Algeria was one of the few successful examples of the European strategy for gas diversification, that is, an alternative supplier of natural gas to Gazprom.
Was - and now floated, like many other projects of this strategy.
On October 31, the Algerian authorities refused to renew the contract for the transit of their gas through Morocco to Spain (via the so-called Maghreb-Europe pipeline) and announced that they would now send gas through another pipeline running under the Mediterranean Sea. The reason, according to the Algerian side, was serious political disagreements between Morocco and Algeria over the territory of Western Sahara, which the first side considers its land, and the second side supports groups fighting for independence there. However, the Moroccans have a different explanation - they talk about a banal drop in Algerian exports (due to depletion of reserves, ineffective work of the state with potential investors and a sharp increase in domestic consumption). Therefore, they say,Algerians can no longer efficiently fill the Maghreb-Europe pipeline and have switched to a pipeline with a lower capacity.
In Spain, this decision of Algeria, taken against the background of still high gas prices, caused a real panic - after all, this African country supplies the Spaniards from 40 to 50% of their gas consumption. The whole of Europe was also strained. And not only because the Spaniards face problems, but also because the Algerian gas history has dealt another blow to the main European energy fairy tale - gas diversification.
There is, of course, nothing wrong with diversification itself. On the contrary, it is always better when you have several equivalent sources of supply and you do not depend on any of them. However, European diversification had two key characteristics. The first is the lack of equivalent sources. Objectively, Europe did not have and could not find any potential supplier with capacities similar to those of Gazprom (the Russian gas monopoly, we recall, exports a little less than 200 billion cubic meters to the Old World). There were not very many alternative options that were equal to the Russian one in terms of price / reliability. And the second - in these conditions, the European Union decided to engage in forced diversification anyway, that is, in every possible way it interfered with the increase in the reliability and volumes of Russian gas exports. Successfully buried the South Stream project,delayed the implementation of "Nord Stream - 2", while limiting through the so-called. The third energy package the throughput capacity of the Russian gas pipeline is 50% of the nominal. And all this against the backdrop of regular screams and tantrums that Russia is an unreliable supplier, intending to use gas as a means of pressure on the European Union.
What was the EU counting on in this situation?
Brussels was betting that Russian gas would be replaced with the help of a host of other suppliers from the countries of North Africa, the Middle East and the Caspian region, as well as with the supply of American liquefied natural gas.
And of course, due to the transition of Europe to green energy - environmentally friendly and politically correct.
However, unfortunately for European storytellers, their diversification design is now crumbling like a house of cards in the wind.
At the same time, Algeria, with its political wishes and gas shortage, is only the extreme (not the last, but the extreme) fallen card.
Many others have already fallen to her.
Thus, the Libyan gas alternative is under a big question because of the chaos that is now happening in the former fiefdom of Gaddafi.
More than once or twice there have been situations when local tribes seized gas-exporting infrastructure in an attempt to squeeze out some privileges from the central authorities.
No one can say when Libya will again become a reliable gas supplier - apparently, only with the emergence of a new Gaddafi.
If we talk about the large shelf gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean (in the waters of Israel, Egypt, Cyprus and Lebanon), then these are still only reserves. They need to be efficiently developed and then exported to Europe - and the latter, perhaps, will be oh, how difficult it is. Turkey (which wants to concentrate on itself all gas transit from the east and southeast to the EU) is trying to sabotage alternative pipeline projects - for example, by signing an agreement on the division of sea waters with the nominal Libyan government controlled by it in 2019.
Moreover, it is divided in such a way that any underwater gas pipeline from the territory of the Eastern Mediterranean to the EU will go through Turkish or Libyan waters controlled by Turkey. The European Union can refuse to recognize this agreement as much as it wants, call it illegal - Ankara has repeatedly proved that it is ready to defend its own with arms in hand. In turn, Europe does not need a Turkish transit - after all, Ankara has proved more than once or twice that it is ready to use its transit opportunities (refugees, gas and everything else) to blackmail and force the European Union to "respect" Turkey. The more opportunities there are, the more Turkish wishes will be in terms of respect - right up to the demand to include Turkey in the EU.
All projects of the Transcaucasian gas alternative also smell like unfulfilled fantasies. Central Asian gas (primarily Turkmen) has been contracted by China, which is pumping out all possible resources from the region. In addition, the Caspian Convention stands in the way of exporting these energy resources to the West - theoretically, according to the agreement signed by the Caspian states, any member country can veto the construction of a pipeline on the seabed for “environmental reasons”. And Moscow, probably, in which case will coveted.
Yes, this veto will not hinder the export of, for example, Azerbaijani gas - if Baku had the capacity to increase this export to the point that is dangerous for Gazprom, but they do not. In fact, Iran is the only real alternative to Gazprom supplies in terms of capacity, but there are many obstacles in the way of Iranian exports to Europe. These are sanctions, and the unreliability of Iran as a supplier (given its relations with the West and the specifics of the authorities in Tehran), and, finally, the lack of pipeline infrastructure for transporting gas from the southern fields to the northern borders.
As for American LNG, Washington has already demonstrated its reliability. In an hour of great European need, the United States, which called on Europe to rally together against the Chinese enemy, sent its LNG to China, as well as to other countries in East Asia. Simply because they paid a hundred or two dollars more. Business, nothing personal.
Perhaps Europe needs to follow the example of the Americans? Stop political games and remember that, despite all the contradictions in the 20th century, despite all the current European rudeness and sanctions games, Moscow has never allowed itself to use gas as a weapon against Europe. She never blackmailed Brussels, Paris and Berlin with a possible cutoff of gas supplies. Gazprom strictly fulfilled its obligations - with the exception of a short period at the end of the 2000s, when Ukraine began to steal transit gas and the Russian side was forced to tighten the valve until the problems with the transit country were resolved. After that, they made the final decision to get rid of the unreliable transit country by building the bypass "Northern" and "South Streams".Which Kiev - and behind it the European Union suffering from Ukrainian desires - has proclaimed the next instrument of the Kremlin's aggression.
I would very much like to hope that Europe will learn the current gas lessons and throw its strategy of “diversification” into the dustbin of history.
And it will stop creating problems out of the blue for Moscow and for itself.
After all, fairy tales are, of course, good, but it is better to tell them in a fully heated and lighted house.
The point of view of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.