Southern Syria.. A model for the opposition not to be neglected

Three years have passed since the signing of the settlement agreement in southern Syria, with no signs of sustainable stability, while the regime was preoccupied with re-imposing security control over the cities and governorates of Daraa and Quneitra after the factions were dismantled and the residents of the area were stripped of heavy and medium weapons.

The regime worked on military redeployment at the entrances and exits of cities and towns in order to cut the supply and communication lines between the countryside of Daraa and Quneitra, and to facilitate the ability to launch security operations to impose sovereignty by re-signing settlement agreements, as happened in the cities of Tafas, Jassim, Umm Batinah and others.

The Syrian opposition should be more careful and careful when dealing with the political process, as the military settlement may not differ much from the political settlement if there are no guarantees through which it preserves the tools of change in the medium and long term, because the regime will not miss the opportunity to completely dismantle the scene militarily and security and administratively to ensure the re-formation of power.

In general, these efforts did not bear fruit in the re-work of the security committees and the deployment of military units in all cities and towns, and this was relatively prevented by the role played by the Central Committee in providing protection for the local population, by ensuring the implementation of the settlement agreement or not completely violating it, at the very least, benefiting in turn from the Close relationship with settlement factions, ability to communicate with Russia and social acceptance of it by families and clans.

Russia did not abide by the promises made in late June 2018 to the Crisis Cell (later turned into the Central Committee in Daraa) to ensure the implementation of the terms of the settlement agreement, as it did not prevent the Syrian regime from redeploying the security and military, but sometimes worked to put pressure on the Central Committee and the people of the cities and villages in order to land upon the new conditions and sign re-settlement agreements, as happened in Tafas, west of Daraa, in late January 2021, when they threatened to use the air force unless the re-settlement agreement was signed.

This means that Russia did not show any credibility when it presented itself as a mediator between the regime and the opposition in the south of the country that could be referred to to ensure the implementation of the settlement agreement, and what reinforces this image is its recent resort to requesting the Central Committee to hand over light weapons in Daraa al-Balad to take measures that push the Syrian regime to withdraw military units and committees security from the region.

There is a clear unwillingness on the part of the Syrian regime to take any steps that would guarantee the return of civil peace to southern Syria, while its focus is on imposing military, security and administrative sovereignty so that the region would be as it was before 2011.

Not only the south, but the security approach also applies to all areas that signed settlement agreements, which will never lead to stability or peace, and this also means that the Syrian regime and its allies - specifically Russia - do not show any seriousness in dealing with the political process, meaning that Participation in negotiations with the Syrian opposition is nothing more than a gain of time until the military and security control is resolved, or in a way that enhances its chances in any settlement between the United States and Russia over Syria.

The Syrian opposition should be more careful and careful when dealing with the political process, as the military settlement may not differ much from the political settlement if there are no guarantees through which it preserves the tools of change in the medium and long term, because the regime will not miss the opportunity to completely dismantle the scene militarily and security and administratively to ensure the re-formation of power.

Before obtaining guarantees, the opposition must not give the regime the opportunity to gain more time unless it has a clear plan to ensure that more of its areas of control militarily and security settlements are not eroded, and this requires reconsidering the relationship with the settlement factions and the Central Committee in southern Syria.

The Syrian regime's lack of seriousness in dealing with the settlement in general - both political and military - stems from its failure to recognize the existence of any rightful rights or demands of the Syrians, and therefore it resorts to considering the bearers of arms as terrorists and restricting the national opposition to those that operate under government approval.

In fact, Russia’s role alone as a mediator in any political or military settlement cannot be trusted, and a greater participation of all actors must be achieved to ensure sustainable stability and the return of civil peace. When the United States signed the de-escalation agreement in southern Syria in 2018, Russia had to work to remove Iran is 80 kilometers away from the border strip with Israel, but it has not adhered to this, regardless of whether it was the result of unwillingness or ability.

This means that for a political settlement to be credible and sustainable, it must witness an expansion in the number of guarantor and monitoring countries for the progress of negotiations and the implementation of commitments. Otherwise, uncertainty will remain inherent in the fate of the political process.

Accordingly, it is assumed that the Syrian opposition seeks to expand the tools it relies on in confronting the Syrian regime, such as trying to strip it of the tools it uses, as communication with the Central Committee in Daraa can contribute to building positive relations with it, and even working to include it in the High Negotiations Committee As an independent platform in strengthening its position in the south of the country, to impose more failures on the regime's security approach, it is also necessary to rebuild confidence in the relationship with the United States and work to urge it to participate in ensuring the progress of the political process and not merely monitor the negotiations.

These steps do not conflict with any other priorities of the Syrian opposition, such as internal reform, military deterrence, and so on. Rather, it seems an opportunity that deserves great attention, taking into account the potential challenges and risks related to Russia's position and the Syrian regime's security and military response in the south of the country.

In sum, southern Syria seems to be an important example and model that deserves to be carefully evaluated by the Syrian opposition after 3 years, whether to understand the fate of any possible political settlement if the opposition’s performance and tools remain unchanged, and to study alternatives that can be resorted to.