Secrets of the "Brussels gas triangle"

Despite the somewhat nervous grins of neutral observers, to say that these were “very important consultations” is to say nothing. In fact, we’ll be quite frank, along with the start of the next round of “gas” negotiations in the EU-Russia Federation-Ukraine format, perhaps the defining stage of the “great European gas confrontation” begins. And no matter what it ends in result, one thing is certain: the energy maps of the historical European subcontinent after that will most certainly never be the same.

And it will be quite difficult for all parties concerned to survive this time of a loss-free fracture. Moreover, which is especially characteristic, at this stage, at last, everyone suddenly began to realize that it would be difficult not only for the Russian Federation, as some European politicians have long been accustomed to it, but also for themselves.

However, for now, let's take it in order.

The Russian Minister of Energy Alexander Novak, leaving the meeting room to numerous journalists (an event of truly exceptional importance), called the trilateral consultations of the Russian Federation - EU - Ukraine, which ended in Brussels, very constructive. And after some time he added the most, perhaps, the most important: "They presented us with a regulatory framework that will be implemented from January 1, 2020." That is, if we understand correctly, we are talking about the implementation of European energy legislation, including the same energy package, which in the worst case scenario will simply allow the Russian Gazprom to calmly redeem up to half of the transit capacities of the Ukrainian gas transportation system at special auctions like “Severny” flow "buys power from OPAL.

In principle, you can exhale.

Nevertheless, in everything else, the negotiations (more precisely, excuse me, the “trilateral consultations”, as the Russian side insisted on this) ended as expected. That is about nothing.

But, seriously, they could not end with anything else, because they had one single intelligible goal: clarifying the position of the new Ukrainian authorities. For the work of the “Brussels gas triangle” itself was interrupted shortly before the Ukrainian presidential election precisely because at that time it was completely pointless to talk about anything with the former Ukrainian authorities. Therefore, the consideration of such a complex and acute, perhaps the most strategically important issue for the European energy sector, was postponed until the fall: it was necessary to wait until the end of this elected big top, see who would come to power, and then decide what these new ones were about people talk. And then, in general, everything is clear: both the Russian and the European positions have long been fundamentally clear.

They are very, very different, but both are designed to provide a compromise option. And most importantly, they coincide both purely strategically: for the Russian Federation and the EU, the Ukrainian pipe, albeit in a fairly circumcised form (hussars, keep quiet!), It would be very desirable to maintain. For the Ukrainian authorities and even various kinds of state entities in this unfortunate territory come and go, and the great work of Soviet and German engineers, and statesmen, who managed to build this technological and logistical miracle at that time under terrible American pressure, still to pass on to descendants in a more or less operational state.

At the same time, it’s understandable that the horizon of concessions is that Russia and the EU are quite limited. This, in fact, is an equation with a very small number of unknowns, which are the subject of specific negotiations.

More precisely, it wasn’t “there”, but “would be”.

Because the position of the Ukrainian authorities was and remains the main unknown in this gas European equation at the present time. And in light of this, the diagnosis issued by the highly experienced Russian energy negotiator Novak (try to talk and agree on something with this crowd from OPEC) of the negotiability of the Ukrainian delegation is a good sign. Or even a good advance. Although, of course, it is still not allowing you to especially relax and reassure. Just because the Ukrainian delegation is possibly negotiable, but it is not known how authoritative it is.

Now let's try to explain why.

In principle, the strategic goal of maintaining transit in one form or another through the Ukrainian GTS is initially shared by the entire “Brussels gas triangle”. The reasons, in general, each have their own. But everyone’s wishes here practically coincide.

In particular, the EU’s own production is falling, plus there is a rejection of coal and nuclear energy in the northwestern (German) industrial cluster. In such a situation, ruining the tried route, despite all the “northern” and / or “Turkish” flows, is somewhat, to put it mildly, irrational.

Exactly for the same reasons, the Ukrainian GTS is interesting along with Ukrainian transit and the Russian Federation. Although a little less than the EU (there are many questions on the resource base: Yamal is now considered as the main source not only for the EU, but also for the “Chinese” “Force of Siberia - 2”, as well as for Novatek’s LNG projects) . Nevertheless, it is interesting: at least on the principle of "why not."

To the extent that this transit, at least, excuse me, a scarecrow, at least a carcass is needed for Ukraine - no one needs to explain to anyone at all: it’s enough to say that it includes the so-called. reverse, at least Slovak, at least some more. And if the gas does not physically exist in the pipe, at least call it Armenian, even call it American - it will not appear there anyway. Consequently, whatever reserves you upload to the UGSF, but sooner or later it is still a humanitarian disaster, because for at least the next few years no gas, except Russian, can be delivered technically to the territory of Ukraine in commercial quantities. Sorry, do not argue with the geography textbook - at least this can cause quite reasonable suspicions among others. Therefore, transit in any form to Ukraine is vital.

And under such conditions, when all three parties, although they have different political and economic positions, have a common or at least a similar goal (and a common understanding that everyone would like to preserve the Ukrainian gas transportation system at least for the future), the parties are in a similar situation quite capable of finding a compromise.

Just because they have a common platform for common arrangements, that’s all.

And all would be well if in the process of negotiations there was no absolutely objective factor of the “fourth side”. Which, of course, is not formally in the tripartite commission. But so, sorry, this side is actually called the United States.

And, we will be honest with ourselves, it is this side that at least owns a “controlling stake” in the Ukrainian delegation. But how exactly the United States, despite all the declarations of friendship with young Ukrainian democracy, is interested in maintaining the Ukrainian pipe is a very big question. Especially when you consider how many LNG plants are currently being built on the east coast of this really, truly great, though not very friendly country.

And just in connection with this, alas, it is mathematically clear that with continuing political trends in the short-term historical perspective, the Ukrainian pipe is certainly doomed. And not even because of malice, but simply because it is difficult to be an independent gray bunny among seasoned wolves. Too serious a battle is now unfolding for the energy markets of Europe, and the weak players here are certainly just consumables. The question is different: how much (again, under current political trends) will this construction of time be given the opportunity to exist. And it is precisely this answer that the current “Brussels gas triangle” should give us, and quite soon, even before the New Year, when the previous transit contract ends. As for forecasts, the author of these lines, admittedly, is a skeptic. However, the current round of trilateral consultations seems to give some hope.

The author’s point of view may not coincide with the position of the publisher.