China News Service, March 26. On September 27, 2020, a major fire accident occurred in the Songzao Coal Mine of Chongqing Nengtou Yu New Energy Co., Ltd., resulting in 16 deaths, 42 injuries and direct economic losses of 25.01 million yuan.
The Chongqing Coal Mine Safety Supervision Bureau’s website announced on the 26th the "Investigation Report and Handling of the "9.27" Major Fire Accident in Songzao Coal Mine of Chongqing Nengtou Yu New Energy Co., Ltd.", according to the "Accountability Regulations of the Communist Party of China" and "Disciplinary Measures of the Communist Party of China" "The Supervision Law of the People's Republic of China" and the "Public Official Disciplinary Law of the People's Republic of China" and other relevant regulations, upon approval, severely held accountable and accountable for 37 public officials who were suspected of violating discipline, illegal duties, or crimes during the accident.
Songzao Coal Mine of Chongqing Nengtou Yu New Energy Co., Ltd.
"September 27" major fire accident investigation report
At 0:20 on September 27, Chongqing Nengtou Yu New Energy Co., Ltd. Songzao Coal Mine No. 2 high-inclination belt coal was transported uphill in a major fire accident, causing 16 deaths, 42 injuries and direct economic losses of 25.01 million yuan.
After the accident, the Party Central Committee and the State Council attached great importance to it. General Secretary Xi Jinping made important instructions. Vice Premier Han Zheng, Vice Premier Liu He, State Councilor Wang Yong and other leading comrades gave instructions respectively.
Party Secretary Huang Ming of the Ministry of Emergency Response and Huang Yuzhi, Director of the State Coal Supervision Bureau, conducted video command and dispatch, and Song Yuanming, Deputy Director of the State Coal Supervision Bureau, led a working group to the scene to guide rescue and disposal work.
The Chongqing Municipal Party Committee and Municipal Government resolutely implemented the spirit of the important instructions of General Secretary Jin Ping. Secretary Chen Miner and Mayor Tang Liangzhi led relevant city leaders and relevant municipal departments to the scene to conduct rescue operations. They have studied and deployed accident investigations and strengthened the safety of the city. Stabilize related work.
In accordance with relevant national laws and regulations, the Chongqing Coal Supervision Bureau was established as the team leader, and the Municipal Emergency Bureau, the Municipal Public Security Bureau, the Municipal State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, the Municipal Energy Bureau, the Municipal Federation of Trade Unions and the Qijiang District Government were the member units, and relevant experts were invited to participate. The accident investigation team is specifically responsible for accident investigation.
The Chongqing Municipal Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision established the Songzao Coal Mine "September 27" Major Safety Accident Review and Investigation Team to carry out relevant work simultaneously.
The accident investigation team adhered to the principle of “scientific and rigorous, legal and regulatory, seeking truth from facts, and focusing on actual results”. Through on-site investigation, sampling and testing, investigation and evidence collection, data retrieval, personnel inquiries, expert demonstrations, etc., the accident process, causes, and The casualties and direct economic losses, etc., identified the nature of the accident and the responsibility for the accident, put forward suggestions on handling and preventive measures for the accident unit, and the Chongqing Municipal Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision put forward opinions on the handling of the responsible personnel.
1. Overview of the accidental coal mine
(1) Basic situation of the mine
Chongqing Nengtou Yu New Energy Co., Ltd. Songzao Coal Mine (hereinafter referred to as Songzao Coal Mine) is located in Qijiang District, Chongqing City, and belongs to Chongqing Nengtou Yu New Energy Co., Ltd., a subsidiary of Chongqing Energy Investment Group Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Chongqing Energy Investment Group) (Hereinafter referred to as Yuxin Energy Company), the economic nature is state-owned.
There are 1,697 employees and an approved production capacity of 1.1 million tons per year. In 2020, it plans to produce 1 million tons of raw coal and 786,500 tons of raw coal from January to September.
Before the accident, the coal mine was in normal production and was a fully licensed production mine.
(2) Situation of coal mine safety management institutions
The coal mine is equipped with party secretary, mine director, deputy party secretary, chief engineer, production deputy mine manager, safety deputy mine manager, electromechanical deputy mine manager, and operation deputy mine manager. It is equipped with production, technology, safety, ventilation, extraction, and electrical and mechanical equipment. , Deputy Chief Engineer of Geotechnical Survey.
There are 7 production safety departments, including production technology department, safety supervision department, ventilation department (the following anti-outbreak group), gas drainage department, geological survey department, electromechanical transportation department, and dispatching room. There are 5 coal mining teams, 5 16 grassroots companies, including the excavation team, the first electromechanical team, the second electromechanical team, the transportation team, the ventilation team, the extraction team, and the preparation team, have formulated the job responsibility system for the heads of each functional department and the grassroots company, and clarified the responsibilities of safe production work. .
(3) Mine mining conditions
The Songzao Coal Mine has an area of 14.8612 k㎡ and mines the K1, K2b, and K3b coal seams with an inclination angle of 20°-40°, which belongs to anthracite.
The average coal thickness of K1 is 0.97m, the average coal thickness of K2b is 0.56m, and the average coal thickness of K3b is 2.49m; the existing recoverable reserves are 39.46 million tons and the remaining service life is 25.6 years; the mine is a coal and gas outburst mine. The relative gas of the mine was measured in 2019 The emission volume is 64.42m3/t, and the absolute gas emission volume is 122.94m3/min; the coal seam that is mined is a spontaneous combustion coal seam, and there is no danger of explosion of coal dust.
(4) Current status of development deployment and production system
The mine development method is the mixed development of flat tunnel inclined shafts. The main roadways at each level are arranged in the Maokou rock formation below the K1 coal seam, and the coal seams are sequentially entered through the stage roadways and crosscuts, and the mining areas and working faces are arranged.
The mine is divided into 3 levels: first level +335m, second level +100m, and third level -300m.
At present, the first-level and second-level mining areas have been completed, and the production areas are concentrated in the second-level, second-level and third-level mining areas.
The mine is equipped with 5 fully mechanized mining working faces, namely the 2324-1 working face of the second level and second mining area, the 3311N working face and the 3213S working face of the third level and the first mining area, the 3222S working face of the third level and the second mining area, and the third level and the third mining area. 3231S working surface.
The ventilation method of the mine is the two-wing diagonal type, and the ventilation method is the extraction type, with a total inlet air volume of 20890m3/min and a total return air volume of 21698m3/min.
There are 4 air intake shafts and 2 return air shafts.
A three-stage drainage system is adopted.
The raw coal is continuously transported by belt conveyors, and transports coal uphill to the second-level coal-carrying roadway through the face transportation lanes, various section lanes, and large inclination angles, and passes through the main inclined shaft and trestle bridge to the ground coal bunker.
