"She's not our partner anymore."
This is precisely the statement made by French President Emmanuel Macron regarding Turkey.
The French president categorically dislikes the aggressive behavior of Ankara - seemingly as a NATO ally - directed against Europe.
So far, there are two main complaints against Turkey.
First, its actions in Libya, where Ankara is actively involved in the civil war on the side of the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA), headed by Faiz Saraj.
The goal of the Turkish intervention is to take control of all of Libya and include it in its sphere of influence.
This not only contradicts the interests of France (which itself claims this territory), but also threatens the security of Europe.
Indeed, in this case, Erdogan will gain control over Libyan hydrocarbon deposits, which in the Old World are considered as an alternative to Russian gas, as well as over the flow of migrants from African countries to Europe, which goes through Libya.
And it can open these gates so wide that Europe will get a second migration crisis.
Secondly, the French strongly dislike Turkey's actions in Greek territorial waters.
Erdogan not only claims these waters (in particular, around the Greek island of Kastelorizon, as well as in the Aegean Sea), but also backs up his claims with the actions of the Turkish Navy, guarding Turkish research vessels conducting geological exploration in these waters.
In fact, we are talking about an attempt on the territorial integrity of a country that is a member of NATO and the EU.
Paris and Athens understand that nothing can be done through NATO: Turkey is also a member of the North Atlantic Alliance and the Americans, who do not want a public conflict within NATO, will put aside the options for collective punishment of Ankara until the last moment, demanding that the Greeks and Turks agree peacefully ...
But Turkey is not a member of the EU, and is viewed by many as a threat.
Therefore, Macron (as the self-proclaimed leader of the EU) invites the member states of the European Union to take a collective tough position, “to be clear and firm about the unacceptable behavior of the Erdogan government” - in general, to educate Ankara.
Not as a partner, but as an adversary.
The chances that Turkey in the process of this upbringing (or wishing to avoid it) will again become a partner in the eyes of Europeans are small.
For Ankara, both the Libyan affair and the Greek adventure are not only economic or foreign policy, but also domestic political projects.
Part of a larger plan to restore the Ottoman Empire (at least in terms of sphere of influence and level of power), which is supported by the Turkish electorate and for which this electorate is ready to continue to vote for Recep Erdogan.
Therefore, the Turkish authorities refuse to admit any guilt and call Macron's words "arrogant", made in a "neo-colonial style."
This means that the conflict along the Europe - Turkey (or at least France - Turkey) line will intensify, as well as acquire new entities - sanctions, demonstrative steps by the Turkish and French authorities, etc. In fact, Macron's statement can be considered a declaration of Turkey cold war.
Moscow is watching with interest what is happening.
They are watching - and thinking about how the aggravation of Turkish-French and Turkish-European relations will affect Russian interests in Europe and the Middle East.
Where these exacerbations pose threats, and where they create interesting opportunities.
Of the threats, of course, is the fate of the Turkish Stream.
Russia implemented this bypass flow in order not to depend on an unreliable transit country in the person of Ukraine, which constantly tried to blackmail Moscow and could simply cut off the export of Russian gas to Europe.
The aggravation of Turkish-European relations (multiplied by Erdogan's personal ambitions), as well as the absence of a serious system of checks and balances in Turkish politics, which could deter the Turkish sultan from rash steps, turn Turkey into an equally unreliable transit country.
Who will deliver ultimatums not to Russia, but to the European Union.
Yes, you can blame the EU for this situation as much as you like (which banned Bulgaria from participating in the South Stream project and whipped itself, refusing to receive Russian gas directly), but now the accusations will not help the case.
A sharp aggravation of Turkish-European relations will mean that the money for the Turkish Stream (at least for those branches that will go to Europe) was wasted.
However, with all this, there are much more advantages from a possible Turkish-European Cold War.
And they may well compensate for the Russian losses due to Nord Stream 2.
Thus, the deprivation of Turkey's partner status may lead to official statements from Europe that Ankara has not been expected and is not expected in the EU.
After almost half a century of Turkish aspirations and meeting various European requirements.
Perhaps this behavior of Brussels will become a signal for a number of politicians in the post-Soviet space, who are also promised to be included in the European Union, demanding that they turn their countries into anti-Russian footholds.
Perhaps these countries will understand that it is not worth sacrificing a well-fed and safe present for a wonderful future that will never come.
In addition, the consequence of the conflict is even greater isolation of Turkey.
And against the background of Ankara's conflicts with Israel (where Erdogan actively supports the "Palestinian cause"), the situation in Syria, competition with Saudi Arabia, as well as tensions with Iran on the entire periphery of Turkey, there will be only one great power, with which Recep Erdogan will retain at least work relationship.
Russia.
This means that the Turkish president-sultan will be forced to treat Russian interests in Syria and the Caucasus with great reverence, and will also think three times before interfering in Russia's internal affairs (in the Crimea, the Volga region and the Caucasus).
Another plus can be the consolidation of the European Union against the "Turkish threat" (if, of course, Paris will manage to consolidate the EU).
And the point here is not that the entire Old World will stand up against Ankara, but that such consolidation will lead to an increase in the subjectivity of the European Union.
It will probably become the beginning of the transformation of the amorphous EU (or at least its western part) into a powerful foreign policy player with its own interests and knowing how to defend them.
Including with regard to Russia, where the constructive interests of the European Union are at odds with the destructive position of the United States.
Finally, if Europe really quarrels with Erdogan and starts a cold war, then it will need Russia's help to successfully resist a much less powerful, but much more consolidated Turkey.
Yes, now Macron says that Moscow and Ankara are almost hand in hand in the Mediterranean - but everyone understands perfectly well that this is not so.
That Russia and Turkey have a number of problems and contradictions, that Moscow is interested in the Turks blocking the construction of a gas pipeline from the Eastern Mediterranean by the Turks (which is hindered by the territorial dispute between Ankara and Athens), but at the same time they do not want to quarrel with Greece.
This means that Brussels has the opportunity to enlist, if not support, then at least the benevolent neutrality of Russia - if the EU, of course, is ready to pay for it.
The end of support for the radicals in Kiev, the lifting of all sanctions, the integration of Russia into the European security systems and much more.
The author's point of view may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.