Ukraine's war... the east and the west's sunrise (1)

The current Ukrainian crisis can be addressed at three levels: the level of media clamor and psychological warfare, which covers the essence of the conflict as much as it provides an abundance of amputated information and superficial analyzes, and the level of political and diplomatic action, which is an important field, albeit a constant movement, according to the change in the balance of power on the ground, and the level of strategic analysis Which focuses on the constants of geography, history, the pushes of major powers and the transformations of the international system.

In this article and the next two articles, we will try to present a view of the Ukrainian crisis at the third level, that is, the strategic analysis.

In the first article, we present a theoretical overview of the historical and strategic context of the Ukrainian crisis, in the second we talk about the winners and losers of this crisis, and in the third we try to feel the effects of this crisis on the Islamic world in general, and the Arab world in particular.

The main argument that we want to present in these three articles is that the Ukraine crisis is the beginning of the rising of the East and the setting of the West, that is, the shift of the international center of gravity from America and Europe to Asia and Eurasia.

This will manifest itself in three things:

In this first article, we will be satisfied with clarifying the historical and strategic background of this conflict from three angles: The first is the historical relationship between the Russians and the Ukraine, which is a complex and deeply rooted relationship in history, and it must be taken into account in analyzing the current situation, whether in its Russian or Ukrainian face, or western.

The second is the legacy of the Cold War in Eastern Europe, and what it left of open files that pop up from time to time, including the Ukraine file and its quest for its accession - or its annexation - to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union, as part of a policy of Western expansion in the strategic vacuum that Behind him was the collapse of the Soviet Empire.

The third is the phenomenon of the steady Chinese rise, which is almost pulling the rug - quietly and steadily - from under the feet of the Western powers, and seals an era of Western domination in the world that lasted for centuries.

Observers of the complex relations between Russia and Ukraine note that Russian President Vladimir Putin - an intelligence man with an icy heart - has an emotional attachment to Ukraine that goes beyond the political relationship between two independent neighbors.

When he talks about Ukraine, his speech is characterized by an uncharacteristically emotional tone, so the language of his speech is charged with symbols of history, nationalism and religion.

This is due on the one hand to the historical ties between the two peoples, and on the other hand to Putin's Slavic nationalist orientation, which aspires to bring together all the Orthodox Slavic peoples - Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Serbs and others - in a cultural and strategic space that would be an alternative to the defunct Soviet empire.

Putin more than once expressed his deep regret over the disintegration of the Soviet empire, and considered that disintegration - in one of his statements in 2014 - "the worst geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century". Lenin

It is historically known that the Russians entered global political history starting with the Russian "Kyiv Principality", which was founded in the tenth century AD, and from the seed of that small emirate, and with its religious and cultural influence, the Russian Tsarist Empire was born later.

Ukraine fell for centuries at the crossfire between the two surrounding countries: Lithuania and Poland, until it returned to its Russian Orthodox roots, and was swallowed up by Tsarist Russia in the mid-seventeenth century, and then inherited from it by the Soviet Union at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Russians still describe Ukraine as "Little Russia".

When the Soviet Union disintegrated, a new era began in Ukraine's history, characterized by the tension between its orthodox Slavic identity, and the desire of part of its people to transform it into a Western European state.

Here, Ukraine fell into the crossfire again, with the aspirations of the Western camp - the European Union and NATO - to expand the Soviet strategic vacuum, and "Putin's" Russia's aspirations to recover at least part of that lost space, especially with regard to the Orthodox Slavic peoples.

NATO has expanded over 70 years;

From 12 countries when it was established in 1949 to 30 countries with the accession of Macedonia in 2020. This expansion was a source of constant Russian complaint and concern, given that the alliance was originally established only to confront Russia.

And by virtue of the tacit understanding between the leaders of NATO and Russia at the end of the Soviet era not to expand the borders of NATO beyond Germany, in exchange for Russia allowing the independence of the countries that were part of the Soviet empire.

Therefore, the Russian patriots - whom Putin represents today - feel very bitter about the expansion of NATO in their vital field, and consider this a betrayal of Russia, and an exploitation of its weak moment after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early nineties.

Russia, under Yeltsin at the time, was not willing to object to the expansion of NATO, as it was burdened with the legacy of the Soviet disintegration.