The gangue is lifted by string cars.
The mine is equipped with KJ90X coal mine safety monitoring and monitoring system and KJ69N personnel position monitoring system.
The air supply for the mine pressure self-rescue system is taken from the ground and the three-level compressor room.
The dispatching switchboard is 510 KTJ113 dispatching switches, of which 50 are on the ground and 460 are underground.
2. Situation of the accident area
(1) Location of the accident
The accident site was located on the No. 2 high-inclination belt carrying coal uphill. The uphill slope was 919m long, had an inclination angle of 28°, and had a section of 12.032 square meters.
Serving the three levels of the first, second and third mining areas, specifically 3222S coal mining face, 3231S coal mining face, 3311N coal mining face, 3213S coal mining face, 3233N transport tunnel driving face, 3312N return air tunnel driving Working face, 3312N transport tunnel driving face.
The coal is transported uphill to install the DTC100/35/2450S belt conveyor produced by Jiaozuo Keruisen Machinery Manufacturing Co., Ltd. (applicable to roadways with large inclination angles below 30°, conforming to design specifications), and produced by Shenyang Shenqiao Belt Manufacturing Co., Ltd. ST/S 2500-1000×(8+7.2+8) model steel wire rope core flame retardant pattern conveyor belt.
A coal stack sensor is installed below the unloading drum of the conveyor, a sprinkling device is installed above it, a voice communication signal device, a pull-wire emergency stop locking device are installed along the line, and a deviation sensor is installed at the head and tail of the machine to drive A smoke sensor is installed at 10m on the downwind side of the drum, a temperature sensor is installed on the driving drum, the reversing drum and the disc brake, an electric valve sprinkler is installed above the driving drum, and a speed sensor is installed near the driving drum, +5m coal The bunker is equipped with a tearing protection at the coal point, and a tension drop limit protection is installed on the top of the tail tensioning trolley.
According to expert analysis, the reason why the smoke sensor did not alarm was that the communication cable of the sensor was burned by the high-temperature air flow before reaching the alarm value, or it had failed before the accident.
Other protection devices burned down in the fire, and it is impossible to verify whether they played a role in the accident.
(2) On-site investigation
1. Damage to ventilation structures.
Two metal-framed wooden dampers are installed in the connecting lane of the No. 2 large inclination belt to transport coal uphill to the +175m air intake main roadway, and the distance between the two dampers is 19m.
The first air door is 2.5m in height and width, 2m away from the +175m air intake main alley. The air door is intact. No fire traces have been seen. After being blown open by the fire wind, it is close to the road wall; the second air door is located at a large inclination angle No. 2 The belt was used to transport coal uphill at 30m from the return wind, and only the metal skeleton was burned.
The No. 2 high-inclination tape transports coal up the mountain and returns to the wind control wind wall with obvious traces of fire, and the wall is damaged.
The air door of the control room of the No. 2 large inclination belt conveyor and the +100m transfer belt connection lane is made of metal iron sheet, 5m away from the +100m transfer belt, the air door is 3.1m high, 2.7m wide, and 1.5m (width)×0.4 is opened above the air door m (high) wind window, after the wind flow reverses, it enters the +100m transfer belt and moves in the direction of +100m Maokou Lane to N3 to transport coal uphill, resulting in difficulties for the belt division.
2. The burning of the No. 2 large inclination belt, control chamber, +100m transfer belt lane and +5m coal feeder.
Only the steel wire rope is left when the tape burns in the nose chamber, and the tape is burned out (the steel wire is exposed and disconnected); the tape joint at 18m above the +5m contact lane is disconnected, and the tape is burned out (the steel wire is exposed and disconnected); active drum coating Layer carbonization, the oil drum in the belt head chamber is intact, the rubber sleeve on the cable surface of the large inclination belt lane is burned out, the armor layer is exposed, and the sprinkler is burned; the +100m transfer belt lane tape burns more than 100 m, and only the tape steel frame is seen.
3. The burning of the control system of the No. 2 high-inclination belt for coal transportation uphill.
Belt conveyor drive chamber integrated protection controller and other devices are all burned; belt conveyor smoke sensor, temperature sensor, anti-tear sensor, anti-slip sensor, anti-deflection sensor, coal pile sensor, conveyor sprinkler, voice The signal communication device, the pull cord emergency stop locking device, the broken belt catching device, the conveyor video camera, and the driving roller sprinkler device were all burned; the surface of the power switch cable in the driving chamber was carbonized; the conveyor wire rope core online detector was burned.
4. Burning of pipelines and CO sensors in the accident area.
+175mN1# The cable box at Shimen burned out; the wind speed and direction sensor, high and low concentration methane sensor, and carbon monoxide sensor were installed in the air inlet of the 2324-1 coal mining face. The sensor stopped running due to power outage on the face and no damage was seen; No. 2 large inclination angle There are obvious smoke signs at the intersection of the belt lane and the +5m main air intake lane, and the monitoring cable burning and carbonization signs are obvious.
5. No. 2 high-inclination belt conveying coal uphill to the fire point and nearby conditions.
-No obvious overfire is seen in the cable at the 25m return roller above the 75m connecting lane, the return tape wire rope is broken, and the burning marks are obvious; the fire source point tape burning mark boundary line is obvious, and the tape coal guard (tape plate) above the fire source point burns The demarcation line of the traces is obvious; the original shelter (on the tape side) 2.5m (length) × 1.8m (height) × 2m (depth), no combustibles were seen; on-site investigation revealed that the fire point was 25m above the -75m connecting lane, nearby There are 4 return rollers stuck, of which 3 of the worn return rollers have pulverized coal deposited inside, and 1 has no dust, water, and slag inside (the dust inside is burned and it is confirmed as a fire Point), the upper surface of the other one is flattened.
The specifications and dimensions of the return roller are: Ø133×1150, pipe diameter Ø133mm, wall thickness 4mm, and material is 20# steel pipe; from –75m connecting lane to +5m connecting lane, the large inclination angle is used to transport coal up the mountain side of the belt conveyor and under the belt. A large amount of coal gangue accumulates; 5m above the ignition point of the return roller is the upper and lower tape disconnection position. After the disconnection position, only the steel rope remains after the upper tape burns, and the upper and lower tape steel ropes are obviously broken; the upper tape falls after the upper tape breaks. -150m squeezed and accumulated near the connecting lane, the lower tape is not burning; the downward tape falls below the position of the -75m connecting lane, and the lower downward tape does not burn; there is an obvious small gap in the rubber sleeve of the steel wire rope inside the return roller at the fire point, which is directly opposite In an avoiding chamber, no combustible debris in the chamber has any signs of burning or overfire. There are obvious signs of demarcation in the area of burning within 5m above this place.
