Palestinians.
The perception that the United States is losing interest in the Middle East, as the power struggle with China and Russia escalates;
It pushes the countries of the region to improve their relations with all its neighbors.
In this regard, it can be said that the inauguration of US President Joe Biden in January 2021 has accelerated the diplomatic movement in the region.
It did not take long, until Ankara expelled the Israeli ambassador in 2018;
protesting the disproportionate use of force by Israel in the protests that erupted in Gaza following the opening ceremony of the US Embassy in Jerusalem;
Tel Aviv also expelled the Turkish consul.
Recently, the dialogue between the two parties on improving relations has gained momentum, accompanied by the question: "Why now?"
Is it a choice or a necessity?
The diplomatic initiatives launched by Turkey to restore relations with countries in the region - including Israel - gained momentum in the past year, and it can be said that developments on the international scene;
The Biden administration, with a liberal, cooperative, conciliatory orientation, in particular the assumption of power in Washington, was the catalyst for this shift in Turkish foreign policy, albeit belatedly, and this trend is expected to continue in the medium term.
The new balances that are forming in the Middle East provide a suitable ground for efforts to advance dialogue between the two parties.
The perception that the United States is losing interest in the Middle East, as the power struggle with China and Russia escalates;
It pushes the countries of the region to improve their relations with all its neighbors.
In this regard, it can be said that the inauguration of US President Joe Biden in January 2021 accelerated the diplomatic movement in the region;
Because the Biden administration advocates ensuring relative stability and order in the Middle East, it focuses its foreign policy attention and resources on competing with and containing China and, to a lesser extent, Russia.
In this context, while the Biden administration supported the normalization "Abraham" agreements, which were signed in 2020 with the aim of normalizing relations between the United Arab Emirates and Israel (which were later joined by Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco) on the one hand, it returned to revive the nuclear negotiations with Iran on the other.
Negotiations are continuing with Iran to return to the agreement, but on the other hand, Iran is close to being able to produce nuclear weapons in terms of the capacity of enriched uranium, and thus the possibility of Iran possessing a sophisticated weapon is another factor that pushes the countries of the region to cooperate in security issues, followed by Iran’s absolute openness to the market energy;
Washington considers it an alternative to Russian energy after the deterioration of relations between the West and Russia due to the latter's aggression against Ukraine.
On the other hand, the fact that the Assad regime remains in power in Syria with the support of Russia and Iran after 11 years of crisis is another development that pushes the countries of the region to move realistically to reposition against the potential growth of Iranian influence.
In the same context, it is read that the United States of America exempted the agreement that provides for the delivery of Egyptian gas from Syria and electricity from Jordan to Lebanon, from the sanctions imposed on it under the "Caesar Law" and that it obtained the green light to reactivate the agreement again;
It is another indication of Washington's tendency to replace the overlapping institutional economic cooperation equation between allies and adversaries in a way that draws an equation closer to the equation of 2011. This is what prompts all countries - not only Ankara and Tel Aviv - to redraw the features of the map of their diplomatic relations on the map.
In the process of the current changes, and in the context of realism, Ankara and Tel Aviv tended to consider the common interests that push them to cooperate and take care of their common interests in the form of a “marriage of convenience” in front of the axes that are currently forming in the region.
The common security and economic interests encourage the two parties to come together in light of the changing balances and the uncertainty in the current equation of the Middle East region.
Also, the fact that the Biden administration adopted a more fair and balanced approach to the Israeli-Palestinian issue than its predecessor provided a suitable ground for Turkey to mend its relations with Israel.
Likewise, the March 2021 general elections in Israel ended Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's 12-year rule, resulting in a coalition government more moderate than the Netanyahu government had been.
In addition to all of that, in light of the escalation of the economic crisis inside Turkey, there is a situation that is forced to repair relations with the countries of the region, from the Emirates, Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Accordingly, Ankara is compelled to improve its relations with the countries of the region, according to the requirements of the international equation, regional balances, and its internal interests.
The nature of the new path
There is no doubt that both sides have some expectations regarding the normalization of bilateral relations.
For Turkey, a healthy re-establishment of a diplomatic dialogue with Israel will first and foremost reduce the country's regional isolation and increase its ability to maneuver its foreign policy.
From a broader perspective, Ankara aims to regain the influence it lost to its regional rivals - Greece and Egypt - in the Mediterranean basin in particular.
In this regard, goals such as redrawing the maritime borders in the eastern Mediterranean and reviewing international agreements with the Libyan Consensus Government have not and will not be abandoned. Nor does it seem that Israel is ready to sacrifice its new allies in the region in exchange for improved relations with Turkey.
The decision of the US State Department to stop supporting the EastMed gas pipeline project, which aims to transport Israeli gas to Europe via Turkey, provided a golden geoeconomic opportunity in the interest of Ankara, which saw the need to evaluate it by rapprochement with Tel Aviv.
Tel Aviv was aware that it was difficult to extend the line without resolving the Cyprus problem;
Thus, cooperation between the two countries may facilitate the realization of alternative projects that would reduce Turkey's need for gas and Europe's dependence on Russia in the field of energy.
In the past decade, the geostrategic landscape of the Middle East has changed drastically, particularly in the wake of the Abraham Agreement, which also shifted the power dynamics in Turkish-Israeli relations to some extent in favor of Israel.
However, Turkey and Israel have broad interests in establishing a system based on security and stability in the Middle East.
Steps to restore the relationship between the two parties will pave the way for Turkey to join the US-backed security axis in the eastern Mediterranean in the medium term, and here Ankara will have the support of Western countries, especially the United States and the United Kingdom.
The possibility of developing cooperation
Turkey and Israel will benefit from developing cooperation in many areas such as trade, intelligence sharing, energy and defense cooperation.
In fact, the two countries have successfully fragmented their relations over the past 10 years, and thus the volume of bilateral trade continued to grow despite the political crises, with trade rates between Israel and Turkey increasing to $6 billion, according to the Israel Chamber of Commerce.
As for Turkey, Ankara may be waiting for the support of pro-Israel “lobbies” in Washington to remove the anti-Turkish mood in Congress, as in previous years.
Here we must add that the development of balanced relations with Israel makes it possible for Turkey to play a constructive and active role in the Palestinian issue as a mediator rather than as an adversary against Israel.
The Abraham agreement may have weakened Turkey's role as a provider of dialogue between Israel and the Arab world, and its privileged position.
However, its Muslim-majority population and NATO membership, as well as its geopolitical location;
They will make Turkey continue to be an important ally in the eyes of Israel.
This explains why Israel has always kept the channels of dialogue open, even if relations have reached rock bottom, and has responded in the same way to the recent moderate messages from Ankara, despite the various reservations.
However, the Israeli side also seems to be aware of the limits of cooperation that must be developed between the two countries as long as Ankara will not abandon its approach in favor of the rights of the Palestinian people and the course of its political relations with the Palestinian Hamas movement.
In this regard, some relative measures will be taken to restrict Hamas' activity in Turkey, with the aim of accelerating the process of improving relations, but this will not be matched by a complete break between Ankara and Hamas.
Bottom line: Real progress in the reconciliation process depends on the harmonization of interests of the two sides in meeting on common ground.
The development of cooperation on the basis of common interests will make bilateral relations relatively resistant to crises, and this will open the door to tangible strategic cooperation in the Mediterranean basin in particular.