At the end of last week, according to data from the London stock exchange ICE, the prices of February gas futures in Europe fell again below $ 1000, having fallen in price during Friday trading by almost 14%.
At the same time, despite the short-term fall, the monthly average prices still remained stably high.
Thus, the average cost of January futures on the ICE Futures platform dropped slightly below $ 1400, and on the spot, according to the Dutch Spot TTF, the same indicator was almost $ 1340, which is almost seven times higher compared to the same period last year.
In fact, what was required to be proved: the first stage of reformatting European energy markets, whether anyone likes it or not, has been launched.
And gas prices on spots are mostly aligned with those in Asia.
And this is a fundamentally different situation, primarily for the extremely energy-intensive European industry, which is losing its obvious competitive advantages in comparison with both its American and, which is much more dangerous, its South Asian counterparts.
That cannot but affect the world economy as a whole: such "displacements" do not happen without a systemic crisis, alas.
Although this, obviously, is not even tomorrow's story yet.
Of course, the situation in European markets is not very pleasant, but so far, fortunately, it is far from catastrophic: the northwestern (Baltic, or, if completely cynical, German-centered) industrial cluster, as well as less significant for Europe, but no less reasonable thinking Serbia and Hungary, for example, feel quite protected thanks to "long contracts" with the Russian "Gazprom". Where the gas price is calculated in relation to the oil price formula.
But here it is worth remembering that, firstly, even in long-term contracts, correction for spot prices is now taken into account, albeit with a time lag.
And this means that the echoes of the price rally will sooner or later overtake the Germans and the Hungarians.
And how.
And secondly, the energy shortage somehow suddenly turned out to be a global and long-term factor.
And unfortunately, the issue here cannot be resolved by leveling gas prices on the spot European and premium markets of Southeast Asia.
Even, say, the immediate launch of the constructed Nord Stream 2, the certification of which is delayed, apparently, until the summer, will not be able to finally solve it.
To which, by the way, the Russian "Gazprom" itself does not particularly object: for them in general now the situation is close to ideal, and it makes no sense to "improve" it.
However, more on that below.
In the meantime - about the main beneficiaries of the current formidable events on the continental energy markets, which are slowly becoming not the creative British financiers and stockists, but the harsh German industrialists and power engineers.
Well, which, of course, are also not white and fluffy.
And they do not shy away from either commercial gain or banal speculation: how they sold Russian gas from UGS facilities to Poles at exorbitant prices at a real reverse price at the peak of the price - it was dear and expensive to see.
But seriously, if you simply add up the capacities of the existing Nord Stream gas pipeline and the recently completed and already withdrawn from direct US sanctions, the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, you will get exactly 110 billion cubic meters per year (in fact, more, it will be possible there if that, to accelerate the pumping and up to 130 billion cubic meters, but this is not so important).
Which is quite comparable with the Ukrainian GTS in its not the worst years.
And if you add Turkish Stream there, then it will be the best, but that's a completely different story.
Well, why do you think that in such a scenario, the new, now basic transit country will not begin to establish its own rules of the game on the market?
Having made such and such efforts to reformat this market, exactly what is it for you?
And having gone, back in the times of Merkel, for the sake of this, even for a certain conflict with a political overseas overseer?
Well, yes.
The Germans, in general, if we take out of the brackets the joyfully galloping creative-political community from all kinds of "green" and "rainbow" people, among serious people, they were always considered quite strong and extremely tough players.
And the fact that their real goal is - yes, so far only economic - dominance in Europe - is somehow stupid not to reckon with this, sorry.
Here it is enough to recall how rather dashingly Bonn first crushed Berlin, and then all the other "young East European democracies", sometimes acting not even on the brink, but beyond the brink of decency.
Ask, for example, the Hungarians, and even more so the Bulgarians, what has become of their agriculture and agricultural processing, which was almost exemplary in its time for the countries of the socialist camp.
And it, agricultural processing, is now simply not there.
It was simply destroyed, and sometimes by rather barbaric methods: why would the Germans have competitors, excuse me, to procreate? Especially in such a sensitive area. Well, as for the galloping "green-rainbow public", it shouldn't be too loose - they'll put it in place, besides, the elder from across the ocean made it clear that he would turn a blind eye to it. And big business just starts to get bored with this madhouse. And now the secretary general of the ruling SPD, Kevin Kühnert, in an interview with Reuters, says about Nord Stream 2: “This project was planned and promoted for a long time, numerous concerns were weighed and taken into account” (c). Adding, literally, that the gas pipeline is “actually in the network” and only “legal issues” remain to be resolved.
Well, actually, what was required to be proved.
It’s probably just enough to wag the tail, we must admit the simplest thing: Nord Stream 2 is primarily a German project, secondly a pan-European project, and only thirdly is a Russian project.
For Russians, this is just an increase in additional volume and so record high sales - a thing, of course, pleasant, but not at all necessary, especially in the current environment.
Now let's try to explain why.
Although, in fact, there is not even much to talk about here: Russian President Vladimir Putin has spoken everything about this on several occasions, and quite figuratively, who is quite authoritative in this sense. The statement of tasks is simple: the priorities of Gazprom's work for the next period are domestic markets and their growth (just recall the ongoing gasification, for example, this is, in official language, “the formation of a steadily growing domestic demand” including). And some, we would say, "re-turn to the east." And by no means, excuse me, it is no coincidence that the West is no longer alarmed by the certification of Nord Stream 2, but by the sudden real advancement of the Power of Siberia-2 project that has emerged here.- this is a gas pipeline that has been designed for quite a long time between fields in Western Siberia (this is important) and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in western China. The projected capacity of Power of Siberia - 2 is 50 billion cubic meters of blue fuel per year.
The announced planned date for the start of the real construction of the new highway is 2024.
And it is very clear why the Europeans are so worried about this: if the first Power of Siberia had a resource base from the fields of Eastern Siberia, then Power of Siberia - 2, nee Altai gas pipeline, is, excuse me, Yamal.
That is, the main resource base for almost a third of gas supplies to Europe.
Here you will be worried, perhaps.
Moreover, certain doubts are beginning to emerge as to whether the long-suffering Nord Stream 2 is the last for the Russians themselves a large gas pipeline to Europe.
And they are not going to build anything of the kind anymore, even if they are very strongly asked about it.
Because the concept, you see, has changed.
And judging by the current trends, you will have to ask ...
Therefore, the Russians, as a matter of fact, are in no hurry to go anywhere else.
Watching with interest.
And the European markets, it seems, are waiting for quite interesting and rather turbulent times, the Germans will willingly provide them to everyone: on the “big energy board” the game turns into the middlegame.
And in this situation, both Nord Stream 2 and Power of Siberia - 2, with all due respect to these projects, are not the meaning of the game, but only significant, but quite passable pieces on this huge board.
The point of view of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.