6. The situation of the compressed air self-rescue system and compressed oxygen self-rescuer in the accident area.
+175m入风大巷N2# The head of the belt transportation lane from vice-shimen to 2324-1 coal face is the air intake and belt transportation of the 2324-1 coal face. There is no burning trace on the site. The working face and the Shimen area are Install a set of compressed air self-rescue devices at an interval of 50m, each group of 5 or 6, in which two breathing apparatus pipes in one set of devices are twisted with no pressure air, and the rest of the breathing apparatus can be used normally; 2324-1 coal mining face enters Fengshimen found that 5 ZYX45 isolated compressed oxygen self-rescuers have been used, and 4 have not been opened for use; no traces of burning N3 coal carrying up the mountain were seen at the scene, and a compressed air self-rescue device was installed. +100m transport belt lane air flow is reversed to enter + The 100m Maokou Lane was moved to N3 to transport coal uphill, which led to difficulties for the belt department at this location.
7. Other circumstances.
No burning traces were seen in the section –75m—–225m of the No. 2 high-incline belt lane, only the floating coal and gangue on the bottom plate, and the unfired belt accumulated on the tail of the machine had obvious wear marks, and the floating coal and gangue accumulated in the belt lane, –75—+5m The section is particularly prominent; no burning marks are seen in the tail section of the 225m machine, only floating coal and gangue are seen in the bottom plate; the belt slips to the tail of the machine due to breakage, causing the tailstock to slide more than 10 meters; there are signs of belt wear on the site.
(3) Conveyor belt situation
After checking the "Product Sales Contract", the coal was transported to the mountain using the ST/S 2500–1000×(8+7.2+8) steel wire rope core flame-retardant pattern conveyor belt produced by Shenyang Shenqiao Belt Manufacturing Co., Ltd., and the coal mine safety mark certificate number MIB070213, valid from June 30, 2015 to June 30, 2020.
The tape was purchased on July 27, 2018, and was put into use on January 5, 2019. It had been used for 20 months at the time of the accident.
After the accident, the accident investigation team took two samples of the unburned part of the No. 2 high-inclination tape to transport coal uphill at the scene of the accident, and commissioned the National Coal Mine Dust Ventilation and Safety Product Quality Supervision and Inspection Center to appraise the qualified performance of the tape.
The result of one sample inspection report (No. DF20206401) was that the "roller friction test" was unqualified, and the result of the other sample inspection report (No. DF20206402) was that the "roller friction test" and the "alcohol blowtorch burning test" were unqualified.
(4) Overview of the accident area
The disaster-affected area and the affected area mainly include the 2324-1 coal mining face, the second mining area N3# coal transportation uphill, the third level No. 2 large inclination belt coal transportation uphill, the third level and the third mining area +5mS boundary stone gate and +5m main entrance Wind lane, third level, No. 2 large dip belt coal uphill +5m coal bunker, –75m coal bunker, –150m coal bunker and connecting lanes.
The fatalities in the accident were mainly 2324-1 coal mining face workers.
This mining face mines the K3b coal seam, which belongs to the protected seam face. It is located between N2#下座石门 to N4# Shimen in the +175m to +240m section of the second level of the second mining area, with a strike length of 572m and an inclination length of 133-141m. The average is 138m, the inclination of the coal seam is 33-35°, the average is 34°, the coal thickness is 2.0-3.3m, and the average is 2.5m.
The working face has an independent ventilation system, full negative pressure U-shaped ventilation, equipped with CH₄ and CO sensors, and 6 sets of compressed air self-rescuers in the air inlet lane.
Starting from November 2019, until September 26, 2020, there will be 65m remaining in the air return lane at the working face and 42m remaining in the transportation lane.
On duty of the accident (from 22:00 on September 26 to 6:00 on September 27, 2020), 18 people attended the 2324-1 coal face and entered the well at 21 on September 26.
The main work of this shift is to cut coal and adjust the support of the working face.
Third, the situation of the superior coal mine company
(1) Chongqing Energy Investment Group
Chongqing Energy Investment Group was formed by the integration of the original Chongqing Coal (Group) Co., Ltd., Chongqing Construction Investment Company, and Chongqing Gas Group Co., Ltd. in 2007. It integrates energy investment, development, construction, operation and service. Large city-owned key state-owned enterprises.
The group company has 10 leadership team members including chairman, general manager, chairman of the board of supervisors, deputy general manager, financial director, chairman of the labor union, and secretary of the Commission for Discipline Inspection. Among them, there is 1 deputy general manager in charge of safety and technology work; 2 are equipped The deputy chief engineer, 1 person in charge of safety work, 1 person in charge of science and technology work; a safety supervision and management department has been set up, with 10 staff and 10 people on duty, responsible for the group's safety supervision and management and scientific and technological information management.
The group company has 15 subsidiaries and branches including Yuxin Energy Company and Trading Company.
(2) Yuxin Energy Company
1. The origin of the company.
On September 7, 2017, the 7th plenary meeting of the Special Reform Group for State-owned Enterprises and Improving the Basic Economic System of Chongqing Municipality reviewed and approved the Chongqing Energy Investment Group's "Deepening Reform, Transformation and Development Plan".
On December 28, 2017, the Chongqing State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission "Approval on Approving the Establishment of Chongqing Energy Investment Yu New Energy Co., Ltd." (Yu Guozi [2017] No. 687) approved Chongqing Energy Investment Group to establish Yu New Energy Company.
2. The nature of the company and its affiliated enterprises.
Yuxin Energy Co., Ltd. is a wholly state-owned legal person-owned company with a registered capital of 3 billion yuan. It is a new type of comprehensive energy company integrating coal and power production and sales. There are currently 12 clean energy companies, Songzao Power Company, and power sales companies. 25 production and operation units including production coal mines (including Songzao coal mine).
The coal production capacity is 10.3 million tons per year.
3. The company's license status.
The business license was obtained on December 28, 2017, and the business period was from December 28, 2017 to permanent, the legal representative Yang Zuhong, and the unified corporate credit code 91500222MA5YPXJC27. The safety production license was obtained on May 18, 2018, with the number (Chongqing) MK Security Xu Zhengzi [2018] 1800001.
4. Company organization and staffing.
The company is equipped with a total of 10 members of the leadership team including the chairman, general manager, chairman of the board of supervisors, secretary of the discipline inspection committee, chairman of the labor union and deputy general managers. It has set up 17 agencies including a comprehensive office, a production technology department, a mechanical power department, and a safety supervision and management department. The working organization consists of 3 district safety management centers.
(3) Songzao Safety Management Center
1. The origin of the center and the positioning of its functions and responsibilities.
The predecessor of the Songzao Safety Management Center was the Songzao Management Center established in January 2018.
