Barkhane: in 2020, "a very positive assessment" even if "everything remains fragile" according to General Lecointre

Audio 07:37

François Lecointre, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces on an inspection visit to Mali, flying over the Malian Gourma Desert aboard a British CH47 Chinook.

© RFI / Franck Alexandre

By: Franck Alexandre

17 mins

French General François Lecointre returned on December 12 from a 2-day inspection visit to Niger and Mali, his 7th visit to the Barkhane force's theater of operations.

The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces went to meet French soldiers and their partners from the Malian armed forces.

The opportunity to take stock of military operations one month before the anniversary of the Pau summit, on January 13, when a change in the format of the French intervention could be announced.

General François Lecointre is the guest of RFI.

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RFI: You have just returned from an inspection visit to the Barkhane theater, a 

French army operation in the Sahel and the Sahara.

RFI was at your side.

We were able to see English airmen in Gao, Estonian soldiers.

We also know that the Americans are present alongside the French.

Can we say that France is no longer alone in the Sahel

?

General François Lecointre: 

France is doing everything it can to be as little alone as possible militarily in the Sahel, which is not necessarily very simple, not vis-à-vis the Americans who, consistently and for a long time , understand the interest there is in our fighting together against the terrorist threat developing here in the Sahel.

And since it is a priority for American defense, they are very supportive with us.

On the other hand, the commitment of the Europeans is something quite new, in particular in the operational field called kinetics, that is to say the fact of going into combat.

The Europeans are now engaged since 2012, in a training engagement of the Malian army and it is the first time, thanks to Takuba [European force] that we manage to train the Europeans to engage in combat missions that carry risk, and that's pretty positive.

It is still progressive, we must continue to work on this.

But in any case, I think that gives us a fairly favorable outlook.

In my opinion, internationalizing things and doing it with Europeans has several advantages.

The first is to share the burden, because it is a financial burden, it is a burden of risks, it is a burden of political responsibility, to share it with Europeans, to draw them into something that allows them to become aware on the part of Europeans of a sort of shared destiny in an area where there are risks.

Then, it is effectively to be more effective with Malians.

To read also: Mali: visit of the chief of staff of the French armies

A year ago, during the Pau summit, France decided to send a reinforcement of 600

additional men to Barkhane.

What conclusions do you draw from this year of activity

I think that the full balance sheet will be drawn and the President of the Republic will draw it precisely on the anniversary date of the Pau summit.

What I am observing is that the effort we made was 600 people, but on the ground in operational capacity, it is more than 600 people and it must be measured like that.

We went from 4,500 to 5,100, but in reality, we have a base of staff which is engaged in support missions, basic protection, health support, logistics which, in any case, is incompressible because that we are deployed on several rights-of-way.

This base actually decreases in proportion in the strength in general when we have at least these numbers.

So the 600 additional troops that we hired were directly with the operational staff, engaged in the field for combat operations, for support operations for our Malian and Nigerian partners or the G5 joint force or the Burkinabè. .

So this has been an absolutely remarkable efficiency increase factor.

And today, what I observe is that the enemy has been disorganized in the Liptako, he no longer has the free disposal of this immense space, he is no longer capable of controlling populations as he did;

their logistics were disorganized, their command was weakened and they inflicted significant losses;

and at the same time, we authorized and allowed the return of the Malian unit and the Nigerien unit which were to reconquer a certain number of places which they had abandoned because there had been massacres of complete garrisons .

So, for me, on a strictly military level, this is a very positive result, even if everything is obviously fragile.

But today it is a very positive result.

Barkhane is a little over

5,000 men today.

Could its format change

?

Are the results sufficient to reduce the workforce or is it too early

?

First, Barkhane's format is constantly evolving.

And beyond the format, there are for example the deployments of Barkhane.

Are we on more bases or less in Mali?

Are we making an effort in another country?

Because I remind you that Barkhane is not deployed only in Mali.

So it's not just a question of staffing.

And I will not answer your question because it is a question which emerges from a political choice which will be informed by the vision that I will bring to the President of the Republic and to the Minister in operational matters.

Anyway, Barkhane needs to evolve.

There must be movement, we must train our partners in a dynamic that will make them evolve towards more autonomy for the partner forces and towards more involvement for the European forces.

The joint engagement in combat that you have just mentioned is what happened a few weeks ago with Operation Bourrasque, which was a success in Liptako.

Is this a way of upgrading partner armies

?

It is first and foremost a way of giving them confidence and it is important, because we must give success to partner armies.

Then, it's a way of bringing them upmarket on an operational level, obviously.

And so it contributes to empowerment.

Now, that is not enough, because the reality of this joint operational commitment is that it has no effect on what is the organic basis of the armies, their day-to-day functioning: the recruiting, daily training.

And that is not Barkhane who can do it today.

It is rather the EUTM [European training mission of the Malian army] and it is a work on which we must lean and that we accentuate because the capacity for autonomy, in combat of these armies - it will be based as much on their organic growth as on what they will have learned and on what they will have acquired in combat experience alongside us.

A few days ago, General Namata, commander of the joint force, indicated on the RFI antenna that the emir of JNIM or RVIM [

Jamaat Nosrat al-Islam wal-Mouslimin - Groupe de support à l'islam et to Muslims], Iyad Ag Ghali, was an enemy that had to be fought.

However, in Bamako, there are dissonant voices.

Do you think it is possible today to negotiate with some of the armed terrorist groups, or is this a red line

?

First of all, it is not a choice of the military.

It is a choice of politicians, starting with Malian politicians.

Then, there is indeed a position of principle of France which considers that we are not negotiating with terrorists.

This does not mean, however, that we do not negotiate with an enemy.

If you want to get along one day, get along with someone you've fought, you have to be able to choose the right partner with whom to get along, the one who is representative, who is legitimate.

And so that will one day raise the question of a political agreement that will be made with people who at one time or another have been enemies of the Barkhane force, have been enemies of the Malian armed force.

Then, I will not comment on the degree of moral acceptability or the risk that we would take in going to negotiate with terrorists who we know are extremely ideologized and that their objective is to create a hard Islamic state in the world. Mali, which, there, is a political assessment which is not my responsibility, but which obviously involves a powerful danger both for Mali and then by risk of contagion on the whole of Africa of the West and Sahel.

You have often repeated it: there will be no military victory in Mali without the return of the rule of law.

Are you seeing any better on the pitch

?

What I am observing on the ground is the beginning of a return to certain places of civil authorities: governors, mayors, police authorities.

Objectively, today, there is a better.

There is a better in this return, perhaps not of the rule of law, but of the state, the re-establishment of a form of public governance in some places.

It is still fragile, but it is made possible by the fact that security is returning despite everything in areas which, once again, are a little more under the control of the Malian armed forces, which are secured by Operation Barkhane.

And that, for me, is a positive movement.

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