Registration of candidates for the presidency has ended in Iran. Let me remind you that they will take place on June 18, 2021, but we will only find out the list of those eligible for the elections on May 26-27 (and then we will tell you about each candidate in detail). Ex-President Ahmadinejad, who was already disqualified in 2017, said in advance that if he was removed, he would not support anyone and would generally lose faith in world justice and Iranian democracy. (Oh well.)
This is the 13th presidential election in the Islamic Republic, and they differ from the previous ones by tightening the rules for participation in them, strengthening the role of the IRGC in screening out candidates and the ability of the Guard Council to remove a registered candidate at the last moment before the vote, if there is any compromising material (and I have no doubts about the ability of the IRGC intelligence to find incriminating evidence even on a newly born baby).
These toughenings were developed by the Council of Guards, a special supra-parliamentary body, which consists of 12 members: six of them are necessarily representatives of the clergy, clerics, the remaining six are appointed by the spiritual leader of Khamenei.
The Council has been chaired since 1988 by Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, a mighty 94-year-old old man.
Hamshahri Online reports that new rules - higher age limits, no criminal record, mandatory experience in leadership and management positions, and more - have reduced the number of candidates by more than 70%. But Iran still suits the show - what is at least the last day of registration, when, having learned that the moderate "heavyweight" Larijani came to register for the elections, almost a dozen Ksirov generals literally grabbed their passports from the nightstands and rushed to "register too" at the last moment , considering it his duty to "reply to Larijani's tweet." Or a young woman who arrived on the first day of registration in a black tight motorcycle suit with a multi-colored manicure, who almost caused the neck dislocations of the employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, where the registration office is located.
There are several important features in the upcoming presidential elections.
1. After eight years of Rouhani's presidency (the camp of pragmatists, globalists, supporters of negotiations with the United States), supporters of the hard line should come to power.
2. Despite the fact that the Rouhani government was determined to cooperate with the West, it was not in the full sense of the reformatory.
Moreover, Hassan Rouhani was one of the prominent representatives of the moderately pragmatic wing of the Ayatollahs who came to power in 1979 after the overthrow of the Shah.
The real name of Hassan Rouhani is Fereydun, and Rouhani in translation means "cleric, priest", it was the military pseudonym of the future Iranian president back in the 1970s, when he led an underground struggle against the Shah.
So for the last eight years, presidential power in Iran has belonged to the Ayatollahs, the clan of the "politically flexible" Rafsanjani, the bearers of the turban and the blessing of Qom.
But the soldiers “protecting” the mullahs have grown up and feel the strength to rule the country (defending the values of the Islamic revolution, of course).
3. Perhaps, never before in the country has the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) been so powerful.
He concentrated in himself virtually all the financial and military power of the country, becoming a state within a state.
The IRGC has been preparing for these elections long and seriously: since February 2020, the Guard Corps has actually controlled the country's parliament, the judicial system (justice) is headed by Ebrahim Raisi, backed by the IRGC intelligence.
Now the generals need a presidential post, for which they will fight in earnest.
4. It is for this reason that at the last moment, thinking about his future and yielding to the IRGC, the strongest candidate of the pragmatists-Rouhanists, Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, who won this election in many preliminary polls, refused to participate in the elections.
So, the strongest competitor of the Guard Corps was removed from the distance, so the victory will somehow belong to the IRGC, the question is which of its candidates: a young strong manager-technocrat, a heavyweight cleric with a sharp sword of "justice" or acting in these elections in an unusual Role of a Critic and a "Liberal" to the Ex-President?
For me personally, as an observer of the Iranian government, this presidential election will be important as a political battle between the Ayatollahs and the IRGC technocrats: turbans against general's shoulder straps.
Many in Iran believe that the ayatollahs will no longer be in power - neither moderate nor tough.
We'll see.
We have made iconography for the strongest candidates who applied for registration in the elections, so that you can more easily familiarize yourself with them.
Some of them are the next president of Iran.
The IRGC
one.
Said Mohammad
Born in 1968, doctorate in civil engineering, former commander of the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Camp - the most powerful financial institution of the IRGC with multibillion-dollar turnover and no less than 40 thousand employees, which concentrates all the country's most important infrastructure projects in the field of construction, oil and gas , petrochemistry, etc. The impact force of the "economy of resistance".