In January 2020, it was changed to the Songzao Safety Management Center (hereinafter referred to as the Songzao Center).
The coal mines under its jurisdiction include five pairs of mines: Songzao Coal Mine, Datong No. 1 Coal Mine, Shihao Coal Mine, Yuyang Coal Mine, and Fengchun Coal Mine, with a total approved production capacity of 6.5 million tons per year.
In March 2020, the "Notice on the Authorized Positioning, Jurisdiction and Functional Responsibilities of the Safety Management Center" issued by Yuxin Energy Company (Yuxin Energy Fa [2020] No. 159) clarified that Songzao Center was authorized by Yuxin Energy Company As a regional safety supervision agency dispatched by the company, it exercises safety supervision functions and responsibilities on behalf of the company. It is the main body of the company's internal supervision of coal mine safety in its jurisdiction, and it is responsible for supervision of coal mine safety in its jurisdiction.
2. The organization and staffing of the center.
The center currently has 26 staff on staff and 3 divisions, including 7 general divisions, which are mainly responsible for supervising the establishment of coal mine safety management institutions under its jurisdiction, staffing, basic information management, emergency rescue, safety training, comprehensive office, etc.; Supervise 7 people in the first division, responsible for the safety supervision of mining roof, mechanical and electrical transportation, and "three preventions" in rainy season; supervise 8 people in the second division, responsible for "one ventilation and three preventions", monitoring and water safety supervision.
4. Accident occurrence, report, emergency rescue and aftermath handling
(1) The accident happened
On the night shift on September 27, 374 people entered the mine, and Chen Zhikun, the deputy safety director, went down to take the shift.
When the accident was on duty, the first electromechanical team arranged for Gui Huanxue and other 7 people to install chutes and clean the floating coal in the section from –150m to –75m on the No. 2 high-inclination belt conveyor. Deng Xiaobin was responsible for monitoring the operation of the No. 2 high-inclination belt conveyor.
The other main working locations in the mine on duty of the accident are: 2324-1, 3231S, 3222S, 3213S and other 4 coal mining face cutting operations, 3311S coal mining face installation operations, 3311N coal mining face construction anchor net beam cable, supplementary installation Pretreatment operations such as gangue nets; excavation operations at 11 locations including the main air return lanes in the fifth and sixth districts, and the downhill lanes on the No. 3 pedestrian; construction at 8 locations including 3223N Yunxiang 9# drilling field and 3232N Fengxiang 3# drilling field Gas drainage drilling operations.
At 22:34 on September 26, the No. 2 large inclination tape was started up.
At 0:19 on the 27th, Deng Xiaobin, a monitoring worker for the operation of the No. 2 belt conveyor with a large inclination angle (died in the accident), discovered that there was a problem with the tape (the specific problem was not explained in the telephone recording), and called Zhang Na, the on-duty officer of the ground control center, to stop. Zone large inclination tape runs.
At 0:20, he reported to Wang Anwei, the deputy captain of the mechanical and electrical team on duty, that No. 2 coal was being transported uphill at a large inclination angle and smoke was going to check.
At 0:21, Sun Chunmiao, a ventilation dispatcher on duty, heard an alarm from the safety monitoring system and found that the upper limit of the +5m coal bunker exceeded the limit by 154ppm and quickly rose to 1000ppm. He immediately reported to the mine dispatcher Yu Jibin, and Yu Jibin immediately called Notify Zhang Na, an on-duty officer of the Centralized Control Center, to stop the operation of the high-inclination belt conveyor (it has been shut down before).
He saw that the video of the monitoring +5m reprinting point was white and foggy, and he immediately called and asked Cao Dong, the driver of the second coal mining team (3231S mining face), who was repairing the hydraulic pump of the second coal mining team (3231S) near the upper mouth of the +5m coal bunker.
Cao Dong saw black smoke gushing from the +5m coal bunker to the 3231S coal mining face. At the same time, he heard the continuous alarm of the CO sensor at the top of the +5m coal bunker. He interrupted the call after informing "CO exceeded the standard" on the phone and immediately called to inform him. The second coal mining team (3231S mining face) withdrew, but because no one answered the phone of the second coal mining team, a voice signal was used to notify the working face to withdraw.
Since then, underground worker Gui Huanxue reported on the –150m telephone that there was an open fire in the middle and upper part of the mountain carrying coal on the No. 2 large dip tape. Yu Jibin arranged for him to quickly contact the team to evacuate people, and at the same time reported the accident to the duty dispatcher Liang Bangbin.
After receiving the telephone report, Liang Bangbin immediately rushed to the dispatch room to command Yu Jibin to notify all areas of the mine to withdraw people, and in turn reported the accident situation to the mine leader Zhang Ze on duty, Qiu Wuqing, deputy head of the electromechanical mine, and Li Qigang, the head of mine.
After Yu Jibin reported the accident to Liang Bangbin, he telephoned the driver of the hydraulic pump closest to the 3231S coal mining team, and Cao Dong quickly informed the withdrawal, but because no one answered the phone, he dialed the working face of the coal mining team. Zhang Bo, a worker in Huifeng Alley, quickly evacuated with his workers after receiving the call.
After Yu Jibin reported the accident by telephone to Chen Zhikun, the leader of the underground mining team, he continued to call the third coal mining team (2324-1 working face), but because there was no answer, he urgently notified the third coal mining team's ground duty personnel to call the working face to withdraw people. , And then notified other areas of the mine to withdraw people, and called the Songzao Mine Rescue Team to the mine for rescue.
From 0:40 to 1:00, the mine leaders and relevant department heads rushed to the dispatching room successively, set up an accident rescue headquarters, activated the emergency rescue plan, counted the underground personnel, and prepared for emergency rescue work such as underground people and vehicles.
As of 10:15 on September 27, 358 of the 374 people who entered the well on duty in the accident have successively exited the well from the No. 5 air intake shaft and the +335m main flat tunnel; as of 13:51, all 16 victims were transported to the surface.
(2) The incident report process
Songzao Coal Mine reported the accident to Songzao Safety Management Center at 1:09, Yuxin Energy Company at 1:20, and reported the accident to Yunan Supervision Bureau at 5:20 and Qijiang District Emergency Bureau at 5:28. Happening.
Yuxin Energy Company reported the accident to Chongqing Energy Investment Group at 3:10, and Chongqing Coal Mine Safety Supervision Bureau at 4:41.
Chongqing Energy Investment Group reported the accident to the Chongqing Coal Mine Safety Supervision Bureau and the Municipal Emergency Bureau at 4:51, the Municipal SASAC at 5:06, and the Municipal Party Committee and the Municipal Government at 6:23.
