display

A great victory was needed, and as quickly as possible.

It is true that in mid-March 1943 the Wehrmacht had only just retaken the cities of Kharkov and Belgorod, which had been lost four weeks earlier.

But that was not enough to stabilize the eastern front more or less permanently.

Army Group Center and Army Group South, which had been greatly weakened by the defeat in Stalingrad, could only reach their front lines if they inflicted a definite defeat on the Red Army.

Preferably in a big cauldron battle, like in the late summer of 1941.

However, as is so often the case in war, it was not least a question of timing.

On March 13, 1943, Adolf Hitler had ordered in his Operation Order No. 5 that a pincer attack on Kursk should not take place until after the mud period, i.e. in late spring.

The code name "Citadel" was given for this.

Field Marshal General Erich von Manstein was the strategic head of the Eastern Front

Source: UIG via Getty Images

But Erich von Manstein, Commander-in-Chief of Army Group South and chief strategist of the entire Eastern Front, did not agree with the scheduled date: "I believe that Army Group Center could now take Kursk without any difficulties," he announced on March 18, 1943.

Because “the Russian” there is currently “no longer capable of too much”.

display

Mannstein's interlocutor, Army Chief of Staff Kurt Zeitzler, rejected the suggestion: “The Führer would like an operation from Chuguyev to Isjum.” In this way, a smaller Soviet bridgehead in the front of Army Group South should be eliminated.

Obviously upside-down world: The best strategist in the Wehrmacht wanted the big battle immediately, the dictator and Supreme Commander, who usually only thought big, relied on a smaller operation.

In fact - as shown by the files preserved in the Freiburg military archive of the Federal Archives, which the historian Roman Töppel has evaluated - Manstein submitted.

He ordered his army commanders to prepare a limited offensive to Isjum with the code name "Habicht" for mid-April 1943 according to Hitler's wishes.

Chief of Staff Kurt Zeitzler in conversation with Hitler.

In the background Armaments Minister Speer (center) and the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command Keitel (right)

Source: Getty Images

But the chiefs of staff in charge of the two armies designated for this refused: Several smaller operations in succession in the spring and summer are more exhausting than a large attack.

So the company "Habicht" was enlarged and renamed "Panther".

display

At the same time, however, it became clear that the Stawka, the Soviet General Staff, had recognized the precarious situation of the Red Army in front of and around Kursk and was relocating more and more troops in the front arc, which is around 200 kilometers north-south and 140 kilometers east-west .

The driving forces were the generals

Now the Army High Command decided to prepare all three operations at the same time: “Habicht” and the larger variant “Panther” and “Citadel”.

But the generals of the planned units rejected the first two variants and clearly preferred “Citadel”.

Töppel quotes from Manstein's unpublished personal war diary;

from this it is clear “who were the driving forces behind the implementation of the Citadel operation” - the leading Wehrmacht generals and not, as was always claimed later, Hitler himself.

On April 15, 1943, the dictator complied with the recommendation of his generals and ordered: “As soon as the weather permits, I will be the first of this year's attacks to launch the 'Citadel' attack.” The scheduled date was May 3 .

But Army Group Center warned against this;

Only May 15 is a realistic time for the offensive.

General Walter Model with Adolf Hitler (in the background Wilhelm Keitel)

Source: Gamma-Keystone via Getty Images

display

Now a number of further postponements began: Colonel-General Walter Model, one of Hitler's new favorites in the highest generals, warned on April 27 that the beginning was too rapid and could get stuck in the Soviet position system.

Then came the message from the Armaments Ministry that by June 10, 1943, numerous new tanks, assault guns and anti-tank guns should be available on the Eastern Front.

Hitler scheduled the attack on June 12th.

On June 1, the start was set for June 25, four days later it was brought forward again to June 20 and then announced on June 16 that the announcement was to be expected from June 18.

But on this very day the Wehrmacht command staff recommended that something like Hitler's personal military advisor, headed by Colonel General Alfred Jodl, be postponed until the overall strategic situation was clarified.

"Citadel Enterprise" - Kursk 1943

1 of 14

With two armies, the Wehrmacht wanted to destroy the Soviet armies with the "Operation Citadel", which had turned the front arc around Kursk into a fortress.

Source: Federal Archives

2 of 14

Hitler placed his hopes above all on the new "Panther" tank models (photo) ...

Source: Federal Archives, Image 183-H26258 / CC-BY-SA 3.0

Published under license CC-BY-SA 3.0

3 of 14

... and "Tiger" (photo).

Above all, the “panthers” rolled immaturely from the factory to the train stations and from there to the battlefield.

Source: Federal Archives

4 of 14

Technically, the German tanks were technically superior to their opponents (photo), but not in number: 2,700 German combat vehicles faced almost 9,000 of the Red Army.

Source: picture-alliance / United Archive

5 of 14

In addition, there were Soviet reserves that were placed in the hinterland.

Source: picture-alliance / akg-images

6 of 14

The Soviet leadership tried to stop the German attack with a pre-emptive strike.

The company turned out to be a failure.

Source: picture-alliance / Mary Evans Pi

7 of 14

With their “Tiger” groups, the Wehrmacht was able to penetrate deep into the closely spaced lines of defense.

Source: Federal Archives

8 of 14

But there was no breakthrough.

“It was a laborious and lossy eating through an enormous system of positions, ...

Source: picture-alliance / Mary Evans Pi

9 of 14

... which was littered with mines in the intermediate area and studded with weapons of all kinds and did not want to end ”, says a report.

Source: picture-alliance / United Archive

10 of 14

Even the heavy tank destroyers "Ferdinand" got stuck in the Soviet defensive fire.

The Red Army had positioned more than 30,000 artillery pieces.

Source: picture alliance / akg-images

11 of 14

Although the German troops proved superior in direct duels both on the ground and in the air, the quantity ultimately decided the battle.

Source: Commons: RIA Novosti

12 of 14

Although the Red Army lost around 2,000 combat vehicles to 250 German tanks shot down, the German leadership broke off the fight after eleven days.

Source: Federal Archives

13 of 14

The German personnel losses amounted to 54,000 soldiers, those of the Red Army are estimated at more than 300,000.

Source: picture-alliance / Mary Evans Pi

14 of 14

Destroyed "Panther" near Kursk.

The battle did not mark a decision, but it did symbolize the end of all German Blitzkrieg hopes.

Source: sovietico sconosciuto

Of course, that had exactly the opposite effect: the dictator decided to strike at Kursk as quickly as possible.

The defeat in North Africa, judged by the number of captive soldiers worse than Stalingrad, can no longer be blurred by propaganda, only successes.

It was supposed to start on July 5, 1943.

“We hope that this advance, which is of course spatially limited, will substantially destroy the Bolshevik troop units standing there,” noted Joseph Goebbels in his diary. “The German soldiers actually found out - faster than they would have liked.

Roman Töppel: "Kursk 1943. The greatest battle of the Second World War".

(Schöningh, Paderborn. 289 p., 29.90 euros)

You can also find “World History” on Facebook.

We look forward to a like.

This article was first published in 2018.