Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have publicly displayed their disagreement on the subject of oil production quotas for several days.

A rare event between these two Gulf allies, used to settling their disputes behind the scenes, which has paralyzed the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

Meetings to reach an agreement on production from August have been postponed indefinitely.

While the cartel of producing countries is cautiously reopening the black gold tap with the onset of a slight global economic recovery marked by the Covid-19 pandemic, Abu Dhabi demands that the reference production volumes be reviewed at the increase to ensure that they are "fair".

This threshold fixed on October 2018 corresponds for the Emirates to 3.17 million barrels per day, while the country's full production capacity rose to more than 3.8 million barrels per day in April 2020.

Until now, Riyadh, very attached to the policy of quotas and the limitation of production, refuses to give in to the demands of its neighbor.

Can the quarrel against a background of oil disagreement cause a stir within the alliance between the two Gulf neighbors?

To understand the stakes of this showdown, France 24 interviewed Karim Sader, political scientist and consultant specializing in the Gulf. 

France 24: How do you analyze the current tension between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates?

Karim Sader:

The dispute that has erupted publicly within OPEC is explained by the fact that these two allies find themselves in a situation of economic divergence and each display an approach that is opposed to that of the other in terms of oil production.

On the one hand, Riyadh advocates a conservative approach to oil production, to impose a certain quota on OPEC members which limits production so that prices remain stable in a high range. 

This approach frustrates the United Arab Emirates, which feel aggrieved and want to end the quota policy that has held them back for years. The Emiratis are in a different dynamic than the Saudis and want to produce, because they have a process of economic diversification much more successful than that of their powerful neighbor. They are therefore in a hurry to pump black gold to reinvest the oil windfall in major investment projects underway or already in existence.

For their part, the Saudis, who have initiated the process of economic diversification much more recently, want to keep their resources in the ground, in order to extract them when the time comes, when it is time to invest their petrodollars in a certain number of sufficiently advanced projects, which is not yet fully the case today.

This difference in visions and needs is at the origin of this clash within OPEC, which is not the first quarrel between its members. 

Is this oil dispute likely to jeopardize the alliance between the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia?

I don't believe so, and I think they will eventually come to an agreement to settle this matter. Especially since there is no sign of personal disagreement between the Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammed Ben Salman, and Sheikh Mohammed ben Zayed (MBZ), Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, who maintain a privileged relationship. Neither Riyadh nor Abu Dhabi have any interest in divorcing, even if for a while a series of differences have arisen within this couple which seemed nevertheless solid. 

From the disengagement of the Emirates from the coalition led by Riyadh in Yemen, in 2019, to be able to play their own part in the southern areas, through their rapprochement with Israel that the Saudis have not followed for the moment, until the reconciliation of the Wahhabi kingdom with Qatar, to the chagrin of the Emiratis who wanted to keep Doha in quarantine, the points of disagreement are not lacking. But from a geopolitical point of view, this sum of divergences remains proportionally minimal compared to their points of convergence which are too existential and important. I am thinking in particular of the rivalry with Iran, their Shiite enemy, their common distrust of Turkey, the non-Arab Sunni power, and their shared fear of political Islam embodied by the brotherhood of Muslim Brotherhood.The Iranian dossier is the one that worries them more, especially as the Saudis and Emiratis fear the United States will disengage from the region while reaching out to Tehran, as the administration's announcements seem to indicate. Biden who seeks to revive the Vienna agreement on Iranian nuclear power. 

Finally, by publicly displaying their dispute with Riyadh, aren't the Emirates seeking to emancipate themselves from their powerful ally?

In this Arabian Peninsula, geographically dominated at 80% by Saudi Arabia, the leadership of Riyadh has been in competition for several decades. So far, the UAE, which has great ambitions, has managed to quietly work for this emancipation. Unlike Qatar, which has openly challenged the Saudi leadership, and is trying to overshadow the Wahhabi kingdom. By drawing all the attention to him and taking center stage, Qatar, which has since been chastised by the Saudis, has indirectly allowed the Emiratis to advance their pawns and gradually emancipate themselves to the point of 'embody today a new form of competition for Riyadh. It is even an accomplished fact which establishes a kind of natural competition, and rather healthy, in the Gulf and which indicates that theGone are the days when Saudi Arabia used to rain and shine on the peninsula. Even the Saudis are aware of this.  

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