In accordance with Article 9 of Chapter II of the Regulations on Reporting, Investigation and Handling of Production Safety Accidents (Order No. 493 of the State Council): “After receiving the report, the person in charge of the unit shall report to the people’s government at or above the county level where the accident occurred for safety production supervision According to the requirements of the management department and relevant departments with responsibility for safety production supervision and management, Songzao Coal Mine did not report the accident within the prescribed time limit.
(3) Emergency rescue situation
At 1:05 on September 27, 2020, Yu New Energy's Songzao Mine Rescue Team Duty Tang Yi received an accident call from Songzao Coal Mine Dispatcher Yu Jibin, and Songzao Team Captain Mu Anbin immediately led 3 ambulances A team of 23 officers and soldiers rushed to Songzao Coal Mine.
At 1:30, the first batch of three teams entered the well for search and rescue; at 2:40, 7 people in distress were found at the +5m进风巷2# pedestrian suspension vehicle. The ambulance team immediately carried out emergency treatment. The wounded were transported out of the well at 4:10.
Subsequently, the Rescue Headquarters organized Songzao and Nantong Mine Rescue Brigade, a total of 15 teams, entered the well in three batches and arrived at the –75 m elevation No. 2 large inclination belt to carry coal up the mountain and adjacent areas to carry out fire-fighting search and rescue from bottom to top. Search and rescue, organized the evacuation of 78 people out of the well safely.
At 7:35, the damper of the +175m Maokou Lane and the 2# high-incline coal uphill connecting lane was successfully closed, and 3 victims were detected in Maokou Lane at +175m; at 8:05, at +175m Maokou Lane was taped One victim was found south of the conveyor nose; then 10 people and one person in distress were found in +175m Maokou Lane 2# Shimen Belt Lane. The distressed persons were transported out of the well at 10:15.
At 12:30, a victim was found in the +5m to +80m section of the No. 2 high-inclination belt; at 12:42, a victim was found at the head of the +100mN3# belt in the second area.
At this point, all the trapped personnel have been searched.
At 13:51, the rescue team transported all the 16 miners who died out of the well, and the rescue work at the scene of the accident ended.
A total of 18 teams and 130 ambulance officers and soldiers were dispatched to rescue the accident. After 12 hours and 46 minutes, they put out a fire and rescued. A total of 86 people in distress were searched and rescued, and a total of 16 people in distress were searched and rescued. .
(4) Accident casualties
After investigation and verification, the accident caused 16 deaths and 42 injuries.
According to the "Appraisal Certificate" [Qi Gong Jian (Pathology) [2020] 0034] issued by the Physical Evidence Appraisal Office of the Public Security Bureau of Qijiang District, Chongqing City on October 17, 2020, the corpse of the deceased Deng Xiaobin was burned to death, and the corpses of the other 15 people died of carbon monoxide poisoning. .
(5) The aftermath
After the accident, as of October 6, 2020, the aftermath of the 16 miners has been completely dealt with; 38 of the injured have been discharged from the hospital, and 4 have been hospitalized in stable conditions, and the social order in the mining area is stable.
5. The cause and nature of the accident
(1) The direct cause of the accident
Coal gangue piled up under the belt of No. 2 large inclination coal transportation in Songzao Coal Mine, the ignition point – the return roller at the 63.3m elevation was stuck, worn through to form a gap, and pulverized coal was deposited inside; the heavily worn tape and the ignition point return support Roller sliding friction generates high temperature and sparks, which ignites the accumulation of pulverized coal in the gap of the return roller; the belt conveyor operation monitor finds an abnormal condition of the tape, and calls the ground control center to stop the tape operation. After an emergency shutdown, the static tape is ignited. Unqualified flame retardant performance, large roadway inclination, upward ventilation, increased fire intensity, causing mixed combustion of belt and coal; fire burned equipment, damaged ventilation facilities, and produced toxic and harmful high-temperature flue gas quickly spread to 2324-1 coal mining face, causing Heavy casualties.
(2) The indirect cause of the accident
1. The mine focuses on production and light on safety.
Songzao Coal Mine No. 2 high inclination belt was replaced and put into use in January 2019. The belt was actually worn for 1 year and 8 months. The belt is responsible for the coal transportation task of the 4 working faces of the mine, so it does not affect the mine. Normal production, the mine is planned to be replaced during the National Day shutdown and maintenance period.
On September 2, 2020, the captain of the first electromechanical team used the coal mine OA office system to report in writing to the coal mine's electromechanical deputy chief, electromechanical deputy chief engineer, electromechanical transportation section chief and other relevant personnel in writing that there was a lot of floating coal in the No. 2 large dip belt lane, and the return journey The rollers and the upper bracket were seriously damaged and deformed and other problems and hidden dangers, but the relevant personnel did not immediately reply.
On September 3, after the captain of the first electromechanical team reported related problems and hidden dangers to the mine manager through the coal mine OA office system, the captain and branch secretary of the electromechanical first team reported the above problems and hidden dangers to the electromechanical deputy mine manager and mine manager.[1] .
On September 5, the coal mine manager called the deputy head of the electromechanical mine to wait until the No. 2 high-angle belt coal was transported up the mountain for an on-site meeting, and decided to rectify the No. 2 high-angle belt coal uphill, but it was required that the rectification work should not affect the belt coal transportation; 9 On the 6th, the Deputy Mine Manager of Mechanical and Electrical came to the site again to hold a meeting to study and implement the rectification work.
However, the lack of awareness of the red line of mine-level leaders and the emphasis on production over safety did not implement cessation of production and rectification, which caused the hidden dangers of the belt conveyor lane to not be completely eliminated, resulting in accidents [2].
2. The mine safety management is chaotic.
No. 2 large inclination coal conveyor belt to prevent the gangue from falling. The daily maintenance of the gangue shed to prevent the gangue from falling out is not timely, deformed and damaged, resulting in serious coal sprinkling during the belt operation, and it is not cleaned up in time, resulting in a lot of coal gangue accumulation at the lower part of the belt, burying or even jamming. Rollers, a few return rollers were ground and worn out, the severely worn belts and the stuck return rollers sliding friction and caught fire[3]; Songzao Coal Mine did not check the floating coal accumulation and metal gangue under the belt as required If the shed is damaged, the business security is not in place [4].
Regarding the long-standing problem of the belt lane, coal mine safety inspectors failed to discover and eliminate hidden dangers in time, which caused the belt to run "with disease" for a long time [5].
The reliability of emergency rescue equipment is poor. According to the site investigation of the accident area, the air pressure self-rescue device has the situation that the mask air supply pipe is too soft, easy to age, kinks, etc., and there is water in the air supply pipe of the air pressure self-rescue device; 12 units of compressed oxygen have been used In the self-rescuer, 1 switch was damaged, 3 leaked, and 2 pressure gauges were damaged [6].