Perhaps its leaders thought that Russia would become a European country one day, so there is nothing wrong with it being preceded by its Soviet sisters.

But the West neither wanted Russia to join it - as Gorbachev and Yeltsin dreamed - nor was it ready to allow it to play the role of a superpower again, even if in a narrow Slavic context.

But Russia's strategic destiny began to change under Vladimir Putin, who combined Slavic nationalism with an ambitious strategic sense.

Putin has more than once expressed his deep regret over the disintegration of the Soviet empire, and considered that disintegration - in one of his statements in 2014 - "the worst geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century". Vladimir Lenin (1870-1924) argued that he built the Soviet Union on the principle of accepting the independence of the Soviet republics, which eventually led to the disintegration of the giant Soviet state.

Putin's strategy in restoring Russia's glories consists of two prongs: One is to build a solid nucleus of the Slavic orthodox peoples, to be part of Russia, de facto or de facto.

The second is to build a vital area, in the form of an envelope of dependent states, that protects this core from the enemy: to the west in Eastern Europe, and to the south in Central Asia.

Putin succeeded in securing the Asian front by keeping the former Asian Soviet republics in the Russian orbit, and closer alliance with the neighboring Chinese giant, but he faced a serious challenge in securing the Western Front due to Western expansion policies in Eastern Europe.

The Ukrainian crisis is nothing but an embodiment of Putin's stubbornness and his insistence on correcting the historical course that began with the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

And because Ukraine belongs to the Slavic nucleus that lies at the heart of Putin's strategic vision, and it is a strategically, geographically and economically important country, its accession to NATO and its transformation into an arena for Western anti-Russian influence cannot be tolerated in any way in Putin's perception, whether by national logic, Or in a strategic sense.

Here we understand the ferocity with which Putin dealt with the Ukrainian issue, his willingness to confront a large number of countries, and the great number of difficulties and troubles for the sake of the Greater Russia that he seeks to build.

It is better to add to this complex background of Russian-Ukrainian relations and Russian-Western conflicts a third dimension, which is the astonishing rise of China during the past decades.

Serious strategic researchers do not disagree that the rise of China is the largest international reality in the current world order, although they differ in its effects. Several books on the rise of China, including the book: "Did the West Lose?", and the book: "Did China Win?"

Brzezinski warned - in more than one interview - that the expansion of NATO towards Russia is a strategic mistake, especially in a world where the Chinese giant is about to invade the globe and remove the entire Western world from the international lead.

Some of them believe that China will not reach the top of the world in a peaceful manner, and that it will sweep away the American forces on their way to ascent, unless America confronts them with force and determination.

To this view the famous American international relations theorist, John Mearsheimer, leaned in the last chapter of his book "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics", and made the title of that chapter: "Can China rise in a peaceful way?"

It is clear that the shapers of the American strategic decision tend to believe in the course of the conflict predicted by Mearsheimer, and that is why they began last year to form the Anglo-Saxon alliance, known as “Aukus” for short, to blockade China in the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea, before Putin attacked them by igniting This is the new Ukrainian war in Eastern Europe.

Based on this historical and strategic background, we tend to believe that the biggest strategic miscalculation that led to this serious international crisis on Ukrainian soil came from the Western camp, which is the insistence of Western countries to expand NATO to the borders of Russia, and we agree on this with a number of strategic thinkers Americans, including former US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, and two prominent political and international relations scholars are John Mearsheimer (from the University of Chicago) and Stephen Walt (from Harvard University).

Prior to his death in 2017, Brzezinski warned - in more than one interview - that the expansion of NATO towards Russia is a strategic mistake, especially in a world where the Chinese giant is about to invade the globe and remove the entire Western world from the international lead.

Brzezinski considered that many of the eastern European countries that joined NATO after the dissolution of the Soviet Union were not a strategic necessity after the end of the Cold War.

In the specific case of Ukraine, Brzezinski concluded that the West is faced with one of two options, and it must accept one of them: Either Ukraine will become Russian, or Russia will become European.

Instead of antagonizing Russia with the process of eastward expansion, Brzezinski called on Western leaders to include Russia and Turkey in the European Union, given that Russia is a Christian country that belongs to the same western civilized space, and because Turkey, with its position and its rising power, cannot secure the southeastern flank of Europe without it.

