The political future in Sudan and possible options

At the very least, the last thing the country needs is this foolish fight and blind scramble for nihilistic choices.

It is not possible, and even impossible, to summon the option of a military coup to resolve the options for the political future in Sudan, as 3 coup regimes and dozens of attempts to overthrow power have passed, and their harvest was the weakness of the state, the multiplication of instability and the decrease of stakes, this is before there were in Sudan more than 8 armies that do not gather Among them is a joint command body, and it is not governed by a unified combat doctrine or law, and of course it does not have a unified command.

Just thinking about a military coup is ignorance of reality and a dreamy adventure that will never succeed in a country that accomplished the greatest revolution less than 30 months ago to put an end to this foolish and irresponsible option.

It is not possible, and even impossible, to hold early elections in the country before implementing the security arrangements, structuring and building the security system, completing the peace file with those with whom the dialogue has not been completed, and without writing an agreed permanent constitution, and enabling the displaced and refugees to return to their areas of origin and others.

It is not possible to overturn the existing political partnership. The political formula that resulted from the repercussions of the political agreement was not acceptable to the vast majority of the Sudanese who made the revolution, and was not admired by most of those at the head of this same government, and I am one of them. Known political circumstances necessitated by this partnership led to the acceptance of most of those who initially objected to it. Therefore, it must continue and be respected in order to reach agreed goals without a response from any of its parties. Retreating from the existing political formula will generate a political climate in which it is impossible to achieve stability, and the least expected scenario is high-cost internal and external confrontations that will inherit this country's fragility due to its existing fragility, open confrontations and fires from which no one will survive - or control - even those who ignited them.

The Constitutional Document is the legal translator of the Political Agreement, the supreme law that governs the country along with the Juba Peace Agreement that was originally included in the constitution, and which did not change much in the Political Charter and its associated constitutional entitlements, including the transition of the presidency of the Sovereignty Council to civilians - According to what is stipulated - before and after the incorporation of the Juba Agreement into the constitutional document, which is necessarily known. There is no constitutional or legal problem about when and how the transition will take place. The transition of the presidency to civilians in the Sovereignty Council is an important test for the seriousness of the partnership and for the full civilian transition for the first upcoming elections.

Whoever could not see that this transitional period should end with free and fair elections after achieving a comprehensive peace with all armed groups and writing a permanent constitution that defines the form and system of government in this country, should look for a government other than the December government, and he must specify The reasons for his support for the transitional period without what we trusted in the Constitutional Document, the Political Agreement and the Juba Agreement for the Peace of Sudan.

It is not possible, and even impossible, to hold early elections in the country before implementing the security arrangements, structuring and building the security system, completing the peace file with those with whom the dialogue has not been completed, and without writing an agreed permanent constitution, enabling the displaced and refugees to return to their areas of origin, and others. One of the obligations of the foundation in the transitional period, which is based on building a new system on the ruins of the old state. Without realizing these priorities, early elections will be a blind repetition of experiences that have only left this country with more political instability, more civil wars, and new grievances.

It is not possible - and it is impossible - to achieve success and a broad consensus around the agenda of the transitional period without strict commitment and serious and continuous work towards issues of people's livelihood and their basic needs, and building an open dialogue base in all the villages and cities of Sudan led by the leadership of the state, both sovereign and executive. Continuing to run the country from Khartoum calls into question the qualities required of leaders in the periods of transition in which we need to inspire and enlighten societies on the overall goals of transition.

It is not possible to build an independent and viable Sudanese model unless we deal with the regional alliances around us with responsibility, independence and great national awareness. In a soil different from ours, and historical, social and ideological conflicts that have nothing to do with our original national orientation, except for the exceptional era that emerged during the past 30 years. Moreover, the Sudanese revolution differs in many of its premises, awareness and self-energies from those that occurred in the Arab Spring. The December revolution was a revolution of liberation from internal dependence and colonialism, and from dependence on economic, political and ready-made models. Accordingly, defining and agreeing on national interests and agreeing on a strategy for regional and international foreign relations is a necessity for building a viable and developing national model.

The energy that we waste in fragmentation and fragmentation must be used to build the foundations of collective leadership that leads Sudanese society towards transformation and transition, which opens a new history for this great country and clearly defines the agenda and requirements of the transition. It is very possible to lead the transition through a platform provided by a broad political alliance based on a purely national agenda that protects the interests of the people and works to implement the tasks of the transition and its requirements set out in the Constitutional Document and the Political Agreement.Despite the short period of transition compared to the large number of tasks that must be accomplished, the broadening of the aspirations of the masses, the complexity and fragility of the political and social conditions of transition as a result of the partition policies that the former regime worked on, and the weak performance of the political system as a result of the same previous reasons, there is a need for the leadership to play its spiritual role The national and the functional in unifying the Sudanese conscience, forming collective awareness and building a positive energy - indeed energies - turns this general discontent into a hope that removes the gap between rural communities that feel excluded and marginalized compared to civil societies that have received a great deal of attention to their issues despite the suffering that still controls large classes Of which. This leadership seeks to crystallize a required and important agreement and cohesion between the parties to the political process. Changing the tools of mass communication and changing the way public servants work depends on the model of inspiring leaders and what more are their models in the continent and the region.If it is not possible to achieve economic sufficiency at the present time and meet all the needs of our societies, there is no justification for not creating hope and confidence in the future among the Sudanese.

After following up and monitoring the performance of the bureaucratic state institution and supervising it at the central, regional/state level, and monitoring the general performance of the state governors, it turns out that the weak response to the necessary needs of the simple Sudanese citizen is not the result of the weak financial resources of the state only, as much as it is the result of administrative weakness and lack of direct supervision On state service and revenue institutions.

Most of the discontent with the transitional government and the faltering conditions of ordinary Sudanese result from apparent weakness in administrative performance, lack of accountability, and oversight of institutions, especially revenue and service institutions.

This resulted in this political discontent that was about to confuse the state’s duties towards its people with the people’s duties towards the principles of their revolution and major issues of transition.

For all this, there has become an objective and urgent need to accomplish the following:

Formation of the Legislative Council and the completion of the Conference of the System of Government that allows local communities to align themselves in local governments with defined powers and authorities and limited resources that represent the safe bulwark for the coming transitional and democratic period.

Urgent implementation of the Juba Agreement, especially the security arrangements clause, and the start of restructuring and building the security system so that all its phases are completed before the general elections.

Completing the peace file with the forces that have not yet signed.

Completing the file of dismantling the political and economic empowerment practiced by the previous regime and addressing its effects.

Complete the formation of independent commissions, notably the Electoral Commission, Civil Service Reform, Transitional Justice and the Anti-Corruption Commission.