3. The safety supervision and management responsibilities of Songzao Safety Management Center are not implemented.
Safety risk analysis, identification and assessment are not comprehensive, and the fire risk of belt conveyor belts in mines has not been analyzed and judged [7].
Inadequate supervision and management of mine safety, in-depth investigation and management of hidden hazards, incomplete safety inspections, and poor pertinence. Since the beginning of this year, Songzao Center has conducted 90 inspections of Songzao Coal Mine. [8].
After the belt conveyor broken in other coal mines of Yuxin Energy Company, the company requested the center to include the steel cord belt conveyor into the scope of supervision in the notification of the accident, but the center did not comply with the requirements of the company’s notification for the No. 2 steel wire rope for transporting coal uphill. The core belt conveyor is inspected [9].
4. The safety management of Yuxin Energy Company is weakened.
The management responsibilities of the company's business departments and the safety management center are not clear, and the powers and responsibilities are not unified, resulting in failure to implement safety responsibilities [10].
In recent years, accidents have occurred frequently, and the lessons learned from accidents are not profound, and effective measures have not been taken to strengthen and improve coal mine safety production [11].
The machine transportation safety management system is not perfect, and the coal mine is not carefully urged to carry out comprehensive investigation and management of hidden dangers, resulting in the accumulation of floating coal gangue on the belt conveyor, the damage of the roller, and the serious wear of the belt. The hidden dangers have not been eliminated in time [12].
After the belt conveyor broken belt and shaft broken accidents occurred in other coal mines of the company, although the accident notification was issued, it did not comprehensively investigate and rectify the hidden dangers of the belt conveyor accident [13].
5. Chongqing Energy Investment Group's supervision and urging of coal mine safety production management responsibilities are not in place.
The group implements four-level management of coal mine safety, with overlapping functions, unclear responsibilities, and weaker implementation of responsibilities[14]; in recent years, coal mine accidents have occurred frequently, and the lessons of accidents have not been learned deeply. It has not held regular safety production meetings in accordance with group regulations and has not carefully analyzed Solve the systemic problems and deep-seated contradictions of the passive situation of production safety[15]; neglect the management of the coal mine safety work of Yuxin Energy Company, and fail to follow the group regulations for serious injuries or major non-injury and above accidents that have occurred in recent years.[16] The secondary company shall be notified and accountable.
The management index is unreasonable, and there are many production heads in the mine [17].
6. The quality of the tape used by the belt conveyor is unqualified.
After sampling the tape for inspection at the accident site and a special investigation on the tape procurement link, the tape was a counterfeit and inferior product; Chongqing Energy Investment Group Materials Co., Ltd. has problems such as imperfect material procurement system, procurement inquiry and delivery inspection violations.
7. The effectiveness of territorial management and supervision is not high.
Insufficient supervision of Chongqing Energy Investment Group's lessons learned from accidents and the gradual weakening of safety responsibilities, supervision and guidance of coal mine enterprises' safety risk research and judgment and hidden danger investigation and management are not comprehensive enough, and the promotion of coal mine enterprises' implementation of the main responsibility of safe production is not strong enough [18].
(3) Nature of the accident
After investigation, it was determined that the “September 27” major fire accident in Songzao Coal Mine of Chongqing Nengtou Yu New Energy Co., Ltd. was a production safety liability accident.
6. Suggestions on handling the responsible personnel and responsible units related to the accident
Regarding the issues concerning the performance of duties of public officials of local party committees, relevant departments, and state-owned enterprises discovered during the accident investigation, they have been transferred to the "September 27" Major Safety Accident Review and Investigation Team of the Songzao Coal Mine of the Chongqing Municipal Commission for Discipline Inspection.
The party and government disciplinary sanctions of relevant personnel and the handling opinions of relevant units shall be put forward by the Chongqing Municipal Commission for Discipline Inspection; persons suspected of criminal offenses shall be transferred by the Chongqing Municipal Commission for Discipline Inspection to judicial organs for handling.
The unit responsible for the accident and the relevant personnel shall be given administrative penalties in accordance with the "Safety Production Law of the People's Republic of China" and other relevant laws and regulations.
The safety production management of Songzao Coal Mine is chaotic, the hidden danger investigation and management are not in place, the production is more important than the safety, and the major accident that caused 16 deaths, 42 injuries, and direct economic losses of 25.01 million yuan, in accordance with the "Production Safety Accident Penalty Regulations (Trial)" According to Article 16 (2) and Article 18 (3), it is recommended to fine Songzao Coal Mine of 3 million yuan and impose a fine of 60% of the previous year's annual income on the mine chief.
Regarding the violation of late reporting of accidents, in accordance with Article 11 (2) of the "Provisions on Penalties for Fines for Production Safety Accidents (Trial)", it is recommended that the mine chief impose a fine of 60% of the previous year's annual income.
According to the "Implementation Measures for Joint Punishment of Untrustworthy Acts in the Field of Work Safety" (General Administration Office of Safety Supervision (2017) No. 49), Article 2, Item (1), Item (6), and Article 3, it is recommended to relax Zao Coal Mine and its main persons in charge are included in the "blacklist" management of joint punishment targets and poor production safety records.
The problem of unqualified tape quality has been transferred to the public security organ for filing and handling in accordance with Article 26 of the "Regulations on Reporting, Investigation and Handling of Production Safety Accidents" (State Council Order No. 493).
7. Suggestions on accident prevention measures
(1) In-depth study and implementation of General Secretary Xi Jinping's important instructions on safe production, and firmly establish the concept of safe development.
The party committees, governments, relevant departments, and coal mining enterprises in coal-producing districts and counties must combine the current severe situation and outstanding problems of coal mine safety work, thoroughly study and implement the spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important instructions on safe production, and deeply learn from Songzao Coal Mine’s "9· Lessons from the 27" major fire accident, and firmly established the concept of safe development.
Earnestly implement the "Regulations on the Safety Production Responsibility System for Local Party and Government Leaders", strengthen organizational leadership, improve systems and mechanisms, and ensure that coal mine safety responsibilities are in place.
It is necessary to correctly handle the relationship between safety and development, strictly implement the requirements of "safety in the industry, safety in the business, and safety in the production and operation", and perform their duties with due diligence.
Effectively strengthen the awareness of political responsibility and responsibility of state-owned coal mining enterprises, always put the safety of miners in the first place, deeply understand the arduous and complex urgency of coal mine safety production, and continuously improve coal mine safety guarantee capabilities.
Carry out large-scale training and assessment of safety performance of the city's coal mine leaders, and cancel the qualifications for those who fail the assessment according to regulations.
(2) Solidly promote the three-year action of special rectification of coal mine safety, and strive to fundamentally eliminate potential safety hazards.
