On November 23, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, according to the speaker of the Russian Foreign Ministry Maria Zakharova, was supposed to arrive in Moscow to meet with his Russian counterpart to discuss the most operational issues of Iranian-Russian cooperation.

The most important (and difficult) issue of this cooperation today is the situation in Karabakh and the new world in the South Caucasus.

The 45-day war between Armenia and Azerbaijan ended on November 10 with the mediation of Russia.

Two presidents - Vladimir Putin and Ilham Aliyev, as well as one prime minister - Nikol Pashinyan - signed a peace agreement detailing the new geopolitical realities in which the South Caucasus will exist.

Russia introduces a peacekeeping contingent, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees is involved in the case, control over transport communications is carried out by the Border Guard Service of the FSB of Russia.

An alien missile war in the southern underbelly demanded immediate intervention, and Russia intervened - harshly, defending its Russian interests.

Ankara was actively included in the Karabakh conflict, which provides support to Azerbaijan, therefore, on November 12, Russia and Turkey signed a memorandum on the creation of a monitoring center for Karabakh.

Soon the Turkish parliament voted to send the Turkish army to Karabakh (so far, with the active participation of Russia, the topic is slowing down, but its development may turn out to be unpredictable).

So, we see that the President of Russia took the initiative to take the laurel wreath of the peacemaker in the conflict.

Turkey was actively involved in the case.

Azerbaijan and Ilham Aliyev are the winners, after the defeat Nikol Pashinyan signed a world (surrender) on conditions humiliating for Armenia.

But there is one country that was not included in the deal at all.

Moreover, this country is the only one that has a common border with all three formal parties to the conflict - with Armenia, Azerbaijan and the unrecognized republic of Nagorno-Karabakh.

A country that, from the first weeks of the military conflict, proposed a peaceful solution and conducted negotiations with Baku, and with Yerevan, and with Moscow.

It will not be an exaggeration to say that, besides Armenia, there is one more losing side in the Karabakh conflict.

We are talking about Iran.

First, some introductory data.

Armenia and Azerbaijan are former territories of the Persian Empire, as well as post-Soviet republics.

I wrote more about this in the column "Who will Iran stand up for in the Karabakh conflict."

There are more ethnic Azerbaijanis (Azeris) in Iran than in Azerbaijan itself.

The provinces of West, East Azerbaijan, Ardabil, Zanjan, Qazvin, Merkezi, Gilan, Hamadan and others are from 15 to 30% of the Iranian population, from 15 to 30 million people!

The second largest nation in the country.

For a month and a half, the population of the border regions watched the battles in Karabakh from the hills near their houses with ordinary binoculars and hooted in unison, supporting the Azeri brothers in the struggle for their land.

The Islamic clergy of Iran publicly supported Azerbaijan in this conflict, and the position of the Iranian Foreign Ministry was publicly built up for it.

The supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is an ethnic Azeri.

There is also a lot of Azeri in the leadership of the IRGC, take at least the commander of the Air Force and Space Forces of Iran, General of the IRGC, Amir Hajizade (whose area of ​​responsibility includes the missile forces, the country's air defense and even the downed Ukrainian Boeing in early January 2020).

Khamenei also entrusted the leadership of his financial empire (the Fund for the Assistance to the Oppressed, Bonyad Mostazafan) to an ethnic Azeri - Parviz Fattah, against whom US Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin imposed sanctions last week.

Khamenei built a reliance on ethnic Azerbaijanis around him from the moment of his election as a rahbar (spiritual leader).

It is the Azerbaijani question that should be very sensitive for the supreme leader (the vast territory of the country and a third of its population were extremely inspired by the victory of Azerbaijan, which strengthens the centrifugal sentiments of all northern Iranian territories).

Iran has a very pragmatic, forward-looking policy on its western, eastern and southern borders, even successfully using offensive tactics.

Why is the defensive strategy in the north of the country so vulnerable?

Despite the fact that in the last week of October Iran held demonstrative military exercises of an "offensive nature" on the territories bordering with Armenia and Azerbaijan, deployed mobile task forces in these areas with heavy military equipment, air defense systems, drones, etc., to an instant diplomatic Tehran was not ready for the agreement concluded by Moscow, Baku and Yerevan.

The moment was missed.

Perhaps the point is behind-the-scenes agreements, and thus Tehran prudently supported the future winner in the conflict, forcing the parties to the conflict with military exercises on the border and militant rhetoric of the generals, and, in order not to spoil relations with both sides, ceded to Russia the role of an active and tough negotiator.

This is a possible option.

But only partially.

Because the result of the Karabakh peace without Iran was:

1) the transport corridor Nakhichevan - Azerbaijan, the width of which, according to Iranian sources, is about 5 km, could block the long-running transit route of Iran to Armenia and Turkey;

2) the new transport agreement Nakhchevan - Azerbaijan, published in the media, was so short that it did not contain information about what it would be, where, when and by whom it would be established.

"The ceasefire agreement in Nagorno-Karabakh refers to the creation of an automobile corridor, or rather a transit route, within Armenia from Nakhichevan to mainland Azerbaijan, the security of which will be guaranteed by Russia, and the exact route is still unknown," said the deputy head of the Iranian MFA Aragchi;

3) part of the Azerbaijani-Iranian state border has been under the occupation of Armenia since 1994, and now that the borders are again under Baku's control, a completely new security dynamic has emerged between Iran and Azerbaijan;

4) 2,000 Russian peacekeepers with military equipment just 100 km from the Iranian border will make many in Tehran nervous, despite the fact that there are excellent diplomatic relations between Iran and Russia (here the author of the column sends a fiery salam to Tehran);

5) the Turkish parliament voted to send Turkish military to Azerbaijan and Karabakh.

The presence of the Turkish army near the northern borders is a very ambiguous situation for Iran;

  • © Wikipedia

6) Iran has lost its geopolitical advantage in the South Caucasus, having lost its unique access to the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic (see map) - an isolated Azerbaijani enclave located between Armenia, Iran and Turkey, the homeland of Heydar Aliyev, by the way.

All the years of the "Karabakh truce", since 1994, Iran has provided Azerbaijan with its airspace for access to autonomy, supplied natural gas to Nakhichevan (according to the new agreement, Turkey claims this instead of Iran).

Even valves on gas pipes in Nakhichevan are in Iranian script.

Through Nakhichevan, Iran had an interesting transit section Iran - Nakhichevan - Turkey, and from December 1, 2019, the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic even canceled the visa regime for Iranian citizens (for visits of up to 15 days), although in all other regions of Azerbaijan, Iranian citizens required a visa.

For the drivers of Iranian trucks, this is the optimal time.

From Nakhichevan airport, in addition to Baku, planes flew to Ganja, Moscow and Istanbul, and, as some eyewitnesses write, there was no screening at the terminal entrance.

On this territory "strangers" did not go;

7) under a new peace treaty, Armenia opens a corridor through its territory to Azerbaijan.

And Iran remains out of work.

A separate issue is the energy corridors of the South Caucasus, the launch of the TANAP - TAP system, the security of the New Silk Road corridors and much more.

Which gives reason to predict the pulling of the Iranian army to the northern borders, the intensification of the escalation of the conflict, translating it into guerrilla and hybrid wars, the possible target of which will be pipelines or energy infrastructure facilities.

PS While this column was being written, it became known that Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif canceled his visit to Russia, scheduled for 23 November.

And on November 22 in the evening, a Russian peacekeeper was injured in a mine explosion in Nagorno-Karabakh, along with four employees of the Emergencies Ministry of Nagorno-Karabakh and one officer of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces.

The author's point of view may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.