Bregeny also implied the need to allow Germany to rebuild its military power, to be the third side in this Russian-Turkish-German triangle, capable of being a wall against the encroachment of the Chinese giant that is sweeping the world.

It seems to me that the objection to adopting Brzezinski's proposal is that this trio will be a substitute for the American strategic umbrella, which the political elite in Washington does not want, even though the exhausted America no longer has the ability nor the will to bear the burdens of leadership in the West, or to protect Europe.

As for Professor John Mearsheimer, he warned years ago against the expansion of NATO to the east, and predicted that this expansion would end in provoking Russia in a way that would end with Ukraine losing more of its land after Crimea, if it did not lose its existence as a state.

Mearsheimer went on to say that the Russians' reaction to NATO's expansion in Ukraine is very logical from a strategic perspective, which is not different from America's response to Cuban missiles at the end of the sixties, and advised the Ukrainians to recognize the fact that they are a small country living next to a "gorilla", and that they have to deal with a rising Russia. Intelligently and realistically, and detachment from the American strategy, which will push them into an unequal confrontation and eventually let them down.

The war in Ukraine distracted America from confronting China, and it destabilized the prevailing strategic equation in Eastern Europe, and imposed on America interest in this region, at a time when the Americans were eager to quarrel with China and renounce their old European responsibilities.

As for Professor Stephen Walt, he pointed out that Ukraine's importance is different for the two sides. For Russia, it is a strategic depth, and for the West it is a secondary sphere of secondary influence.

He also warned of Russia's readiness to fight in this confrontation, unlike the Western camp, which will not exceed the media clamor and economic sanctions.

This difference in motivation makes the West's confrontation with Russia in Ukraine a loser from the start.

We add to this that Russia cannot lose Ukraine, while the West will not lose much by losing Ukraine.

It also seems to us that the current Western unity is a fleeting emotional unit, not based on solid data, and perhaps we will witness a rift between Europe - led by Germany - and America, after this uncalculated mess with the results in Ukraine, especially with Russia's control of European energy sources.

It is clear that the Ukraine war distracted America from confronting China, and that it destabilized the prevailing strategic equation in Eastern Europe, and imposed on America interest in this region, at a time when the Americans were eager to quarrel with China and to abdicate their old European responsibilities.

It seems to us that the Americans and Europeans have not learned much from their previous confrontations with Putin in Georgia's Osita in 2008 and in Ukraine's Crimea in 2014. This may be due to Western adherence to a Cold War mentality in their relations with Russia, decades after the end of the Cold War, and their misjudgment of Russian power and ambitions.

The Western media's portrayal of the conflict in Ukraine as a struggle between democracy and authoritarianism is a partial view and a strategic diversion at best, and crude propaganda at worst.

More precisely, we live today in a struggle between two expansionist tendencies: Putin's neighborhood expansionism, and the traditional Western tendency to besiege Russia.

The Americans may not have any objection to using the Ukrainians as fuel for a war whose purpose is to drain Russia, and not necessarily to help Ukraine, for it is Slavic blood that bleeds on both fronts, and there is nothing wrong with that from the American and European perspective, just as the West drained the Soviet Union before in Afghanistan, with Afghani Muslim blood , without the value of Afghan blood in his eyes.

Evidence for this line of thinking has been reported by American commentators in recent days, including the blatant opportunism of journalist Thomas Friedman: "We will fight Russia until another Ukrainian annihilation."

From this perspective, it can be said that the Westerners have actually involved Putin in a kind of civil war, which usually ends with the loss of both parties, regardless of who wins, because it is the shedding of fraternal blood.

Russian writer Alexander Nazarov expressed this bitterly, in an article he wrote a few days ago, in which he said: "The real disaster for Russia is the war of the two brotherly peoples, the Ukrainian and the Russian, who, in general, represent one people on both sides of the conflict. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Klimkin is of Russian descent, and a third of the Russian government is of Ukrainian descent."

This is the historical and strategic background to the Ukrainian crisis, which is about to burn Europe and afflict the international system today.

The two big questions remain: Who will be the winners and losers of the Ukraine crisis?

What are the effects of this crisis on the Arab world and the Islamic world?

This is what we will address in the next two articles, God willing.