The party committees and governments of all coal-producing districts and counties must improve their political positions, strengthen overall awareness, and effectively strengthen the overall leadership, supervision and guidance of the three-year special rectification of coal mine safety, to promote the high-quality development of coal mine safety as the main line, and continue to promote coal mine safety governance Modernization of systems and governance capabilities.
Relevant departments should strengthen inspection, guidance and supervision, "open small focus" over key areas and key enterprises, and strive to resolve outstanding and common problems in their own regions and departments.
Continue to deepen source governance, systematic governance and comprehensive governance to effectively resolve major security risks.
Coal mining enterprises should aim to "fundamentally eliminate hidden accidents" and focus on key difficulties and systematic and in-depth issues such as ideology, implementation of responsibilities, standardized management, foundation improvement, risk prevention and control, and disaster management. Responsibility, benchmarking and metering, steadily promote the implementation of rectification and reform, and continuously improve the intrinsic safety level of coal mines.
(3) Fully implement the main responsibility of coal mine enterprises for production safety, and earnestly strengthen coal mine safety management.
Adhere to the rule of law thinking, establish a safety production responsibility system for all employees with "clear responsibilities, responsibility at all levels, and everyone's responsibility", and improve the safety production responsibility operating mechanism of "accountability, accountability, performance, and accountability".
Effectively strengthen the prevention and control of coal mine safety risks, and carry out in-depth investigation and management of hidden dangers, so as to achieve full coverage and no blind spots.
Continue to promote the construction of "one quality, three reductions" and "four modernizations" in coal mines, no more than 2 coal seam mining and coal mining face with an annual output of 450,000 tons, and multiple coal seam mining and coal mines with an annual output of 450,000 tons no more than 3 A.
Strengthen staff training and personnel training, strengthen emergency response plan drills, and continue to strengthen the basic work of coal mine safety.
Continue to deepen the management of major disasters such as coal mine gas, water damage, and spontaneous fire, and resolutely prevent and curb serious coal mine accidents.
(4) Strictly manage mechanical and electrical transportation and improve the level of safety assurance.
Improve the mechanical and electrical transportation management system, and strictly control the gates of equipment procurement, well testing, installation acceptance, and operation management.
Strengthen the overhaul and maintenance of facilities and equipment, daily maintenance, regular inspections, adjustment tests, and hidden danger investigation and management, and strictly prevent the "diseased" operation of equipment.
Strengthen standardization and dynamic compliance, and improve the on-site operating environment.
For large-incline belt transportation, safety protection devices and facilities are improved from the design source to ensure compliance with norms and standards.
For long-distance, high-inclination belt transportation, densely arranged smoke, temperature, CO and other monitoring and early warning devices to improve the level of security.
(5) Strengthen safety production supervision and further enhance the effectiveness of supervision and supervision.
Firmly establish the awareness of the rule of law and strictly perform statutory duties.
Improve work style, improve supervision methods, enhance law enforcement capabilities, and work hard to promote strict and precise law enforcement.
Keep a close eye on the “critical minority” such as the main person in charge, technical person in charge, and safety management personnel of the enterprise, and use the problems found on the spot to dig into the deep-seated problems behind the hidden dangers, and comprehensively use interviews and notifications, economic penalties, suspension of production rectification, and rectification. Measures such as credit reporting system, joint punishment, "blacklist" management, reporting, investigation, and rewards, increase administrative penalties and accountability, and strengthen the deterrence of supervision, supervision and law enforcement.
A coal mine accident warning education meeting was held, and the work of warning and promoting reforms was carried out in a down-to-earth manner.
Continue to promote the elimination of outdated production capacity in coal mines, promote the high-quality development of coal mines, and promote the stable improvement of coal mine safety production.
Songzao Coal Mine of Chongqing Nengtou Yu New Energy Co., Ltd.
"September 27" Major Fire Incident Investigation Team
Songzao Coal Mine of Chongqing Nengtou Yu New Energy Co., Ltd.
Persons responsible for the "September 27" major fire accident
Handling situation
On September 27, 2020, a major fire accident occurred in the Songzao Coal Mine of Chongqing Nengtou Yu New Energy Co., Ltd., causing 16 deaths, 42 injuries and direct economic losses of 25.01 million yuan.
The accident investigation team determined that the “September 27” major fire accident at Songzao Coal Mine of Chongqing Nengtou Yu New Energy Co., Ltd. was a production safety liability accident.
In accordance with the work deployment of the Municipal Party Committee, the Municipal Commission for Discipline Inspection established the Chongqing Nengtou Yu New Energy Co., Ltd. Songzao Coal Mine "September 27" major fire accident review and investigation team, and held accountability in accordance with regulations, disciplines and laws.
Pursuant to relevant regulations such as the "Accountability Regulations of the Communist Party of China", "The Regulations on Disciplinary Actions of the Communist Party of China", "The Supervision Law of the People's Republic of China" and the "Law of the People's Republic of China on Governmental Sanctions of Public Officials" and other relevant provisions, with approval, the suspected violations of discipline, illegal duties, and duties in the accident The 37 public officials who committed the crime are held accountable seriously.
In accordance with the management authority of cadres, the Chongqing Municipal Disciplinary Inspection and Supervision Agency handled 34 responsible personnel from Chongqing Energy Investment Group Co., Ltd., the Municipal State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, the Municipal Emergency Management Bureau, and the Qijiang District People’s Government. Among them, 4 were subject to disciplinary inspections for serious violations of discipline and law. The supervisory agency filed a case for review and investigation, and transferred it to the judicial agency for criminal responsibility. 22 public officials were given party discipline and government sanctions for negligence of duty and 8 were organized and dealt with.
The three responsible personnel of the Chongqing Coal Mine Safety Supervision Bureau involved in the accident were transferred to the Disciplinary Inspection and Supervision Team of the Emergency Management Department of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection in accordance with the cadre management authority.
1. Handling personnel transferred to judicial organs (4 persons)
1. Yang Bo, Chief of the Mechanical and Electrical Transportation Section of Songzao Coal Mine, Chongqing Nengtou Yu New Energy Co., Ltd., was expelled from the party and public office, and transferred to the judicial authority for handling.
2. Qiu Wuqing, member of the Party Committee and deputy director of Songzao Coal Mine of Chongqing Nengtou Yu New Energy Co., Ltd., was expelled from the party and public office, and transferred to the judicial authority for handling.
3. Li Qigang, member of the Party Committee and mine director of Songzao Coal Mine of Chongqing Nengtou Yu New Energy Co., Ltd., was expelled from the party and from public office, and transferred to the judicial authority for handling.
4. Hu Minli, deputy director of the Supply Department of Chongqing Energy Investment Group Materials Co., Ltd., was expelled from the party, expelled from public office, and transferred to the judicial authority for handling.
