Towards understanding the dynamics of protest in Egypt

How can we read the popular protests that took place in Egypt during the second half of September? Are we facing a new intifada that could lead to a change in the current regime or is it only a temporary donation? The recent period has witnessed a popular movement against the backdrop of the economic and social issue and accusations of financial and economic corruption of the current authority.

This movement came after six lean years of fear and silence due to the regime's repressive policies of arrest, enforced disappearance, liquidation, murder, house raids, intimidation of children and women, fabrication of accusations, and death sentences.

We had mistakenly thought that the Egyptian people swallowed fear inside and silenced! After years of blood and bullets, there will not be a list of him. But we were surprised that a large segment of this people began to rise and rise, take to the streets and squares, and cheer what the regime could not imagine or absorb when he left.

A quick look at the dynamics of the protests that began on September 20 - and are continuing - tells us:
- Hey. First, we are facing protests that started mainly in the parties - in the political and geographical sense - and did not start from the center, as was the case with the January 25, 2011 revolution.

In the political sense, the current movement has not been sparked by political parties, currents, groups or networks, such as the April 6 Movement, the Kifaya Movement, the Khaled Said Network, and the National Assembly for Change that sparked the January Revolution eight years ago. .

But the spark came from outside expectations, and from within the system itself represented by the sudden emergence of the contractor and businessman Mohammed Ali, who suddenly lifted the cover of the state of corruption and financial, economic and political corruption at the summit of the pyramid of power in Egypt, which was confirmed and publicly acknowledged by Sisi And his supporters and supporters.

Ali's speech - both bold and simple - and his defiance of the regime has played an important role in triggering the anger and rejection that has accumulated in Egypt since Sisi came to power five years ago. Indeed, Ali's appearance, regardless of whether it was spontaneous or tidy, was only a small flame thrown at a barrel of gunpowder, which ignited and exploded and its fragments continue to reach many.

In a geographical sense, unlike the January revolution in which the capital - especially Tahrir Square - played a central role in its activities and dynamism, the September uprising emerged and still caught on urban peripheries and rural margins.

Over the past two weeks, Marsa Matrouh rose in the far northwest of Egypt, Luxor, Qena and Sohag in the far south, Suez in the far east, Mansoura and Damietta in the heart of the Egyptian Delta, etc. While the regime and its security forces focused on closing the squares and squares, for fear of being occupied by the protesters and the end; the parties caught fire and recorded their presence strongly, which requires careful reading to understand its implications and role in the dynamics and future of the current movement.

Second, the recent protests were not led by the middle class or the upper class as was the case in the January Revolution, but the lower class represented its main nerve, a class that was crushed by the economic and social policies of the current regime. They emerged after the regime's narrative fell from their eyes, especially on the issue of "poverty and destitution."

Many of those who have gone out have no minimum standard of living. They know only the ugly face of the state, represented by the heavy security stick, when they rise up in protest against their living conditions. They suffer economically, socially and service. Those who protested in Cairo came out of their areas and dialogue and marginal alleyways in Al-Warraq, Helwan and Mataria. They are densely populated, poorly developed, economically and socially marginalized.

They are closer to what Asif Bayat called social movements, which are unorganized, politically, ideologically and intellectually unorganized groups that come out abruptly to express their indignation and rejection of the existing economic, social and political conditions, declare their rebellion and resist them, and exit the street becomes the only way for them. They cannot deal with them in the same way as political elites, through mutilation, demonization, treason, and arrest.

These blocs and movements are difficult to trace and punish because of the lack of political records or organizational links to them; they live on the sidelines, and by continuing to protest and reject the current regime, will represent a severe headache for him and his forces, and will expand as they gain confidence and boldness over time.

Third, the tactics and tools of the protest are no longer as difficult or complicated as the regime and its organs think, but on the contrary. Mohamed Ali managed to shake the throne of the regime through a phone and a camera !! Like him, many did - and still do - use the same tools in protest to break the barrier of fear, and share their feelings with others angry and rejecting the policies of the current regime and those demanding his departure.

In the face of security repression and the regime's media control over newspapers, channels and magazines, ordinary people have become news makers and carriers via their mobile phone camera, which will reach all over the world in a few minutes.

- Fourth, if the motives of the current intifada are linked to the difficult economic and social conditions experienced by the majority of Egyptians, it is deep in the political uprising (if we assume that there is already a separation between the political and economic!).

It targets the regime's head and demands its departure, and does not demand reforms or changes in its policies and procedures. This represents the pinnacle of revolutionary and protest action aimed at changing the whole system and not patching it here and there.

The current movement cannot be reduced to mere rejection and anger at the corruption of the regime and its entourage because of the issue of deficiencies.

Finally, authoritarian regimes do not fall by knockdown, but gradually, through accumulated and sustained political action. This is how recent history teaches us: former President Hosni Mubarak did not fall on February 11, 2011, but fell about six years earlier, specifically with the first cry of the leftist activist Kamal Khalil (currently detained) in a demonstration organized by the movement "Kefaya" in front of Cairo University in January 2005, with its eternal slogan: "No extension, no inheritance."

Sudan's dictator, Omar al-Bashir, fell in April this year as a result of persistent political activity that has invested in popular anger that has been building up over the past six years, particularly since the September 2013 protests in Khartoum and Omdurman.

Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika not only resigned as a result of protests since late February, but the man fell out of the eyes of his compatriots several years earlier because of his insistence on holding power, despite his illness and the bankruptcy of his political project, and the high cost of his economic reforms. In many protests began since late 2016 after the imposition of new duties and taxes, especially in the municipalities of Bejaia, Bouira, Tizi Ouzou and others.

The foregoing means that the change of dictatorial regimes does not happen suddenly, but through continuous resistance until the right moment when the fall becomes inevitable.

The bottom line is that what the Egyptians did on September 20 will continue to be an important turning point in collective consciousness that may come to fruition after a while. It marks the beginning of a long road to change the current situation and realize the dream of freedom and democracy for which the revolution of 25 January was founded. Second 2011.