We can agree with the assertion that in today's Afghanistan there is simply no alternative to the Taliban movement *.

But the potential of the Taliban * in terms of establishing the necessary level of stability in the country and restoring the system of public administration depends on a large number of factors, among which, first of all, it is necessary to highlight the following:

- the ability of the pragmatic wing to dominate the leadership of the movement when making the most fundamental decisions, this factor also includes the potential in leading the movement to find the necessary compromise solutions and solutions that meet the expectations of both the civilian population and the ordinary majority of the Taliban movement;

- the ability of the Taliban leadership to control the behavior of the lower levels of the movement, including in relation to the civilian population, especially in areas densely populated by ethnic and religious minorities;

- pursuing a balanced foreign policy with countries expressing their readiness to recognize the Taliban and economic cooperation while fulfilling the international conditions put forward (China, Russia, Iran, Central Asian countries, except Tajikistan);

- the ability to involve in the system of public administration at all its levels of professional staff of officials and managers and the transformation of management into effective;

- solving socio-economic problems in the context of the beginning of a large-scale humanitarian crisis.

This issue includes the creation of conditions for the receipt and equitable distribution of international humanitarian assistance;

- the level of destructive external influences on the intra-Afghan situation from the point of view of the prospects for military-political stabilization (applies primarily to the policy of the United States, EU countries, Turkey and Arab countries).

The Taliban are originally an irregular, guerrilla movement. Now the leadership of the Taliban movement is faced with the difficult task of structuring the movement on rigid organizational principles that would provide the necessary hierarchy and vertical subordination. The fulfillment of this task in the short and medium term should become almost the main content of the transformation of the Taliban, which is necessary to establish full control over the country as the main political force. In combination with the task of forming an internal political balance, the task of involving other ethnic and political forces in political administration is urgent (for which the mechanisms have not been defined at all at present).In any case, overcoming the "guerrilla" will be a guarantee of the very preservation of the Taliban as the main or one of the main political forces in Afghanistan. But even with the most ideal execution of these tasks, as well as with the maximum optimism in general, too much depends not only on the movement of the Taliban, and not on the intra-Afghan situation.

Among the above factors that determine the trends in the further development of events, special attention should be paid to the “level of destructive external influences”.

The military-political conflict in Afghanistan has no prospects for completion in the short and medium term, since, in addition to regional and intracountry contradictions, its imposition on the global geopolitical conflict within the framework of the formation of a fundamentally new configuration of the world system of international relations was and remains a factor in the continuation of the conflict.

The geographical location of Afghanistan, as well as the already historically formed mechanisms of intra-Afghan conflict, make the country's territory one of the most important areas for the application of geopolitical contradictions. The most important of the actors in this conflict was and remains the United States, capable of delegating the implementation of its strategic tasks to a large number of local military-political subjects. Proxy wars are sometimes called “proxy wars,” and there is no doubt that “trust” - in this specific sense - relationships represent a large network throughout the region.

A significant reserve of American influence lies in the large social stratum of the predominantly urban population, who have received an American education and a corresponding worldview in recent decades.

Rather, indirectly, this reserve can be attributed to the entire population who are supporters of the secular development of the country (a very thin and outgoing layer of supporters of secular development is also represented by people who studied in the USSR or interacted with Soviet structures, this layer is already very small in Afghanistan).

During its presence in Afghanistan, the US military and special structures created a very large number of various private military companies (PMCs).

They can be divided into two partly conventional categories:

- PMCs created under the auspices (or model) of the famous Blackwater. After scandals related to activities in Iraq, the new PMCs (in Afghanistan) were recruited mainly from citizens of the country of activity, that is, in our case, from Afghans. Most of them until August 2021 worked for the Pentagon and allied foreign contingents. Information about these PMCs is rather scarce, one can only note the high degree of participation of Afghan Pashtuns, especially from the Durrani tribal group (mainly the eastern provinces). There are also Turkic-speaking PMCs from Uzbeks and Turkmens; the participation of Tajiks and Hazaras is unknown. The current state of these proxy structures is also unknown;

- PMCs created by Afghan political (mainly ethnic) groups based on military units of the 1990s - they generally survived with varying degrees of assistance from the United States. Among them, there are groups originating from Panjshir, where a significant number of participants are mujahideen from the units of the former Northern Alliance or their relatives, fellow countrymen (Panjshir and Parwan provinces, Salanga region, Baghlan province). A large number of politicians in charge of them are under the control of various American structures and are able to carry out tasks indirectly set by the US representatives. Among the Afghan politicians involved in these PMCs, one can note the current ex-Vice President Amrullah Saleh, who has been working for the US intelligence services for the third decade.and a number of former military and senior officials from the IRA's National Security Directorate and Ministry of Defense.

Another important resource of American proxy funds is the military units of ethnopolitical groups, primarily the Tajik party "Jamiate Islomi" (the organization is declared terrorist on the territory of the Republic of Tajikistan, and is also included in the list of terrorist, extremist and separatist organizations of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization), Uzbek "Jumbesh-e Milli-e Islomi-e Afgoniston" by Abdul-Rashid Dostum.

Their actual inaction in the spring-summer of 2021 does not mean that they have no military potential, rather it is explained by the absence of any American recommendations to resist the Taliban movement. With the exception of the Shiite Hazaras, without exception, the current Afghan politicians - both in the country and in exile - are focused primarily on the United States and its allies, including Turkey, and are controlled by it. Accordingly, the hierarchical communities existing under the main leaders can always be mobilized to perform certain tasks in the interests of their leaders and, accordingly, their American curators.

A significant part of the military personnel of the former government army (junior and middle officers, as well as non-commissioned officers) can also be attributed to the reserves of American proxy funds, especially this applies to special forces (Special Operations Corps of the Government Army, ANASOC).

A significant part of the above resources are currently located outside Afghanistan; it is known, for example, that a large number of special forces soldiers have been redeployed in an organized manner to the UAE, where they are under the control of the American military and continue their military training.

It is important to take into account that the interests of the United States and a number of countries that have similar and other instruments of influence on the Afghan situation are aimed at maintaining the conflict in Afghanistan and partly at transferring instability to neighboring countries.

Therefore, one cannot speak of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan as a defeat or a strategic failure.

US Afghan and regional policy will most likely continue in less costly, but in many cases more effective forms.

The United States retained its presence in Afghanistan in the person of its proxy structures, which include both the Panjshir National Resistance Front and ISIS ** and other similar terrorist structures in a latent form.

* "Taliban" - the organization is under UN sanctions for terrorist activities.

** "Islamic State" (IS, ISIS) - the organization was recognized as terrorist by the decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of December 29, 2014.

The point of view of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.