Second, give party discipline and government sanctions and organize handling personnel (30 people)
(1) City management cadres (6 people)
1. Li Wenshu, member of the party committee and deputy general manager of Chongqing Energy Investment Group Co., Ltd., was given a disciplinary sanction for major demerits and removed from the posts of party committee member and deputy general manager.
2. Zhao Zicheng, deputy secretary and general manager of the Party Committee of Chongqing Energy Investment Group Co., Ltd., was given a government warning.
3. Liu Dezhong, Secretary of the Party Committee and Chairman of Chongqing Energy Investment Group Co., Ltd., gave serious warnings to the party and removed the posts of Secretary of the Party Committee and Chairman of the Board.
4. Jiang Huajiang, member of the Party Leadership Group and Deputy District Mayor of the People's Government of Qijiang District, Chongqing City, ordered a written inspection to the People's Government of Chongqing City.
5. Liu Guangcai, deputy director of the Chongqing Emergency Management Bureau, gave written warnings.
6. Shi Jidong, member and deputy director of the Chongqing Municipal SASAC Party Committee, ordered a written inspection to the Chongqing Municipal People’s Government.
(2) Enterprises and related personnel (24 people)
1. Yang Xiaoping, Deputy Chief Safety Engineer (and Chief of Safety Supervision Section) of Songzao Coal Mine of Chongqing Nengtou Yu New Energy Co., Ltd., was given a one-year party inspection and administrative dismissal.
2. Zhang Hedong, Secretary of the Party Committee of Songzao Coal Mine of Chongqing Nengtou Yu New Energy Co., Ltd., was given sanctions of removal from party positions and government affairs.
3. Chen Zhikun, member of the Party Committee and Deputy Mine Director of Songzao Coal Mine of Chongqing Nengtou Yu New Energy Co., Ltd., was given sanctions of removal from the party and government affairs.
4. Luo Lunzhong, deputy chief engineer of Songzao Coal Mine Electromechanical Engineering of Chongqing Nengtou Yu New Energy Co., Ltd., gave serious warnings to the party and government dismissal.
5. Zhang Guoping, member of the Party Committee, Deputy Mine Director and Chief Engineer of Songzao Coal Mine of Chongqing Nengtou Yu New Energy Co., Ltd., was given an administrative warning.
6. Tu Xingyue, Deputy Director of the Supervision Division I of the Former Songzao Safety Management Center of Chongqing Nengtou Yu New Energy Co., Ltd., gave serious warnings within the party and sanctions of government dismissal.
7. Yan Xuerong, Deputy Director (presiding over the work) of the First Supervision Division of the Former Songzao Safety Management Center of Chongqing Energy Investment and Yu New Energy Co., Ltd., was given a demotion of government affairs.
8. Zhang Fengqin, member and deputy director of the Party General Branch of the Former Songzao Safety Management Center of Chongqing Nengtou Yu New Energy Co., Ltd., was given a government downgrade sanction.
9. Wei Yuwan, director of the original Songzao Safety Management Center of Chongqing Nengtou Yu New Energy Co., Ltd., was punished by government affairs.
10. Yang Zuhong, Secretary of the Party Committee and Chairman of Chongqing Nengtou Yu New Energy Co., Ltd., gave serious warnings to the party and sanctions for serious political demerits.
11. Li Zongfu, deputy secretary and general manager of the party committee of Chongqing Energy Investment and Yu New Energy Co., Ltd., gave serious warnings to the party and sanctions for serious political demerits.
12. Hu Wei, the head of the Mechanical Power Department of Chongqing Nengtou Yu New Energy Co., Ltd., was punished by the government affairs recorder.
13. Li Renyuan, the head of the Safety Supervision and Management Department of Chongqing Nengtou Yu New Energy Co., Ltd., was given a disciplinary sanction for government affairs.
14. Liao Yefeng, Deputy Chief Electrical Engineer (former Minister of Mechanical Power Department) of Chongqing Nengtou Yu New Energy Co., Ltd., was given a political penalty.
15. Xu Gang, member of the party committee and deputy general manager of Chongqing Nengtou Yu New Energy Co., Ltd., was given a political penalty.
16. Chen Hong, member of the Party Committee and Deputy General Manager of Chongqing Nengtou Yu New Energy Co., Ltd., was given a political penalty.
17. Chen Chaohe, the head of the Safety Supervision and Management Department of Chongqing Energy Investment Group Co., Ltd., was removed from the post of minister.
18. Jiang Qingyu, Chongqing Qijiang District Emergency Management Bureau dispatched to Chongqing Nengtou Yu New Energy Co., Ltd. Songzao Coal Mine Safety Supervisor, expelled from the party and terminated the labor relationship.
19. Ma Huaqi, Chongqing Qijiang District Emergency Management Bureau dispatched to Chongqing Nengtou Yu New Energy Co., Ltd. Songzao Coal Mine Safety Supervisor to terminate the labor relationship.
20. Li Bin, Chief of the Coal Mine Safety Supervision Section of the Emergency Management Bureau of Qijiang District, Chongqing City, was given an administrative warning.
21. Su Jian, member of the Party Committee of Chongqing Qijiang District Emergency Management Bureau, and political commissar of the Comprehensive Administrative Law Enforcement Detachment of Emergency Management, gave written admonishment.
22. Jiang Zonghua, Secretary of the Party Committee and Director of the Emergency Management Bureau of Qijiang District, Chongqing City, ordered a written inspection to the People's Government of Qijiang District, Chongqing City.
23. Wang Zhili, director of the Coal Mine Safety Supervision and Management Division of Chongqing Emergency Management Bureau, was given a government warning.
24. Wang Wen, Director of the Comprehensive Division of Chongqing SASAC, gave written warnings to deal with.
3. Handling personnel from the Disciplinary Inspection and Supervision Group of the State Supervision Commission of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the Ministry of Emergency Management (3 persons)
1. Hu Jian, director of the Second Safety Supervision Office of the Chongqing Coal Mine Safety Supervision Bureau, Yunan Supervision Branch, was given an administrative warning.
2. Yang Mingwen, member and director of the General Party Branch of the Chongqing Coal Mine Safety Supervision Bureau Yunan Supervision Branch, ordered a written inspection to the Party Group of the Chongqing Coal Mine Safety Supervision Bureau.
3. Zhou Yulian, Director of the Safety Supervision Department of Chongqing Coal Mine Safety Supervision Bureau, has important leadership responsibilities in other safety accidents, and is dealt with together and given administrative warnings.
Songzao Coal Mine of Chongqing Nengtou Yu New Energy Co., Ltd.
"September 27" Major Fire Accident Review and Investigation Team