A small number of leading cadres use their positions to facilitate black-box operations, eat interest differences, and engage in benefit transmission
Strictly prevent state-owned platform companies from becoming a hotbed of corruption
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and State Supervision Commission website Han Yadong Xue Peng
The Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision of Chun'an County, Zhejiang Province has strengthened the supervision of state-owned investment and financing platform companies such as urban construction and investment, according to the characteristics of the industry, analyzed and judged the risks of clean government, carried out targeted and precise supervision, and strictly investigated the intervention of party members and cadres in engineering projects, related party transactions in violation of regulations.
The picture shows the county's discipline inspection and supervision cadres and the CCIC Disciplinary Committee jointly inspected the construction site of the national highway to understand the relevant situation.
Photo by Mao Yongfeng
On January 5, 2022, the Sichuan Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision announced that Luo Yi, member of the Party Committee and Director of the Provincial Energy Investment Group Co., Ltd., was subject to review and investigation; on December 1, 2021, the Guangdong Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision released the province's railway construction. Wang Gang, the former deputy secretary of the Party Committee and general manager of the Investment Group Co., Ltd., was "double-opened"; on November 30, 2021, the Gansu Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision released news that Liu Xiaoli, former member of the Party Committee and deputy general manager of the Provincial Electric Power Investment Group Co., Ltd. Expulsion from the party... Recently, the disciplinary inspection and supervision organs have continued to report typical cases, releasing a clear signal of resolutely investigating and punishing the use of state-owned investment and financing platform companies to engage in new types of corruption cases.
In recent years, many provinces, cities and counties have established local state-owned platform companies such as "urban investment", "trading investment", "water investment" and "cultural tourism investment", which have played an important role in local economic development.
However, some platform companies deviate from the original intention of their establishment, and some take advantage of government projects, preferential policies, and capital-focused owners to operate behind the scenes in project contracting; some take rebates and interest margins in the process of financing and borrowing; In operation, the fraudulent use of identity to contract at a low price and lease at a high price is self-serving.
The Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection pointed out that it is necessary to clearly see the problems of "traditional corruption and new-type corruption".
Disciplinary inspection and supervision organs at all levels have effectively strengthened the research on the new situation and new problems of state-owned investment and financing platform companies, dissected the investigated cases to see the lack of system, lack of responsibility, and lack of supervision, and took targeted measures, through special inspections and other methods to timely Identify, investigate and deal with relevant problems in a timely manner, promote platform companies to continuously improve their governance structures, prevent platform companies from becoming a breeding ground for corruption, and prevent integrity risks, debt risks, financial risks, and social risks.
1 The general manager regards the city investment company as his own "small vegetable garden" and accepts more than 35 million yuan in bribes for more than 7 years, involving many urban construction projects such as shantytown renovation
The boxes were opened, and piles of cash appeared in front of the investigators: the neatly packed banknotes were basically not opened, and some banknotes had become moldy due to long-term storage.
After counting, there were a total of 15 such boxes, stored in 3 different places, with a total amount of more than 35 million yuan... This scene happened during the investigation of Zhang Han'an's case by the Shaanxi Provincial Disciplinary Inspection and Supervision Authority.
Zhang Han'an, former director of the Urban Investment Office of Hanzhong City, Shaanxi Province, and former general manager of the Municipal Urban Construction Investment Development Co., Ltd., was "double-opened" in January 2020, and was later sentenced to 12 years and 6 months in prison in the first instance for the crime of accepting bribes and fined Gold 2 million yuan.
After investigation, Zhang Hanan accepted a total of more than 35 million yuan in bribes during his more than 7 years of working in the city investment company.
Hanzhong Urban Investment Company is an investment and financing company that organizes and manages urban infrastructure construction and project development in Hanzhong. It is responsible for the annual investment and construction plan of major development projects in Hanzhong, reviewing construction project plans, planning and design, and organizing the implementation of the city's key infrastructure projects. It is a state-owned investment and financing platform company.
During Zhang Han'an's tenure in the city's urban investment company, it was at a time when Hanzhong was speeding up the westward expansion of the central urban area and a number of major projects were launched.
