Idlib refugees: the weakest link or the solution?

Idlib and intentional excessive violence
Turkish campaigners and measures

With the Syrian revolution approaching its tenth year, the consequences of internal displacement and the refugee crisis remain one of the most prominent effects of the war that the Syrian regime and its allies waged on the Syrians, until this crisis became the most prominent title in the past decade due to the political and economic repercussions that followed.

This is in addition to various countries of the world following great attempts to prevent refugee waves from reaching them, whether by erecting border walls and fences or through legislation that prevents refugees from receiving and easing the pace of their access to them; in addition to the escalation of the extreme right in the European Union, which takes a firm stance on The waves of asylum, and he does not see any objection to the need to confront it with violence - if necessary - with the aim of preserving the cultural fabric of the continent.

With the number of refugees in the world reaching 25 million people displaced from his country, and the presence of about 41 million others who are displaced within their home countries, this means that the refugee problem has become a growing global crisis, which reflects an international failure to solve the conflicts in a number of countries, which are forced by citizens To flee to many countries of the world in search of safety and stability.

Idlib and intentional excessive violence
The head of the Syrian regime disclosed several times the most important benefit gained by his authority from his war against the Syrian people, as Syria gained a "homogeneous and healthy society", as he put it. This tells us that displacement is not an effect of the war, but rather was a target for it, so that Assad could purify Syria’s bases of the possibilities of his opposition and the coup against his authority.

Since the first day of the revolution, the security services and the military have followed practical steps to consolidate the process of sectarian cleansing in some cities, and to confirm the character of mass displacement in other cities; The alleged, as the violent bombing campaigns during 2013/2014 on Aleppo and its countryside were a decisive factor in the departure of about one million people from the city towards Turkey.

The displacement operations continued to escalate until the number of Syrians refugees in neighboring and western countries reached nearly 12 million people, as a statistic of the UNHCR - in late 2018 - showed that the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan and Egypt reached 5,637,050 registered Syrian refugees At the Commission.

The share of Turkey was 3,594,232 refugees, 63.8% of the total registered, in Lebanon 952,562 refugees by 16.9%, in Jordan 673,414 refugees by 11.9%, in Iraq 251,793 refugees by 4.5%, in Egypt 131,504 by 2.3%, and in North African countries about 33 Thousand refugees, 0.6%.

These recorded numbers constitute a great pressure card in the hands of the regime and its allies on the countries of Europe in general and on Turkey in particular, and that - of course - because they realize the sensitivity of the refugee file among decision makers in democratic countries in which these issues are intertwined with many internal parties, in addition to its economic impact on the countries Neighboring Arabia, such as Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon.

In Idlib, the Syrian regime forces and their ally Russia have pursued the utmost levels of violence in targeting the backlines and human settlements since the start of their last campaign in June 2019, with the aim of forming an additional factor pressing the northern Syria regions such as the city of Idlib with a high population density, where the number of The population has three million people, despite its small area.

This adds to the displacement of nearly a million and a half million people - according to Turkish officials' statements - to the proximity of the Turkish border to the north of the province, and their dispersal in more than two hundred random camps along the border.

Turkey has previously been able to absorb large numbers of refugees, especially since the majority of Syrian refugees offer an addition to the Turkish economy, and most of them depend on their efforts to secure their residence and engage in the labor market, but the association of the Syrian refugee file in Turkey with high sensitivity - for objective reasons - has further complicated Calculations with decision makers, before taking the step of opening doors for refugees to enter.

The most prominent effects resulting from the asylum file are internal popular interactions, in addition to the political opposition exploiting the refugee card to contradict the Turkish government and reduce its share of the votes in the elections, which produced a significant difference in the municipal elections in 2019, which required the government to issue a tough decision package in the file The deportation of the violating Syrian refugees from Istanbul and other provinces, which immediately reflected on the reality of the daily life of the Syrians, and prompted them to think again about asylum in Europe.

Turkish campaigners and measures
In the same context, the authority in Turkey views the serious threats by the Syrian regime - and Russia behind it - with the continuation of the military campaign, which will drive millions of other people to seek refuge in the north and break through the borders - when necessary - in an effort to save themselves from the oppression and revenge of the Assad regime. Other cities, such as Homs, Daraa, and Eastern Ghouta, have paid high prices of arrest, torture, and forced absenteeism upon their return to regime control, albeit under a Russian guarantee.

The situation in Idlib is getting more complicated, as it contains more than 300 thousand forced displacements from the cities of Zabadani, Ghouta, Aleppo, Daraa, and Homs, and the majority of the rest in Idlib have their family ties to revolutionary and military activities against the Assad regime.

Military developments - which have caused the displacement of hundreds of thousands and which affect Turkish national security - called for a determined action by the Turkish government, which introduced military equipment that included hundreds of tanks, artillery, and rocket launchers, in addition to large numbers of Turkish army soldiers, with the aim of creating an advanced defense line inside Syrian territory . With the killing of 59 Turkish soldiers, the matter has become more complex and severe for the Turkish authorities, as it has entered them into intense confrontations with the internal opposition, which refused to enter the army into Syria.

Turkey has tried to find a three-pronged approach to support its strategy to stop the Assad campaign, and to prevent the massive influx of refugees into its territory; firstly through the "Spring Shield" military campaign launched by intense air strikes by Turkish air strikes, and fiery support for the opposition forces that retook important areas North and south of the M4 road; secondly through diplomatic talks that resulted in the "Moscow agreement" between the Russian and Turkish presidents; and thirdly by pressuring the European Union and NATO countries to share with Turkey the burden of responsibility and confront the Assad regime.

It cannot be said that the three steps have produced a satisfactory solution for Turkey in order to preserve its national security; Europe and NATO did not provide military support to Turkey in order to respond to Assad’s aggression, and therefore, despite Turkey’s announcement that it opened its doors and not exposed it to refugees heading to Europe - the closure of Greece’s land borders with Turkey has made the border strip more like separate cantons from random tents, as its residents await crossing into Europe.

Likewise, the Russian-Turkish agreement did not achieve a withdrawal of the regime forces to the borders of the Turkish observation points, which would not allow people a safe return to their villages and regions, and therefore the Turkish military forces and equipment continued to head to Idlib at higher rates than before, to reinforce the defense line deployed from the western areas of Aleppo To the south of Idlib, and the regime was prevented from applying to it, and to reassure the displaced people of the presence of a large military force ready to respond to the regime's violations.

In conclusion, it can be said that the refugee issue - despite being the weakest link in the current conflict - has become among the active files in Turkish national security, due to its direct repercussions on the chances of the Justice and Development Party winning the local and presidential elections, in addition to the fact that Turkey is not ready to receive about three million refugees This is new, as is the case in Europe, which requires Turkey to close its doors and bear the brunt of the military campaign alone.

However, Turkey is not willing to accept this option, and it seeks to put pressure on Europe with the same paper; however, it knows that it does not guarantee a strategic breach through it, and therefore seeks to strengthen its position by strengthening defense lines and weaving bilateral agreements with Russia, in the absence of a safe environment for the return of refugees. People displaced to their homes, the possibility of war escalation and the emergence of a new wave of asylum.