To run for president, Mohammad left the post, which speaks of the coordination of his actions with Khamenei and high chances of winning.
General of the IRGC by rank and a young technocrat-manager in essence.
2.
Hossein Dehgan
Born in 1957, former Minister of Defense of the first government of Rouhani, IRGC Air Force officer, participant in the Iran-Iraq war, commander of the IRGC training corps in Lebanon and Syria.
Today - adviser to Khamenei.
He is not a member of any political party, the British The Guardian and the American media were among the first to write about his nomination as a likely "military candidate" for victory.
3.
Mohsen Rezai
Born in 1954, the oldest candidate, but once the youngest commander-in-chief of the IRGC in history, he became him at the age of 27, the "commander" for almost all the top generals of the IRGC in the political establishment of Iran, went through the Iran-Iraq war with them, secretary of the Council of Political Expediency and "Regular" candidate - has been running in the presidential elections since 2009 and does not win.
four.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
Born in 1956, a graduate of the Tehran University of Science and Technology, a participant in the war with Iraq as part of the Basij special unit (part of the IRGC).
After the war, he began his political career - he headed the administrations of the cities of Khoi and Maku, during a break between the governorship in the province of Ardabil and the mayor's office in Tehran, he taught, twice in a row was the most controversial president of Iran.
The political heavyweight - populist, charismatic, relies on the "common people", while historically strengthened the role of the IRGC in politics and economics during his rule and carried out privatization.
By this election he decided to change his role - he criticizes the government, the deal with China, wants to come to an agreement with the Americans, some of the conservatives now sarcastically call him a "liberal".
Pragmatist reformers
one.
Ali Larijani
Born in 1957, representative of an influential family clan.
The son of the Ayatollah, born in Iraqi Najaf, Ph.D., under President Khatami was a key negotiator on Iran's nuclear program, from 2008 to 2020 he was speaker of parliament and mediator of Iranian-Chinese relations.
Brother Sadik Larijani headed the judiciary and aimed to succeed Khamenei, but was ousted by the IRGC group that promoted Raisi.
Represents the interests of the Ayatollahs of the moderately pragmatic camp.
Despite the clan's influence, he is not very popular as a public politician.
2.
Eshak Jahangiri
Born in 1957, since 2013 - permanent first vice-president of the government of Hassan Rouhani, ex-minister of industry and mines in the government of liberal president Khatami.
For eight years of his political career, he was most famous for being one of the first in the Iranian political elite to catch the coronavirus and miraculously recovered.
In 2018, his brother Mehdi was involved in a corruption case, which was backed by the IRGC intelligence and the figure of the current head of the judiciary.
The political overtones of the cases against Rouhani's people were obvious, but in this election he could be admitted by the Guardian Council as the reformer with the highest anti-sympathy rating, whose chances are slim.
3.
Mostafa Tajzade
Born in 1956, Iranian reformist and senior member of the Islamic Iranian Participation Front, member of the Green Movement (many Iranians still wear green ribbon bracelets on their wrists - a symbol of protest) - the most massive and lasting protest against the election of Ahmadinejad in 2009, which became a threat to the regime ...
He was sentenced to six years in prison and banned from politics for ten years.
One of seven reformists who filed a lawsuit against several IRGC commanders for their alleged election interference.
Will definitely be disqualified and removed.
Heavyweight Cleric
Ebrahim Raisi
Born in 1960, head of justice, Ayatollah, son-in-law of an influential conservative cleric, member of the Militant Clergy Association, the toughest of all hardliners, is considered the main contender for victory in the Iranian media.
Manages the multi-billion dollar Astan-e Quds Rezavi Islamic Foundation.
This is his third presidential election - the two previous ones were lost to the current president Rouhani, but over the past two years he has noticeably increased political weight and at official events appears on the left hand of the spiritual leader, being named among his likely successors.
Raisi was nominated as an independent candidate, but his populist "fight against corruption", "purges" and high-profile criminal cases against the objectionable are carried out with the support of the IRGC and the spiritual leader.
The point of view of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.