As the company's "top leader", Zhang Han'an is in charge of decision-making and selection of major projects, bidding and bidding, and the use of funds.
"Big companies and private bosses have requests from me. They often hold banquets, including famous cigarettes, wines, and high-end hotel clubs. Over time, I have become accustomed to it and feel that it is natural..." In the interaction with business owners, the idea of seeking pleasure In Zhang Han's peace of mind, he secretly grew, and gradually developed wrong thoughts such as "it is natural to do things for others and get rewards", "my ability is not bad, and my income should keep up with it".
As a result, in addition to frequently interacting with the businessman's boss to exchange cups, Zhang Hanan began to accept gifts and gifts, from high-end drinks to high-end cameras, from gold and silver products to cash consumption cards, he refused to come.
With the fall of the ideological dam, Zhang Hanan's door to corruption has become wider and wider, and he has become more and more arbitrary in company affairs. He can't listen to any different opinions.
Zhang Hanan has repeatedly approved construction projects in violation of regulations: in a shantytown renovation project, he received 11.5 million yuan to help a construction company and an individual enter the site for construction and successfully won the bid; after receiving 2 million yuan from a partner of a company, he asked the city investment company to finance The personnel postponed the collection of the debts owed by the company; after receiving the 4.5 million yuan "thankful fee" sent by the contractor, they arranged for the financial personnel of the urban investment company to pay the project money to them.
Zhang Hanan was eager for quick success and great success in the construction of the project, regardless of the company's financial capacity, blindly borrowed debts, paved the way, and launched the project, which triggered a chain reaction.
During his tenure in office, he launched 39 projects, of which 11 projects under construction are estimated to have a total investment of about 10.46 billion yuan, and the funding gap is as high as 7.534 billion yuan.
In order to make up for the funding gap, Zhang Hanan adopted mortgage loans from banks, high-interest loans from private enterprises, and new projects to solve the funding problems of old projects. As a result, many projects such as the company's high debt and shantytown renovation have been suspended or suspended. Unpaid wages and other issues continue to petition.
According to the investigators, Zhang Hanan acted recklessly and was willing to be "hunted", providing help to unscrupulous businessmen in major project decision-making, bidding, fund allocation and other links, accepting as many as 110 bribes.
"Zhang Han'an's acceptance of bribes involves many projects, many times, and a large amount. It is the largest case of violation of discipline and law in Hanzhong since the establishment of the city. The social impact is extremely bad, and the lessons are very profound."
During the review and investigation, Zhang Hanan reflected: "I regard the city investment company as my own 'small vegetable garden'. I don't differentiate between public and private, and I want to extend my hand.
2 State-owned investment and financing platform companies are rich in development resources, have many construction projects, and have a large amount of capital, and new types of corruption cases that use them to channel profits frequently occur
A local government investment and financing platform refers to an economic entity established by local governments and their departments and institutions through financial appropriation or injection of land, equity and other assets to undertake the financing function of government investment projects and have independent legal personality.
The platform company mainly undertakes two major tasks of financing and construction, that is, raising funds for local economic and social development, and undertaking the specific construction tasks of infrastructure construction and public service projects.
As a financing method, local financing platforms can help solve the financing problems of local government departments and promote local infrastructure construction and economic and social development.
But at the same time, some state-owned investment and financing platform companies are not standardized in management and supervision is not in place, making state-owned assets the "Tang monk meat" of individual corrupt elements.
Some take advantage of the company's advantages in government projects, policy inclination, and capital concentration to operate behind the scenes in project contracting.
Luo Xusheng, the former general manager of Hangzhou Industrial Investment Group Co., Ltd., engaged in the exchange of interests in a large-scale complex project, and received bribes of several million yuan.
In order to thank Luo Xusheng for his care in construction, project coordination and cost settlement, Pan Mou, the project contractor, gave him 300,000 yuan in cash, and then gave him 3% of the company's shares, which was worth more than 4.24 million at the time Yuan.
