Main demographic challenges

If the number of births does not stop falling, the Spaniards would end up becoming extinct , and until we get there, those who remain would live in a very aged, decadent society, with a lot of loneliness and more past than future. If foreign immigration is not managed for the benefit, at the same time, of foreigners and natives, we will suffer costly, painful and growing social fractures. In addition, and in third place of importance for the whole of Spain, although now it is the most pressing of the three for those directly affected, we face the problem of Spain that "empties" by combining a particularly low birth rate - the largest cause of depopulation at the provincial level - and emigration to places with more economic opportunities, better basic services and / or more social life.

The first of these challenges, reversing the (very) insufficient number of children per woman, is, in the long run, an existential challenge, of those of being or not being: with fewer children each year, a society tends to lose population and age more and more for lack of young sap. In term, it would disappear. Spain is on that path, that of demographic suicide , with more deaths than births, and a population that tends to be the most aging in the world, by adding a very high life expectancy to a very low fertility.

In 1976, in a Spain with 23% less population than now , almost 677,000 children were born. Because of the subsequent collapse of our fertility, which became the lowest in the world and remains the lowest, in 2018 only 367,000 babies were born here (46% less than in 1976). Of these, in the absence of definitive data, we estimate that only 270,000 to 275,000 were children of a woman born in Spain (60% less than 42 years ago, with a fall of over 70% in the Basque Country and Asturias). In 1976, 378,000 cribs were needed in Spain more than funeral coffins / urns. In 2018, in contrast, deaths exceeded births by more than 56,000. And among native Spaniards, without counting babies of immigrants or deaths of foreigners of origin, in the absence of definitive data, we estimate that there were about 130,000 more deaths than births. In the provinces of Orense and Zamora, the deaths were more than triple that of births , and in others such as Lugo, León, Asturias, Soria, Palencia or Ávila, more than double. As for social aging, if at the beginning of 1976, half of the Spaniards were 30 years old or less, now, the median age, which divides in two halves equal to the population, is 13 years older, which is 15 for native Spaniards, because immigrants are younger on average and have more children. The autonomous community that has aged the most since 1976 is the Basque . It has gone from a median age of 29 years -one less than in the rest of Spain- to almost 47 now -three more than nationally-, which are 48 not counting foreign immigrants and their children, and 49 among Biscay without foreign roots.

As worrisome as the serious consequences of our demographic deterioration (among others, economic impoverishment, affective impoverishment and more loneliness , democracy denatured by the hegemony of the retired vote, tendency to the international irrelevance of Spain and Europe due to its diminishing demographic weight in the world; and more in the long run, the eventual risk of extinction) is that the increase in birth rate is not a primary commitment in the Spanish (and European) public agenda, of the political class and civil society. It is an extremely irresponsible omission.

Foreign immigration is a very complex issue, which arouses great controversy throughout the West , and of enormous socio-political impact. Poorly managed, it can be a source of major social problems and fractures. And well managed - what is not trivial to achieve in countries with a very generous welfare state, which acts as a powerful magnet for many more low-skilled immigrants than their labor market needs -, can be very valuable as a partial solution to structural labor deficit that generates low birth rates. But it can hardly be the whole solution. In the world there is a virtually unlimited supply of low-skilled people willing to emigrate to the West, but not of skilled workers. And we need both types. Nor can immigrants solve other serious social problems derived from low birth rates , such as emotional impoverishment and growing loneliness due to lack of close relatives (children, grandchildren, brothers, uncles, cousins, etc.). Goods and workers can be imported from abroad, but not relatives, beyond some adoptions of children (of which there are fewer and fewer, by the way).

Is immigration well managed in Spain and Europe? In such a polyhedral issue, it would be simplistic to answer in black or white, with a yes or no. Let's see some data. For the third consecutive year, in 2018, Europeans surveyed in the EU Eurobarometer -1,000 per member country identified immigration as the biggest problem in Europe (40% of respondents considered it that way). The second most cited problem was terrorism (20% of respondents), which is closely related to the previous one in today's Europe. Already in Spain, according to the latest EPA available, after five long years of economic growth, the unemployment rate of immigrants was still 20% (and over 24% among non-Europeans), there were 3 million foreigners working and 2 , 5 million unemployed Spaniards. Figures do not seem in line with the theoretical objective of "that immigration be accurate for the needs of the labor market that cannot be covered with Spaniards." It is true that some types of jobs are no longer wanted by the Spaniards / Europeans, but there are many others that both native and foreign Europeans perform (in hospitality, commerce, construction, transportation, cleaning, medical care, security, etc.). In any case, immigration has been managed until now worse or better, integrating it properly, and especially its descendants, is one of the main sociodemographic challenges in Spain . 14% of the current population of Spain was born abroad, and around another 4% are children of immigrants, born here. More than 25% of today's children, the next generation of Spaniards, have immigrant parents, and around 8% - and growing up - are children of Muslims.

We finish with some brush strokes on the so-called empty Spain . The first is that it shows us the future of all of Spain if the number of children per woman does not increase and / or there is much more foreign immigration (but it is chimerical to trust everything to it, since very old places, due to their low socioeconomic dynamism, attract little immigration or almost none ): many empty / abandoned houses, fewer and fewer people, and a high percentage of elderly and old people among its dwindling population. The second is that it is a softened version of the future, because Spain "does not empty" continues to have economic strength to generate and transfer the wealth that allows providing basic public services, infrastructure and pensions to sparsely populated areas. If cities are also unfolding and aging a lot - and it is already beginning to happen in not a few of them, like my native Aviles -, that will not be possible, for lack of wealth to transfer. The third is that low birth rates are the main cause of emptying and social aging in rural Spain at the provincial level. Emigration has also contributed, but less. Therefore, in Andalusia or Murcia, historically with a lot of emigration but a fecundity clearly superior to that of the provinces of empty Spain, this depopulation problem is not yet appreciated, although it will also come soon if their fertility does not increase.

Unfortunately, Spain has been in profile for decades before its very low fertility and its migration challenge . And without more births, the problem of the vast empty Spain will not be solved either. In a few issues such as birth and immigration management we play in a way so obvious and radical our future. Will we be able to live up to these challenges?

Alejandro Macarrón is an engineer and business consultant and director of the Demographic Renaissance Foundation.

According to the criteria of The Trust Project

• Spain
• Europe
• Asturias
• Palencia
• Basque Country
• Soria
• Zamora
• Ávila
• Murcia
• Lugo
• Lion
• Andalusia

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