Zhou Zhong, the former chairman of Chengtou Company in Jinjiang District, Chengdu City, Sichuan Province took advantage of his position to charge a "thank you fee" after contracting a greening and road maintenance project in Jinjiang to a specific person.
Some take rebates and interest spreads in the process of financing and borrowing.
Zhou Yongan, former chairman of Longmen Ancient Town Development and Construction Co., Ltd., Nanchong City, Sichuan Province, illegally lent funds from state-owned enterprises to private enterprises and individuals, charging interest at annual interest rates ranging from 5% to 20%, accumulatively amounting to more than 80 million yuan, and accepting more than 1.4 million yuan in bribes .
In Zhou Zhong's case, he did not perform the "three important and one big" procedures in the financing process, and decided to lend the bank loan funds to other units even though the financial staff reminded him of the risks and refused to sign.
In addition, there are others who pretend to use the identity of ordinary farmers to contract at low prices and lease at high prices in the land consolidation business for their own interests.
In some counties, 70% of the corruption cases investigated and dealt with in 2020 occurred in platform companies.
Liu Jiacong, Member of the Standing Committee of the Jinjiang District Committee of Chengdu, Secretary of the District Disciplinary Committee and Director of the Supervisory Committee, analyzed that the state-owned investment and financing platform companies such as "Urban Investment" and "Agricultural Investment" are both financing entities and construction entities. They have a wide range of operations and a long business chain. It is characterized by a large amount of funds, a large number of projects, and strong professionalism.
The main person in charge of the company has highly concentrated powers and powers, extensive social contacts, and a large number of contacts, and the risk of being "hunted" is high. Once there is no effective supervision and control, corruption can easily breed.
3 years without a secretary of the party committee and secretary of the discipline inspection committee, and replaced the collective decision-making of the leadership team with individual decisions
"The 'top leaders' of state-owned investment and financing platform companies can mobilize a lot of resources, and their power is centralized, but they are subject to very little supervision and restriction." Liu Jiacong told reporters that analyzing the relevant cases, the problems of lack of system, lack of responsibility, and lack of supervision exposed are thought-provoking. Sobering and urgently needed.
The loopholes in the "cowpen to close the cat" system have led some people to frequently cross the red line.
As local state-owned enterprises, state-owned investment and financing platform companies have generally established a corporate governance structure, but some enterprises' internal power operation mechanism and supervision mechanism are not sound enough.
The division of responsibilities and powers of internal decision-making bodies such as the Party Committee, the Shareholders’ Meeting, and the Board of Directors is not clear enough; the supervisory committee or independent external supervisors perform their supervisory duties in a mere formality. The rules and regulations formulated by the company are often more principled and standardized, with fewer operational details, and lack of accountability rules.
According to Zhang Han'an case investigators, Hanzhong Urban Investment Company has not established a discussion system and decision-making procedures, and there is no clear regulation on which matters should be decided through what procedures.
After Zhang Hanan took office in the company, he often replaced the collective decision-making of the leadership team with individual decision-making on major matters such as project development, land transfer, institutional setup, and personnel adjustment.
In order to avoid supervision, Zhang Hanan even transferred staff from the planning and development department, contract cost department, engineering department, project development department and other departments one after another on the grounds of improving work efficiency, making the supervision department unable to perform their duties.
Zhang Hanan analyzed after the incident: "I put aside the collective decision-making and supervision departments, and bite the bullet. Slowly, illegal construction projects such as construction before approval and construction on behalf of punishments appeared."
The organizational structure is not perfect, which makes it difficult to implement the "two responsibilities".
Since its establishment in 2016, the party committee of Hanzhong City Investment Company has not been equipped with a party secretary, and only in 2018 was equipped with a secretary of the Disciplinary Committee.
It has been difficult to implement the main responsibility of the party committee of the city investment company and the supervision responsibility of the discipline inspection committee.
As the director of the Municipal Urban Investment Office and the legal representative of the Municipal Urban Investment Company, Zhang Hanan has been lacking in organizational supervision in the company's business matters such as project development, land transfer, institutional setup, personnel adjustment, etc., forming a "one word" situation.
Industry supervision is weak and external supervision is lacking.
During the operation of state-owned investment and financing platform companies, they must be supervised by administrative agencies at all levels and in various industries. However, some relevant administrative supervision agencies often have relatively lax standards and lax supervision on problems arising from local state-owned enterprises.
For example, the higher authorities did not take effective measures to correct the situation that Hanzhong Urban Investment Company started construction of multiple projects without properly fulfilling the pre-requisite procedures such as land, planning, and bidding.
As the main person in charge of the city city investment company, Zhang Hanan has long accepted gifts and bribes from others, which violated democratic centralism and the "three important and one big" decision-making system.
In order to maintain the business relationship, the external audit firm deliberately "released water" during the audit, and even individual financial personnel were not found to have misappropriated public funds for a long time.
4 It is necessary to detect and punish in a timely manner, and promote platform companies to continuously improve their governance structures and prevent integrity risks, debt risks, financial risks, and social risks.
"Some state-owned platform companies are both financing entities and construction entities, taking advantage of policy advantages to monopolize government business, and taking advantage of their positions of power to participate in market competition." Zhuang Deshui, deputy director of the Research Center for Integrity Construction at Peking University, believes that platform companies have updated corrupt practices and rely on corporate governance. Problems such as eating enterprises and benefit transmission are high, and it is easy to induce a series of secondary risks.
Targeted measures must be taken, through special inspections, professional audits, etc., to timely discover and seriously investigate and punish platform companies to continuously improve their governance structures and prevent integrity risks, debt risks, financial risks, and social risks.
Supervise and improve internal governance, and explore the promotion of centralized and unified supervision of operating state-owned assets.
After the Zhang Han'an case, the Hanzhong Municipal Party Committee and Municipal Government issued the "Implementation Plan for Promoting the Centralized and Unified Supervision of Municipal Operational State-owned Assets", requiring that, in addition to the relevant units authorized by the Municipal SASAC and the municipal government, municipal Party and government organs and institutions In the future, it will no longer perform its duties as a state-owned asset investor, and will no longer invest and set up operating enterprises and economic entities in various names, integrate and reorganize enterprises with certain asset scale and operating capabilities, and conduct centralized management of city and county financing platforms.
We will deepen the promotion of reforms and governance through cases, and prevent operational risks of investment and financing platforms.
Relevant units shall strengthen the system design, standardize the daily operation and management of investment and financing platforms, set out a list of powers around high-frequency investment and financing risk points, and implement all-round supervision of investment and financing behaviors before, during and after the event.
Hanzhong State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission issued normative documents such as "State-owned Enterprise Party Committee Research Decisions, Preliminary Research and Discussion Items Model Text (Trial)" and "Guidelines for the Rules of Procedure of Municipal State-owned Enterprise Party Committee Meetings" to clarify the specific pre-research and discussion of municipal state-owned enterprise party committees. To ensure the rationalization, standardization and institutionalization of enterprise party committee meetings.
Hanzhong Urban Investment Company promoted the construction of the accountability system for illegal operation and investment, and revised and formulated 20 management and supervision systems.
Strengthen the construction of daily supervision and accountability system, and control the "key minority".
Some localities and enterprises have strengthened the supervision of key positions in platform companies, especially the "top leaders", paid attention to warning and education, and severely investigated and punished illegal acts such as prohibition and idle arbitrage.
Since the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the Jinjiang District Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision of Chengdu City has investigated and punished 3 main persons in charge of state-owned platform companies, and given Party discipline and government sanctions to company executives, department heads and specific business managers or organized dozens of people to deal with them.
While investigating and handling cases, we should simultaneously find out the lack of the system, and urge the finance and state-owned assets departments to reorganize and revise the declaration and approval procedures for major business matters of state-owned enterprises; urge the development and reform and construction departments to revise the management system of government-invested projects; urge the audit department to use special audit, Strengthen the supervision and inspection of the core business of state-owned enterprises by means of simultaneous auditing, and explore the implementation of a "blacklist" system for external audit institutions.